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Price and Volatility Behaviour of Four Asian Stock Markets 
by 
Mei Wa Wong 
A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in 1999 
Abstract 
The past ten years have witnessed many changes in the Asian economies and stock 
markets, particularly in the Four Tigers, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan. They enjoyed economic growth well above the world average during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. There were sharp increases in their stock market 
capitalisations against the background of low growth and low interest rates in the US 
and European countries in the early 1990s. This coincided with the time when 
measures to liberalise these markets were implemented to allow or attract foreign 
direct investments in their stock markets. Then by mid 1997, both their economies 
and stock markets began to slump. This ten year time period thus provides a good 
opportunity to examine how such economic and institutional changes affected the 
price and volatility behaviour of the Four Tigers and their relationships with other 
markets. Overall, the findings of the thesis suggest that with the increase in foreign 
participation in the four individual markets, the influence of noise trading activities has 
been reduced through more and better informed trading. However, their relationships 
with three world major markets, the US, the UK and Japan, are not getting much 
stronger. There is no evidence to suggest that their prices are being increasingly led 
by the world markets, nor is their volatility becoming more sensitive to foreign news. 
Their price and volatility relationships with three regional markets, Thailand, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, were not particularly strong either, .until recently, when the Asian 
financial crisis has made them more responsive to shocks from one another. The 
message to the governments of the Four Tigers is clear. Foreign direct equity 
investments have not destabilised their stock markets. Instead, the mismanagement of 
their own and/or their trading partners' economies should be held more responsible. 
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Introduction 
The spectacular growth of Asia's four newly industrialised countries commonly 
known as Asia's Four Tigers, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan 
during the 1980s and early 1990s attracted much attention in the western world. It 
was often referred to as the 'Miracle growth of East Asia.' Such a rapid economic 
growth period coincided with the time when their stock markets were liberalised for 
the first time or modernised to attract foreign portfolio investment. Stock markets of 
the Four Tigers had all experienced a boom period after receiving substantial inflow of 
foreign portfolio capital. However by the mid 1990s, the sharp fall in export earnings 
plus the accumulation of short-term foreign debt and the pressure of devaluation in 
other Asian countries had put a halt to the growth. This was then followed by 
depreciation of their currencies, large foreign capital outflow and a sharp fall in most 
stock markets. Now, what was once renowned as the East Asian miracle has become 
the Asian crisis. How has this rise and fall in economic growth affected the Four 
Tigers' stock markets? Would their market behaviour have been different had the 
markets not been opened to foreign participation? Were movements in prices and 
volatility of these four markets affected by regional and foreign leading markets? If 
so, what were the driving forces? It is the aim of this thesis to investigate these issues 
with the theme centred on price and volatility of the stock markets in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. 
While the economic developments of the Four Tigers over the past decade have 
already been widely documented, examinations into their stock markets behaviour are 
1 
still rare. Most of the previous studies on these stock markets concentrated either on 
their market anomalies such as day-of-the-week effects or their lead-Jag relationships 
with other world markets. Enquiries into the nature of volatility in individual Asian 
stock markets and the ways in which their price volatility respond to foreign 
innovations following their liberalisation have not previously been undertaken. Such 
enquiries are important as they can help foreign investors and local government to 
assess the benefits of international portfolio diversification or the effects of opening 
up their markets to foreign investments respectively. If the four Asian stock markets 
and other major world leading markets are not integrated in terms of price eo-
movements and volatility spillovers, it is indicative that international investors can still 
benefit from risk diversification by investing globally. As for the local Asian 
governments, it is always feared that foreign participation would destabilise their 
stock markets by making them more vulnerable to a reversal flow of portfolio capital 
and sensitive to the movements of overseas markets. If this was found to be the case, 
the Asian governments might be very reluctant to open up their markets any further. 
However, what seems to have overlooked is the possibility that foreign participation 
may contribute positively to the Asian stock markets. With their expertise in share 
dealing and technology in transmitting information across international markets, 
foreign investors can help improve market efficiency, increase the rate of information 
flow and improve the quality and reliability of information. That is why foreign 
investments could also have positive impacts on the operation and behaviour of the 
local stock markets. Whether foreign participation in the Asian stock markets is 
desirable or not for both local governments and international investors is an 
interesting issue worthy of investigation. Hence the impacts of foreign investments on 
2 
the stock price behaviour and volatility of prices in the Four Tigers will be examined 
in this thesis. 
The reasons for choosing the stock markets of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan for the investigation are twofold. First, they had the fastest growing 
economies in the region between mid-1980s and mid-1990s, relying heavily on export 
trade. They also had the largest share of foreign portfolio inflow during this period 
compared to other emerging markets. Therefore, they are the most interesting and 
informative Asian markets in an examination of possible links between economic 
development, foreign investment and stock market movements. Second, they broadly 
represent two sets of markets with different degrees of market openness and 
government intervention. While Hong Kong and Singapore impose no or little 
restrictions on foreign direct investment in their stock markets, South Korea and 
Taiwan remained totally restrictive until 1991/92. Subsequently, the foreign 
investment ceiling was raised to 10% on local companies' stocks from the start and 
was gradually lifted to 18% and then 20% in 1996. A study of these four markets 
could thus give more insights into the possible effects that differing degrees of foreign 
participation might have on their market behaviour as well as their reaction to foreign 
market news. 
The issues examined in this thesis are different but inter-related, issues regarding the 
price and volatility behaviour of each of the four individual Asian markets as well as 
their interactions with the world and regional markets. These include (i) the changing 
nature of volatility in the four individual Asian markets; (ii) the price relationships 
3 
between the four Asian markets and the markets in the US, the UK and Japan; (iii) the 
response of volatility in the four Asian markets to innovations from the US, the UK 
and Japan; and (iv) the link between the Four Tigers and their regional markets during 
the recent Asian financial crisis. 
Chapter One gives some background information on the four Asian markets under 
examination by outlining both their economic and financial market developments. 
Chapter Two investigates the changing nature of volatility in individual markets 
following their liberalisation measures. In the past, interest in individual Asian 
markets concentrated on market anomalies such as day-of-the week and January 
effects, small firm effects and price/earnings ratio effects. Comparative analysis of the 
impact of market liberalisation on the changing nature of market volatility was non-
existent. Moreover, news asymmetries in the volatility spill-over has not been 
addressed for Asian markets. This chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature. Two 
main arguments have been put forward as possible explanations for the asymmetric 
response of volatility to news, namely the leverage effect (Christie 1982) and the noise 
traders effect. If asymmetries arise from the leverage effect, then changes in foreign 
investment activity would have little impact on the extent of any asymmetries. 
However, if the second explanation of asymmetric responses is correct, then 
increasing activity by well-informed foreign investors might be expected to reduce the 
impact of noise traders, reduce observed asymmetries and, thus, alter the nature of 
local stock market volatility. To examine this issue, asymmetric generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models are fitted to the 
unpredictable return series for each of the four markets over pre- and post-
4 
liberalisation periods. Since noise trading can manifest itself in over-reaction to 
negative news, a significant reduction in the impact of negative news post-
liberalisation would indicate a reduction in the impact of noise trading in the four 
markets following liberalisation. Results in this chapter show that there is a 
substantial reduction in news asymmetries following liberalisation. 
The fact that the nature of volatility in individual markets underwent changes with the 
presence or increase in foreign participation is indicative of a possible link between the 
four Asian markets and other foreign markets. Price movements of the four Asian 
markets would become more influenced by overseas markets as foreign investors 
respond to their price movements or news to adjust their portfolio positions in the 
local Asian markets. Whether such inter-relationships between local and foreign 
markets do exist, and if so, how close, is an empirical issue to be addressed in Chapter 
Three. In Chapter Three, the relationships of the four Asian markets with three 
leading world markets, the US, Japan and the UK are examined for their price 
movements. These three leading markets are chosen on the basis of their share in 
portfolio investment in the Four Tigers' stock markets. The proposition is that if 
cross-market investment is the key mechanism for strengthening inter-market 
relationships, then there should be strong evidence of price eo-movements between 
the leading markets and the Four Tigers. The Johansen technique is used to 
investigate this issue. A seven-market model is constructed over pre- and post-
liberalisation periods for the four Asian stock markets to enable comparison of results. 
Results show that a significant cointegrating vector exists during the post-
liberalisation period, but only with the UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan entering 
5 
significantly into the relationship. While this is suggestive that cross-market 
investment opportunities do have a role to play in strengthening world market inter-
dependence, there are other factors determining the way in which each individual 
market inter-relates to one another. These include (i) the actual size of foreign 
equity securities investment in the Four Tigers on the part of the three leading markets 
and the state of economies they are in; (ii) the level of government intervention in 
their stock markets on the part of the Four Tigers. The insignificance of the US, 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in entering the cointegrating relationship during the 
post-liberalisation period is attributed to one of these two factors. 
However, as cointegration essentially deals with the existence of a stable long-run 
equilibrium between markets, it says little about the short-term linkages and 
interactions between markets without a long run cointegrating relationship. In 
addition, the presence or absence of a long run price relationship with the world 
markets gives no information regarding the relative significance of local and world 
news in affecting volatility of the Asian markets. An examination into the impacts of 
foreign news on the volatility of local markets is therefore necessary. Thus in Chapter 
Four, the channels and the extent of market volatility spill-over to the Four Tigers are 
examined under a bi-variate asymmetric GARCH framework. The impacts of news 
from the three leading markets on each of the four Asian markets are investigated one 
at a time. Each model contains positive and negative news terms of a local market 
and that of a foreign leading market. Six models are examined over two sample 
periods for each local Asian market according to the time they introduced their 
liberalisation measures. There is evidence of volatility spill-over to South Korea and 
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Taiwan before they were opened to foreign direct participation. This, together with 
the absence of any intensification of foreign news impacts on Hong Kong and 
Singapore after they introduced measures to attract more foreign investment in their 
stock markets, suggests that cross-market stock investment is not the key mechanism 
for volatility transmission. The possibility that cross-market volatility transmission is 
induced by pure contagion effects is also ruled out. This is supported by the absence 
of a uniform asymmetric response of local markets' volatility to foreign negative 
news. Instead, the differing asymmetric effects of foreign news on local markets' 
volatility indicates that the presence of trading links could be the key channel of 
volatility transmission. Depending on the nature of the markets' economic ties, 
foreign news, such as changes in foreign exchange rates, could be good news to one 
local market but bad news to another. Through such differing impacts of foreign 
news on the local markets' economic fundamentals, volatility could thus be 
transmitted from the major markets to the four local markets with differing intensity. 
Yet in general, there is little evidence that the impact of foreign news on each of the 
four markets is on the increase following their liberalisation. 
A logical extension of the empirical work would have been an analysis of regional 
effects on the four Asian stock markets' behaviour. However, the emergence of the 
Asian financial crisis since July 1997 has brought tremendous effects not only on the 
Asian markets but on other world financial markets and economies too. The severity 
of the crisis thus warrants a detailed examination into the crisis. Hence in Chapter 
Five, the Four Tigers' relationships with other regional markets are examined over 
two periods, before and during the crisis, to see how their relationships have been 
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changed by the crisis. The intensity and persistence of shocks from one Asian market 
in affecting others are also investigated. The empirical analysis is based on variance 
decomposition and impulse response functions derived from the Vector 
Autoregression modelling method. The three most troubled markets during the crisis, 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, are examined together with the Four Tigers' stock 
markets. The main objective is to establish whether price movements in these seven 
Asian markets have been responding to shocks from the region before and during the 
crisis and if so, for how long and to what extent. Results show that three of the Four 
Tigers, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan, are not responsive to shocks from the 
three regional emerging markets before the crisis. Only Singapore is found to be 
substantially affected by shocks from Hong Kong and Malaysia. This is attributed to 
its strong financial and economic ties with them. Nevertheless, the effects of all 
regional markets on each individual Asian market are not persistent, often lasting for 
just one day. During the crisis, the seven regional markets have a stronger 
interaction. South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong are increasingly affected by shocks 
from other markets in the region and their shocks are now more influential on others 
too. Not only that, the effects of shocks from each one of the seven markets have 
become more persistent, lasting for up to five days. Meanwhile, markets' responses 
to the regional shocks are slow and appear to be uncertain, not knowing which 
direction should be taken. This indicates that the pure contagion effect (where the 
shocks have no implications on the local market's fundamentals) and/or fundamentals 
contagion effect (where economic fundamentals of the local market have been 
changed by the shocks) might be at work to help spread the crisis across the region. 
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To sum up, this thesis has contributed to the understanding of price and volatility 
behaviour of four Asian stock markets over the period of 1986-1998 on four counts. 
( 1) There is a changing nature of volatility in the stock markets of Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan following their market liberalisation in that there 
has been an increase in informed trading and a reduction in the impacts of noise 
trading. 
(2) The relationships of the Four Tigers with either the world's major markets or the 
region's emerging markets have not been substantially strengthened with an increase 
in foreign investment opportunities in their markets. The ways their stock markets are 
inter-related with other markets are more governed by the economic ties they have 
with the rest of the world. 
(3) Local market news and economic conditions remain the major driving forces 
behind the movements of the four Asian markets regardless of their institutional 
changes. 
( 4) Market contagion is at work during the Asian crisis as some markets are slow to 
respond to regional shocks and often with uncertainty. 
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Chapter One : Economic Background And Financial Market 
Developments Of The Four Tigers 
(I) Hong Kong 
(A) Economic background 
(A. I) Core economic sectors 
(A.l.J) Service sector 
Hong Kong is essentially a trading centre that relies heavily on export trade for 
economic growth. During the past few decades, it started out as a low-cost labour-
intensive manufacturing base. In the last ten years, however, a large share of Hong 
Kong's manufacturing capacity has been shifted over the border into China in order to 
take advantage of lower operating costs. Unlike other newly developed countries in 
the region, Hong Kong has not developed any high-technology industries to replace 
its declining labour-intensive industries. Instead, its service industries, such as 
finance, business, catering as well as those relating to trade, developed rapidly and 
became Hong Kong's core economic sector. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 reveal two 
contrasting pictures of these two sectors' contribution to GDP. While the 
manufacturing sector's contribution has declined by more than half over the past eight 
years, that of the service sector has been increasing steadily. Figure 1.3 shows that in 
1996, 46.6% of Hong Kong's GDP was contributed by the service sector compared 
to 7. 7% for the manufacturing sector. Thus the service sector is now even more 
dominant as Hong Kong's major economic sector. 
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Figure 1.1 Contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP in Hong Kong 
Contribution to GDP 
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Source: EIU Country Profile : Hong Kong (1995-98) 
Figure 1.2 Contribution of the service sector to GDP in Hong Kong 
Contribution to GDP 
Service sector 
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Source: EIU Country Profile: Hong Kong (1995-98) 
Figure 1.3 Gross domestic product by sector in Hong Kong (1996) 
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Figure 1. 4 Total value of domestic exports in Hong Kong 
I Total value of domestic exports I 
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Source: EIU Country Profile : Hong Kong (1995-98) 
Figure 1.5 Total value of re-exports in Hong Kong 
I Total value of re-exports I 
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Source: EIU Country Profile : Hong Kong (1995-98) 
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(A.l.2) Trade sector 
Export trade has always been a main source ofHong Kong's earnings. It consists of 
domestic exports and re-exports. The total value of re-exports in 1997 amounted to 
US$159 billion compared to US$27 billion for domestic exports. Figures 1.4 and 1. 5 
show that the value of domestic exports was gradually falling whilst that of re-exports 
was rising rapidly over the past decade. The fall of the former is likely to be caused 
by a contraction in manufactured outputs and the growth of re-exports could be the 
result of continuous upgrading and expanding of Hong Kong's container port. The 
sharp increase in indirect trade between China and third countries through Hong Kong 
is also likely to have played a part. Figure 1.6 shows that now, only textile, clothing 
and electronic products remain as Hong Kong's significant domestic merchandise 
exports. 
(A.l.3) Financial sector 
Hong Kong is among the most important financial centres in the world. This sector is 
the main pillar of Hong Kong's economic growth. Together with insurance, real 
estate and business services, financial services account for a quarter of Hong Kong's 
GDP from 1992 onwards as shown in Figure 1. 7, compared to 15% in 1984. 
Figure I. 7 Contribution o the mancial sector to GDP in Hong Kong 
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(A.2) Government's economic policy 
(A.2.1) Laissezfaire policy 
Since the Second World War, the government has followed a non-interventionist 
economic policy. The government is of the view that the allocation of resources in 
the economy will normally be achieved in the most efficient way if market forces are 
relied on and if government intervention in the private sector is kept to a minimum. 
Its low tax regime, good geographical location between East and West as well as 
excellent infrastructure have attracted lots of high value-added direct investment into 
the region. These include financial services , regional headquarters and companies 
doing business in China. 
(A.2.2) Monetary policy 
Since 1983 when the Hong Kong dollar was pegged to the US dollar at 
US$1 :HK$7.8, the government has lost control over monetary policy. Interest rate 
and monetary policy have to be made in line with the US policies. This has 
undermined the government's ability to tackle inflation problems. As a result, there 
has been a surge of money into the stock and property markets, where returns are 
traditionally higher than the interest rates paid on bank deposits. 
(A.2.3) Fiscal policy 
In order not to interfere with the economy, government spending is restricted to 
providing essential support services, such as housing, education and to a lesser extent, 
health care. Meanwhile, revenue is raised through a combination of direct and 
indirect taxes, land sales and utility charges. Stamp duty earnings from property and 
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stock market transactions have also become an increasingly important revenue source. 
Consequently there has been a budget surplus every year since 1985/86. 
(A.3) Economic performance 
The economy of Hong Kong is strongly cyclical, partly because it is so open to 
foreign trade, and partly because the government normally chooses not to iron out 
cyclical fluctuations. Hence, booms and recessions tended to be relatively violent 
until the 1990s. In general, however, the growth trend in the 1980s was upwards, 
with an average annual GDP growth of 7.7% in real terms. Into the 1990s, the 
growth dipped when China experienced a slowdown in 1989 to1990. The negative 
impact of Beijing' s Tien-an-men Square Massacre in 1989 on public confidence 
helped aggravate the situation. On average, Hong Kong's GDP was below its trend 
rate of about 5% per annum during the past seven years as shown in Figure 1. 8. 
Figure 1.8 Real rate ofGDP growth in Hong Kong 
jReal GDP growthj 
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Sources: EIU Country Profile: HK (1995-98) and Annual report ofHK(l990-1995) 
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(A.4) Other economic indicators 
(A.4.1) Foreign exchange rate system andforeign reserves 
Hong Kong abandoned its floating exchange rate system introduced in late 197 4 and 
adopted a linked exchange rate system in late 1983. Under this system, the HK$ was 
pegged at 7.8 to the US$ with a two percent fluctuation band. The consequences of 
this peg are that interest rate policy has to be surrendered and relative trading 
competitiveness is affected by movements in the value of US currency. Despite these 
constraints, the government still sees this peg as necessary to maintain economic 
stability in Hong Kong and has no intention to modifY this exchange rate system in the 
near future. As far as foreign reserves are concerned, Hong Kong has abundant 
foreign exchange reserves that are continuing to grow rapidly. By 1995 the territory's 
foreign exchange reserves were estimated as the seventh largest foreign exchange 
holdings in the world. 
(A.4.2) Current account balance 
Figure 1. 9 shows that for almost every year since 1988, Hong Kong's current account 
has always been in deficit and the deficit grew larger and larger in the mid-1990s. 
This could be due to the faster rate of growth in imports than in total exports. The 
strength of the US$ to which the Hong Kong dollar was pegged, as well as the decline 
of domestic manufacturing industries were responsible for widening the gap between 
imports and exports. 
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Figure 1. 9 Hong Kong's current account balance 
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(B) Stock market developments 
(B.J) Formation 
The first stock market in Hong Kong was established in 1964. Between 1969-71, 
three more stock exchanges were established. In order to promote Hong Kong as an 
international financial centre, a number of measures were introduced between 1970 
and 1980. These include the abolition of foreign exchange controls, capital gains tax, 
as well as withholding tax on interest payments on all deposits. Then in 1986, the 
four Stock Exchanges were unified into the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to enhance 
efficiency. The Stock Index Futures Market was also established in this year. 
(B.2) Market structure 
All listed companies in Hong Kong are traded under common execution, settlement 
and clearance procedures. There is no secondary or over-the-counter market in Hong 
Kong. In order to list on the HKSE, a company must first be a public company and 
commit to remaining public. They must have an initial capitalisation of at least 
HK$150 million (about US$19.4 million) although the listing committee has 
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discretionary power to require higher or accept lower capitalisation. At least 25% of 
shares outstanding or shares valued at a minimum ofHK$24.5 million (about US$3.2 
million), whichever is greater, must be made available to the public. Smaller 
companies, however, are still unable to list equities at present. 
A new development in the market began to emerge as the hand-over of Hong Kong 
back to Chinese rule was approaching. The HKSE expanded its listings to include 
many China-based corporations seeking overseas capitalisation. In 1993, nine 
Chinese companies were listed on the exchange and many others were scheduled for 
the following years. 
(B.3) Market characteristics 
(B. 3.1) Market capitalisation 
Hong Kong has the largest market capitalisation among the 'Four Tigers' and is the 
second largest market in the region after Japan. Figure 1.10 shows that its market 
capitalisation grew slowly in the late 1980s but by 1993, it climbed by more than 
twice from the previous year's level to US$385 billion. In 1996, it reached another 
historic record of US$446 billion. The sharp rise in market capitalisation during the 
past four to five years could have been attributed to an influx of foreign portfolio 
capital at the time when US prime interest rates were cut and unit trusts and pension 
funds in western countries were growing rapidly. Thus institutional investors would 
become increasingly interested in Asian stock markets where returns were expected to 
be much higher. 
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Figure 1.10 Market capitalisation of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
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Figure 1.11 Number of listed domestic firms in Hong Kong 
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Figure 1.12 Value of shares traded in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
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(B. 3. 2) Number of listed domestic firms and value of shares traded 
Figures 1. 11 and 1. 12 show that the number of listed domestic firms as well as the 
value of shares traded did not change too much between 1986 and 1990. Then in 
1991, they began to rise at a faster rate, especially from 1992 onwards. This could 
result from the fact that more and more local firms wished to raise capital from the 
market as foreign investors were showing more interest in the Hong Kong market. 
Alternatively, as the hand-over of Hong Kong back to mainland China in 1997 got 
closer, more China-linked companies began to list on the Exchange so that foreign 
investors could participate in the Chinese market indirectly. In both cases, the number 
of listed domestic firms as well as the value of shares traded in the market would be 
driven up. 
(B.3.3) Foreign Portfolio Investment 
Information on foreign portfolio investment in Hong Kong is very fragmentary. 
Neither the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong itself nor other world organisations, such 
as the International Financial Corporation and the World Bank, publish annual figures 
for the foreign capital movements in Hong Kong. Therefore, the change in foreign 
portfolio investment in Hong Kong from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s can only be 
inferred indirectly from other sources of information. For instance, according to the 
World Economic Outlook published by the International Monetary Fund (October, 
1993), the amount of equity investment in Asia by the developed world was less than 
US$0.5 billion between 1982 and 1988. However, between 1989 and 1992, the 
amount rose to US$2.9 billion. Being one of the largest and the least restrictive 
developing markets in Asia, the benefit of such an increase of foreign portfolio 
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investment in the region to Hong Kong is perceivable. Moreover, according to the 
Asian Company Handbook (1998), almost half of Hong Kong's listed companies in 
1996 had their shares owned by foreign investors, with the percentages of their share 
ownership ranging from 5% to above 50%. Taken together, these figures suggest 
that there has been a change in foreign portfolio investment in Hong Kong from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. 
(B. 3. 4) Stock market indicator 
The activity of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is measured by three main stock 
indices. The oldest and most widely used, is the Hang Seng Index compiled by a 
subsidiary of Hang Seng Bank. The index was first published in 1969 with 31 July 
1964 as its basis base point, that is, Hang Seng Index = 100. The index is based on 3 3 
companies in different industry sectors, weighted by market capitalisation and is thus 
strongly influenced by large capitalisation stocks. 
(B.3.5) Trading system and trading hours 
At present, only 620 members of the HKSE are allowed to trade on the exchange and 
transactions are carried out by floor-traders on behalf of their member firms. 
Alternatively, the trade can be conducted through the exchange's computerised 
trading system and there are no time limits for off-floor trading. There are also no 
limits on daily permissible price movements in stocks. However, the deals transacted 
off the floor are treated as trades for the following day for the purposes of reporting 
and settlement. Trading hours ofthe Exchange are from 9:00a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and 
1:30 p.m. to 4:30p.m., Monday through Friday. 
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(B. 4) Market regulation and investor protection 
The Hong Kong government has kept intervention m the financial system to a 
minimum. In May 1989, it set up the Securities and Futures Commission in response 
to the weaknesses in Hong Kong's financial markets at the time of October 1987 
world stock market crash. It was established as an autonomous statutory body, 
outside the civil service, funded largely by the market and partly by the government. 
The Governor of Hong Kong appointed its directors and might give policy direction 
to it. Now it is responsible for overseeing the operation and modernisation of the 
stock exchange. 
To protect investors, a Stock Exchange Compensation Fund was formed to 
compensate investors in the case of fraud. It was formed from deposits with the 
Securities Commission by each Stock Exchange firm for each individual stock broker 
admitted as a member. This Fund will pay out compensation, up to a limit of HK$2 
million per stockbroker involved in any default, to customers who have suffered 
monetary loss as a result of a member's default. In addition, the insider dealing 
tribunal may inquire into insider dealings and report them to the public. However, 
insider dealing is not a criminal offence in Hong Kong. 
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(B. 5) Cost of dealing and taxation 
Table 1.1 Cost of dealing and taxation in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Commission rates on equity 
transactions 
Stamp duty 
Tax on interest income and 
dividends 
0.25% on contract value subject to a minimum of 
HK$ 25 (around US$3.2) 
0. 6% on all securities transactions levied on both 
the buyer and seller 
Nil 
Tax on capital gains Nil 
Source: Annual Report ofHong Kong (1995) 
(B. 6) Links with other international or emerging markets 
There are no formal links with overseas markets in terms of trading and settlement. 
However, the exchange is trying to forge closer links with the international market. It 
has linked up with the London stock market for the exchange of closing prices of 
selected Hong Kong securities traded in the United Kingdom. At present, twenty-
eight Hong Kong shares are cross-listed in the London Stock Exchange. 
(D) Singapore 
(A) Economic background 
(A. I) Core economic sectors 
(A.J.l) Manufacturing sector 
Singapore's economy is highly industrialised with emphasis placed on developing high 
value-added and capital intensive manufacturing industries. Its primary sector plays 
only a limited role in the economy whilst the service sector has just started to grow 
during the 1990s. Among all manufacturing industries, electronics is the most 
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important. Singapore is the world's major producer of disk drives. Oil refining, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals are other significant manufacturing industries in the 
country. Figures 1.13 to 1.16 show that both the manufacturing and financial sectors 
grew rapidly between 1992 and 1994, whilst in recent years the rate of growth has 
slowed. The primary sector remained weak throughout the early 1990s. By 1996, the 
manufacturing and financial sectors together represent just above half of Singapore's 
gross domestic product whilst the primary sector's contribution is negligible. 
(A.J.2) Financial sector 
Singapore has had a well established off-shore banking system since the 1970s and its 
foreign exchange market is the world's fourth largest market. It is a regional centre 
for offshore deposit taking and foreign exchange activities. The government's tight 
regulatory policies might have given investors the confidence needed to undertake 
these financial activities in Singapore. Its local banking sectors and stock exchange, 
however, are less established. Four locally owned banks dominate and control the 
retail banking in Singapore. As for the Singapore stock exchange, there is a lack of 
supply and demand for market shares as many firms across the spectrum are under 
state control. Thus the more liberal offshore financial system is doing better than the 
more tightly controlled domestic one. 
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Figure 1.13 Contribution of the primary sector to GDP in Singapore 
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Figure 1.14 Contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP in Singapore 
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Figure 1.15 Contribution of the financial sector to GDP in Singapore 
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Figure 1.16 Singapore's GDP by sector in 1996 
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(A.l.3) Trade sector 
Singapore's economy is also highly dependent on entre-pot trade thanks to its 
excellent port facilities and good geographic location between the East and West of 
the world. A large volume of merchandised goods imported into Singapore are re-
exported to other parts of the world. The total value of trade in goods and services 
was equivalent to around 250% of GDP in the early 1990s, compared with 10% to 
20% for Japan and US. As far as domestic exports are concerned, the bulk of the 
exports is made up of machinery and transport equipment, which accounts for 68.2% 
of total domestic exports in 1996 as shown in Figure 1.17. Among them, electronic 
products such as computer peripherals, micro-assemblies and integrated circuits as 
well as automatic data-processing machines are the key elements of Singapore's 
domestic exports. In fact, Figure 1. 18 suggests that there is a clear growing trend for 
the exports ofthese electronic goods and machinery since 1989. However, from 1995 
there are signs of a slowing down in the pace of growth. 
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Figure 1. 1 7 Singapore 's domestic exports in 1996 
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Figure 1.18 Singapore's key exports (1989-1996) 
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(A.2) Government's economic policy 
The Singapore government has long adopted an interventionist policy in managing the 
country's economy through direct and indirect measures. On the one hand, it is deeply 
involved in the individual industries through ownership of firms in many sectors. On 
the other, it constantly directs the path of its economy through investment incentives 
so as to achieve its set targets. The Singapore government is directly involved in 
many industries across the spectrum, ranging from high-tech defence contractors to 
low-tech service industries. Several sensitive and strategically important industries, 
such as defence-related industries and utilities, are under direct state control. The 
government also controls a number of Singapore firms indirectly through its agencies 
such as the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation and Singapore 
Technologies. Through these agencies, it can retain a strong influence over its 
banking, shipping, engineering as well as technology sectors. 
Apart from direct and indirect participation in local firms, the government also plays 
an active role in steering the economy through micro-economic policy. For instance, 
during the 1970s when the government tried to shift the economy from labour-
intensive to high-technology and capital-intensive industries, it greatly increased wage 
costs in an attempt to force greater use of machinery. As a result, labour-intensive 
industries were relocated in its neighbouring countries such as Thailand and Malaysia 
that had lower labour costs, whilst capital-intensive industries such as electronics 
became the star performer. Yet the fall in global demand for some electronic products 
in mid-1980s had forced the government to change its direction. From 1988 onwards, 
it placed more emphasis on the growth of local small and medium-sized enterprises, 
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the service sectors and the financial sector. It also encouraged firms to expand to 
other countries in the Asia-Pacific region such as China and India. The resurgence in 
world demand for electronic products, such as disk drives, in the early 1990s once 
again prompted the government to direct resources to boost the industry and export 
of electronic goods. 
(A. 3) Export-led economic growth 
Figure 1.19 shows that since 1989 Singapore's annual rates of growth have been high 
with an average of around 7% per annum. Much is owed to a continuing expansion in 
investment and in exports. In recent years, the booming electronics sector has helped 
Singapore grow even faster than Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. The role of 
the government behind such remarkable growth in Singapore is noticeable too. It 
offers a favourable environment to industries by providing investment incentives as 
well as economic stability for them to develop and grow. For instance, it has let the 
value of the Singapore dollar appreciate, so reducing imported inflation. The inflation 
rate is the lowest among neighbouring countries, staying within the range of 2%-3% 
per annum. Its tax rates are also stable from year to year, with changes signalled well 
in advance, allowing investors to plan ahead to accommodate the changes. Foreign 
investment too is welcomed to bring in manufacturing and service facilities, helping to 
boost Singapore's prosperity. All these measures have brought about sound 
economic growth in Singapore between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. 
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Figure 1.19 Real rate of GDP growth in Singapore 
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Figure 1.20 Exchange rate of Singapore dollar against US dollar 
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Figure 1.21 Singapore's Current account balance 
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(A. 4) Other economic indicators 
(A.4.1) Foreign exchange rate system andforeign reserves 
In the 1980s, the Singapore dollar was held against a basket of currencies but this 
arrangement was later broken. Now, the value of the Singapore dollar is heavily 
weighted against the US dollar, as US is its major trading partner and its interest rates 
mirror those of the US. Since 1992, its exchange rate against the US dollar has been 
stable at around S$1.4 to S$1.6 per US$ as shown in Figure 1.20. Apart from having 
a stable currency, Singapore also has substantial foreign reserves and they are on the 
increase year after year. Their reserves stood at US$ 76 billion in 1996, which was 
the fifth largest foreign exchange holding in the world. 
(A.4.2) Current account balance 
Singapore has experienced a balance of payments surplus since 1989. Figure 1.21 
shows that the surplus rocketed upwards since 1993 and this coincided with the time 
when Singapore's manufacturing sector was booming and the exports of electronic 
machinery was rapidly increasing. 
(B) Singapore Stock Exchange 
(B. 1) Formation 
The roots of the Singapore Stock Exchange can be traced back to 1930 with the 
formation of the Singapore Stockbrokers' Association to regulate activities in the 
interest of the public. During the following four decades, the Stock Exchange 
underwent a number of name changes, and eventually became incorporated as the 
Stock Exchange of Singapore Ltd. (SES) in May 1973. Since 1995, there have been 
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no foreign exchange controls nor restrictions on foreign trading in Singapore shares, 
although foreign share-holdings in strategic industries such as defence and banking are 
limited. There are no limitations on the repatriation of income, capital gains and 
capital. 
(B.2) Market structure 
The Stock Exchange of Singapore operates four markets for the trading of securities 
and derivatives: the Main Board, SESDAQ, Stock Options and CLOB International. 
(B.2.1) Main Board 
Companies have to meet rmmmum criteria with respect to capital, number of 
shareholders, turnover and dividends etc. to be admitted to the Main Board. 
Approximately, two-thirds of the companies listed on the Stock Exchange are 
included in this Board. As at 31 December 1994, a total of 197 Singapore and 3 2 
foreign companies were listed on the Main Board with a market capitalisation of 
S$256.12 billion. 
(B.2.2) SESDAQ 
The Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing and Automated Quotation (SESDAQ) 
Board, the second securities market launched in 1987, is designed to provide an 
avenue for small and medium-sized Singapore-incorporated companies to raise funds 
for their expansion. As at 31 December 1994, 43 companies were listed on SESDAQ 
with a market capitalisation of S$3.32 billion. Shares listed in the SESDAQ may be 
promoted to the Main Board when they satisfy the necessary requirements. 
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(B.2.3) Stock Options 
Trading of equity options commenced on 8 March 1993. As at 1994, call and put 
options on four underlying stocks were traded. 
(B.2.4) CLOB International 
On 2 January 1990, the Exchange introduced an over-the-counter market known as 
the Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) International. The CLOB is a floor-less 
screen-based computerised trading system for all transactions carried out on the 
Exchange. Orders are executed on a broker-to-broker basis by means of high 
powered trading workstations located in brokers' offices. The CLOB system 
maintains an order book for every traded security and matches buy and sell orders 
keyed in by brokers. Each order in the order book has a limit price, this being the 
highest (for a buy order) or lowest (for a sell order) price at which the order can be 
carried out. Confirmation of trades are disseminated automatically after the trade is 
executed. The establishment of the CLOB International allows investors to trade in a 
number of international securities which are listed on foreign stock exchanges. As at 
31 December 1994, 10 Hong Kong stocks, 112 Malaysian stocks and 4 other 
international stocks were quoted on CLOB International. 
(B.3) Market characteristics 
(B. 3.1) Market capitalisation 
Figure 1.22 shows that Singapore had a small market capitalisation of less than 
US$50 billion before 1993. Since 1993 market capitalisation began to surge. It 
coincided with the time when the government tried to part privatise some of its tightly 
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Figure 1.22 Market capitalisation C?f the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
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Figure 1.24 Total value of shares traded in the stock exchange of Singapore 
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controlled utilities and industries, thus increasing the number of listed firms as well as 
the value of firms with existing listings. 
(B. 3. 2) Number of listed domestic firms and value of shares traded 
Figure 1.23 shows that the number of listed domestic firms in Singapore was on the 
increase year after year with the biggest changes taking place after 1993. Again this 
could have been the result of the government part-privatisation plan to float its state-
own industries to the stock exchange, leading many other firms to follow suit. Total 
value of shares traded in the market also rose dramatically from 1993 as shown in 
Figure 1.24. 
(B.3.3) Foreign investment in Singapore's equities 
Figure 1.25 shows that the Stock Exchange of Singapore received the largest net 
amount of foreign equity investment capital in 1993 of about US$2.9 billion than in 
the previous three years. In common with other emerging markets in Asia, this was 
likely the result of an influx of foreign capital from the developed world at a time 
when returns from these markets were low due to recession. The availability of more 
investment opportunities in Singaporean stocks in 1993 after the part-privatisation of 
some state-owned companies could also have contributed to such an increase in 
foreign portfolio investment. Then in the subsequent two years, foreign equity 
investment capital fell to around US$0.1 billion to US$0.4 billion in 1994 and 1995. 
Such a fall could be the result of a shift of foreign investment from portfolio 
investment to direct investment in Singapore so as to take advantage of its booming 
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electronic industries. As a matter of fact, the amount of direct investment in 
Singapore doubled from US$4 billion in 1993 to US$8 billion in 1994 and 1995. 
Figure 1.25 Foreign investment in Singapore's equities 
I Foreign investment in equities I 
4 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
lanuual flow of foreign equity capitad 
Source: IMF Balance ofPayments Statistics Yearbook (1998) 
(B. 3. 4) Stock market Indicator 
There are several financial indices that trace the price movement of the Singapore 
stock market. These are identified in Table 1.2 below. Among these indices, the 
Straits Times Industrial Index is the most commonly used in representing the market 
movement. 
Table 1.2 Stock market indicators of the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
Indices 
SES All Singapore Index 
Straits Times Industrial Index 
BT Composite Index 
Component Stocks 
All Singapore shares 
30 stocks in the commercial and 
industrial sectors 
40 Component stocks representing 
various sectors 
OCBC Index 55 component stocks from all industry 
groups 
UOB SESDAQ Index All SESDAQ stocks 
Source: The Stock Exchange of Singapore Fact Book (1995) 
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(B. 3. 5) Trading system and trading hours 
(B.3.5.1) Open out-cry system 
Before 1988, transactions were executed through brokers, who acted as either 
principals or agents in any transaction, but they had to disclose to clients the capacity 
in which they were acting. No limitations were placed on daily permissible price 
movements in securities by then. 
(B.3.5.2) Computerised trading system 
In 1988, a computerised order-routing and confirmation system was implemented to 
allow brokers to send their orders to the trading floor and receive trade confirmation 
through a computer network. From 1989, a floor-less screen-based computerised 
trading system for all transactions carried out on the Exchange known as the Central 
Limit Order Book (CLOB) began in use. A brief description of the system has been 
given in Section B.2.4. 
(B. 3. 5. 3) Trading hours 
Trading in the Singapore Stock Exchange takes place from Monday to Friday, 9:00 
a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 2:00p.m. to 5:00p.m. 
(B. 4) Cost of dealing and Taxation 
(B.4.1) Taxes 
In 1987, interest income on government bonds was subject to the normal tax rate of 
30%, though some specific bonds might be tax free. Share dividends were also 
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taxable at a rate of 33%. By 1995, taxes on interest income, share dividends and 
capital gains were all abolished. 
(B.4.2) Brokeragefees 
The scales of brokerage payable for securities transactions on the Main Board and 
SESDAQ as at December 1995 are listed in Table 1.3. 
Table 1. 3 Brokerage fees for trading in the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
Transaction amount 
On the first S$250,000 (approx. US$176,429) 
On the next S$250,000 
On the next S$250,000 
On the next S$250,000 
On the next S$250,000 
On amounts exceeding S$1. 5 million 
subject to a minimum brokerage of S$2 per 
contract 
Brokerage percentage 
1.0% 
0.9% 
0.8% 
0.7% 
0.5% 
negotiable, subject to a minimum of 
0.3% 
Source: The Stock Exchange of Singapore Fact Book (1995) 
(B.4.3) Other transaction fees 
Table 1. 4 Other transaction fees for trading in the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
Clearing fees 0.05% on the contract value, subject to a maximum of 
S$100. 
Contract stamp duties 0.05% on the contract value 
Transfer stamp duties 0.2% on the contract value 
Goods and Sales Tax 3% on brokerage and clearing fees 
Source: The Stock Exchange of Singapore Fact Book (1995) 
(B.5) Market Regulation and Investor Protection 
(B.5.1) Market regulation 
While Hong Kong has a more hands-off regulatory style, Singapore has a closer 
regulatory oversight towards the stock market operation. Numerous restrictions are 
38 
applied to insulate the country's financial system from foreign shocks. For instance, to 
protect domestic currency from too much foreign attention, overseas loans 
denominated in Singapore dollars are discouraged. Membership of the Stock 
Exchange is also limited to Singapore incorporated companies or Singapore citizens. 
Foreign membership is achieved by holding shares in stock-broking firms which are 
member companies of the Stock Exchange of Singapore. However, foreign 
ownership can only be as high as 49% ofthe equity ofthe stock-broking firm. 
(B.5.2) Investor protection 
To protect investors' interests, a fidelity fund has been established under the Security 
Industry Act 1986 to compensate investors who suffer financial loss due to the 
dishonest misuse of their funds by a stock-broking company or any of its employees. 
Besides, trading on or off the floor of the Stock Exchange by stock brokers or their 
representatives directly or indirectly for their own accounts or for discretionary 
accounts is prohibited. 
(B. 5. 3) Insider trading 
Insider dealing is treated as a criminal offence liable for a fine or imprisonment. 
(B.6) Links with other markets 
(B. 6.1) Malaysia 
Singapore has close ties with other countries within the Association of South East 
Asian Nations, in particular, Malaysia. Until 1990, the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
had cross-listings of shares with the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and they 
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accounted for 60% of transactions in Malaysian shares. However, Malaysia ended 
this arrangement in 1990 with the aim of encouraging its local trading. 
(B.6.2) Japan 
The Stock Exchange of Singapore has also established a custodial linkage with the 
Japanese securities Clearing Corporation (JSCC) that allows Japanese Securities to be 
traded on a scrip-less basis on the SES, with the shares held in custody at the JSCC. 
Transactions to date have, however, been extremely limited. 
(DI) South Korea 
(A) Economic background 
(A. 1) Core economic sectors 
(A. 1.1) Manufacturing sector 
Manufacturing industry has been the main thrust ofKorea's economy for the past two 
decades. As shown in Figure 1.26, it accounts for about one-third of total GDP since 
1990. A diversified range of manufacturing industries including electronics, car-
making, ship-building, iron and steel, electrical machinery as well as textile industries 
have done well in the past six years. This is a result of the government's policy to 
promote high technology and high-value added industries. In contrast, primary 
industry such as agriculture, forestry and fishing has been falling steadily over the past 
few years. By 1996, it only accounted for 6% ofKorea's total GDP. 
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(A.J.2) ~Financial sector 
The financial sector which consists of finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services has been growing steadily since 1990. It accounted for about 15% to 17% of 
total GDP in the past six years and was the second most important economic sector in 
South Korea in 1996 as shown in Figures 1.28 and 1.29. Historically, the government 
exercised tight control over the banking system through public ownership and detailed 
guidance from the Ministry of Finance. For instance, if the government targeted the 
development of a certain industry, it would ask the bank to grant loans to companies 
at very low rates of interest regardless of their productivity and operational efficiency. 
As far as the stock market is concerned, the finance ministry has a firm belief that it is 
its responsibility to intervene in the market so as to regulate its growing trend. When 
the market is low, the government's Stock Market Stabilisation Fund would prop up 
the market by buying shares and when the market seems overheated, it cools it down 
by dumping its shares. As there is growing demand for more openness of the financial 
market to foreign investment, Korea's financial sector is expected to continue its 
growth in the near future. 
(A.l.3) External trade sector 
Due to the development of export-oriented industries and the rising degree of 
openness to international trade, Korea's external trade sector has also been growing 
rapidly over the past few years. The total export value of merchandised goods has 
nearly doubled from US$65 billion in 1990 to US$125 billion in 1996. Figure 1.30 
shows that the biggest increase to export value was between 1993 and 1995. 
Machinery and equipment such as semiconductors, ships, passenger cars, telecom 
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Figure 1.26 Contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP inS. Korea 
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Figure 1.27 Contribution of the primary sector to GDP inS. Korea 
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(17.2%) 
Figure 1.29 S. Korea's GDP by sector in 1996 
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Figure 1. 30 Total value of merchandise exports from S. Korea 
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Figure 1. 31 S. Korea's key merchandise exports 
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apparatus and office machinery are the dominant exports of Korea with export value 
three times above the average as shown in Figure 1.31. Textile products and clothing 
such as woven fabrics, footwear and accessories come second whilst crude products 
such iron and steel, refined petroleum as well as rubber are the next key exports. 
(A.2) Government's economic policy 
The Korean government manages its economy by intervention and protection. It sets 
up targets for the growth of particular sectors within the economy and provides 
investment incentives such as low interest loans to achieve its goal. The development 
ofhigh technology manufacturing industries such as car-making and electronics is one 
such example. Another example is the granting of export subsidies to companies in 
pursuit of the government's central objective of export-led industrialisation. 
Meanwhile, quotas and tariffs for imported goods are in place to protect domestic 
products and the government is reluctant to have them removed. A notable example 
is the ban on many Japanese consumer goods, particularly rice. Thus the Korean 
economy is far from being a free-market economy. 
(A.3) Economic growth 
Figure 1.32 shows that real GDP growth in Korea has been above 5% per annum 
since 1990. After a sharp fall from 9% to 5% between 1991 and 1992, real GDP 
growth picked up again in 1993 and kept rising until 1996. On the whole, its 
economic growth rate was well above those experienced in the western industrialised 
world of just 2% to 3% over the same period. 
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(A. 4) Other economic indicators 
(A.4.1) Foreign exchange rate regime andjoreign reserves 
The exchange rate of the Korean currency won is pegged to an undisclosed basket of 
currencies but is known to be heavily weighted on both the US dollar and Japanese 
yen. Figures 1.33 and 1.34 show that during 1990 and 1994, the won depreciated 
against both the US$ and yen but at a faster rate for the latter. From 1995, the yen 
became weaker and so the won began to appreciate against it. This could be partly 
responsible for the slow-down of export growth in South Korea over the past three 
years who competed directly with Japan for export markets. 
As far as South Korea's foreign reserves are concerned, they were less than half that 
of other Asian countries like Taiwan and Singapore in 1996. At one point, they were 
severely depleted to a low of US$ 8.9 billion as the Bank of Korea tried in vain to 
prop up the won towards the end of 1997 when it was sharply depreciated. Now by 
the end of 1998 with the liquidity crisis eased, the reserves climbed up again to nearly 
US$50 billion. 
(A.4.2) Current account balance 
Korea experienced a current account deficit for almost every year since 1990 as 
shown in Figure 1.35. The main reason is that strong local investment growth 
required spending on imported capital equipment and new plant and hence would 
keep the trade balance in deficit. Between 1995 and 1996, the current account deficit 
began to deteriorate and reached a record high of US$23 billion. This was due to 
the appreciation of the Korean won against the US dollar as well as the yen, thus 
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Figure 1.32 Real rate ofGDP growth in South Korea 
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weakening Korea's export competitiveness but making imports much cheaper. The 
fall in world demand for electronic goods in 1996 also played a part in bringing about 
such a huge deficit problem. In 1998, a current account surplus of US$36 billion 
occurred for the first time in many years mainly because of the devaluation of the won 
in 1997 and a contraction in import demand. 
Figure 1.35 Current account balance in South Korea 
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(B) Korea Stock Exchange 
(B.l) Formation 
A predecessor of the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) known as the Daehan Stock 
Exchange was formed in 1956 with only twelve listed companies. It was not 
developed well until 1978 when the number of listed corporations increased from 66 
in 1972 to 3 56 by the end of 1978. In 1988, a computerised automated trading 
system was introduced and trade volume increased. Foreign investors were not 
allowed to participate in the Exchange directly or indirectly before 1984. In 1984, 
indirect investment was made possible through the establishment of the Korea Fund 
which was listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Then in January 1992, for the 
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first time in history, the Korean stock market was opened to foreign investors for 
direct investment with certain limitations on foreigners' holdings. In aggregate, 
foreign positions in any class of shares of a company was limited to 10%. In the 
subsequent years, this ceiling was lifted to 12% in 1994, 15% in 1995 and 18% in 
1996. 
(B. 2) Market structure 
The stock market is divided into two trading sections - the first trading section and 
the second trading section. Newly listed stocks are automatically assigned to the 
second trading section for at least one year. The Exchange evaluates annual reports 
of all listed companies for the last business year to decide whether they meet the 
requirements for assignment to the first section, such as the number of share-holders, 
paid-in capital and debt-ratio. 
(B.3) Market characteristics 
(B.3.1) Market capitalisation 
In 1990, South Korea had the second largest market capitalisation amongst regional 
markets after Japan. Then its position was overtaken by Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
Nevertheless, like many other markets in the region, South Korea's market 
capitalisation increased rapidly between 1993 and 1994 before dropping off slightly as 
shown in Figure 1.36. Now its market capitalisation is above US$200 billion and, 
according to the Emerging Market Fact book, 47% of this is represented by the 
manufacturing sector. The total value of shares traded in the market also peaked in 
the year 1994 as shown in Figure 1. 3 7. 
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Figure 1. 36 Market capitalisation of the Korea Stock Exchange 
250 
200 
il 150 
~ 
;:J lOO 
Market capitalisation 
(end of period levels) 
Source: IFC Emerging Market Fact book (1996) 
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(B. 3. 2) Number of listed domestic firms 
Figure 1.38 shows that the number of listed domestic firms in the Korea Stock 
Exchange grew rapidly in the late 1980s, but the pace slowed down since 1990. 
Many of the listed firms belonged to the manufacturing sector. 
(B.3.3) Foreign investment in South Korea's equities 
In the first two years following the opening of the Korea Stock Exchange to foreign 
direct investment in January 1992, foreign investment in equity securities increased 
rapidly. It rose from US$0.4 billion in 1990 to US$6.6 billion in 1993. Although the 
levels of foreign investment in equities dropped in subsequent years, they were still 
much higher than the levels before 1992. 
Figure 1.39 Foreign investment in South Korea's equities 
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(B. 3. 4) Stock market indicator 
In 1983, a new index called the Korea Composite Stock Price Index was adopted to 
replace the existing Korea Stock Price Index. It is based on aggregate market value 
and has a base date of January 4, 1980 and a base index of 100. The index is adjusted 
to eliminate the influence of any corporate action and thereby reflects only movements 
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resulting from market activities. Hence the base aggregate market is adjusted 
whenever the current market value undergoes certain variations such as capitalisation 
changes, new listings or delistings. 
(B. 3. 5) Trading system and trading hours 
(B. 3.5. 1) Trading procedure 
The KSE market is a typical order-driven market where buy and sell orders compete 
with each other for the best price and there is no market maker. Throughout the 
trading session, customer orders are continuously matched at a price satisfactory to 
both parties according to price and time priority. 
(B.3.5.2) Computerised trading 
In 1983, a computerised order -routing system was put into full operation. This 
enabled member firms to transmit orders directly to the trading floor. In 1988, a 
computerised stock market automated trading system was introduced. Within three 
years, it handled more than 95% of the total stock trading volume. In addition, most 
market information on prices and trading volume are electronically provided on a real 
time basis. 
(B.3.5.3) Daily price change limits and trading hours 
As there is no market maker in the Exchange to function as a stabilising force in the 
market, a daily price change limit has been set to avoid excessive price fluctuations. 
This limit is currently set at 12% of the previous day's closing price. 
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(B. 3. 5. 4) Trading hours 
The trading hours for the Exchange are from 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. to 
3:00p.m. Monday through Friday and 9:30a.m. to 12:00 at noon on Saturdays. 
(B. 4) Market regulations and investor protection 
(B.4.1) Insider dealing and abnormal trading activities 
The Korea Stock Exchange is strictly regulated. Although insider dealing is not a 
criminal offence, it will be turned to the Securities Exchange Commission for 
investigation. A stock watch system is also in place to detect unusual price 
movements, sudden increase or decrease in trading and other abnormal trading 
activities. 
(B.4.2) Trading halt 
The Exchange may also request a listed company to clarifY a rumour on news that has 
caused unusual market activity or a substantial price change in the securities 
concerned. In the case of a rumour or news relating to bankruptcy or receivership, 
the Exchange may also request the lending bank or a court having jurisdiction to 
verifY the facts. If the share price and I or the trading activities in an issue is expected 
to show an abrupt movement before the opening of the trading session, or actually 
shows the same situation during the course of trading in response to a rumour 
concerning the issue, the Exchange may halt its trading to protect the investing public. 
Trading of that issue is resumed only when a direct disclosure relative to the matter is 
made by the company concerned. 
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(B. 4. 3) Compensation 
Finally, in order to protect investors against fraud, Fidelity Guaranty Money and the 
Joint Compensation Fund have been devised to make payments for damages stemming 
from a settlement default. 
(B.5) Cost of dealing 
(B.5.1) Brokerage commission 
The brokerage commission rates are freely determined by the individual companies 
based on the trading value without any ceilings. Actually, securities companies levy 
commission within the range of0.4% and 0.5%. 
(B.5.2) Securities transaction tax and tax on interest income and dividends 
Transaction tax is payable by both residents and non-residents at a rate of 0. 5% for all 
sales proceeds from listed shares. Tax rates on interest income and dividends are 
shown in table 1. 5. 
Table 1. 5 Tax rates on interest income and dividends in the Korea Stock Exchange 
Residents Non-
residents 
1. Dividend paid by listed companies 20% 25% 
Dividend paid by unlisted companies 25% 25% 
2. Interest from corporate bonds 25% 25% 
Interest from public bonds 20% 25% 
3. Capital gains from transaction of listed stocks tax-exempt 25% 
Capital gains from transaction of unlisted stocks 20% 25% 
Source : Korea Stock Exchange Fact Book (1995) 
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(IV) Taiwan 
(A) Economic background 
In the past 50 years, Taiwan's economy has undergone several stages of 
transformation: from an agrarian base in the 1940s to an industrial base in the 1950s; 
from developing export-oriented industries in the 1960s and 1970s to promoting 
capital and technology-intensive industries in the 1980s. In the 1990s, manufacturing 
remains at the heart of the Taiwan economy though services are growing steadily. 
Thus Taiwan's economy is constantly changing to meet different internal and external 
demands over time. 
(A.l) Core economic sectors 
(A.J.J) Manufacturing sector 
The manufacturing sector is still the most important econoffilc sector in Taiwan 
despite its falling contribution to Taiwan's GDP over the past eight years as shown in 
Figure 1.40. High-technology and capital intensive industries such as electronic and 
chemical industries have been encouraged in place of labour-intensive industries. 
Their main manufactured products include computers, integrated circuits, television, 
calculators, cement and nylon fabrics. They form the bulk of Taiwan's merchandise 
exports as shown in Figure 1. 41. 
(A.l.2) Financial sector 
Taiwan's financial services sector has been growing steadily since 1991 when the 
financial market was gradually deregulated. Foreign investors were allowed for the 
first time to participate directly in the stock exchange although the investment ceiling 
was limited to no more than 1 0% of any company's stocks. New banks were allowed 
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into the market and restrictions on the establishment of bank branches were removed 
in 1990. Now, foreign banks can open more than one branch in Taiwan. All these 
liberalisation measures have helped in boosting the development of financial 
services in Taiwan. It is now the second most important sector contributing to 
Taiwan's GDP and in 1997, it represented 23% of Taiwan's GDP as shown in Figure 
1.42. 
Figure 1.40 Contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP in Taiwan 
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Figure 1.42 Contribution of the financial sector to GDP in Taiwan 
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(A.J.3) Service sector 
The growth of the service sector in Taiwan began when its people demanded more 
consumer goods and services with their new-found wealth as a result of continuous 
economic growth during the 1990s. The contribution of the service sector to 
Taiwan's GDP has been increasing steadily over the past eight years and is now the 
third most important economic sector ofthe country. Now it accounts for 16.5% of 
Taiwan's GDP. 
Figure 1.43 Contribution of the service sector to GDP in Taiwan 
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(A.2) Economic policy 
Taiwan's economic policy is highly protective towards its own small firms. The 
Taiwan government has all along acted as a facilitator to create the conditions in 
which Taiwan's small and medium-sized enterprises can thrive. It wants to see these 
small and medium-sized firms grow into larger firms so that they can exploit 
economies of scale and afford significant research and development programmes. 
Thus investment incentives were complemented by infra-structure development to 
help encourage business. Moreover, in order to protect them from being 
overwhelmed by foreign multinationals, foreign involvement in some industrial sectors 
such as the energy sector, telecommunications and media has been barred until the last 
two years. 
(A.3) Economic growth 
Despite being an island state with no strong diplomatic ties with any major countries, 
Taiwan's economy managed to grow strongly between 1990 and 1997. Its average 
real growth rate was 6.4% per annum as shown in Figure 1.44. Continued export 
growth due to the sustained economic growth of Asia as well as high domestic 
consumption demand could have been the forces behind the strong economic growth 
in Taiwan. 
(A. 4) Other economic indicators 
(A.4. 1) Low inflation rate 
Taiwan has experienced low inflation with an average of 3.4% by international 
standards over the past seven years as shown in Figure 1.45 as a result of the 
government's effort to maintain a low inflation policy to win the support of its people. 
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Figure 1.44 Real rate ofGDP growth in Taiwan 
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Figure 1.45 Inflation rate in Taiwan 
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Figure 1.46 Exchange rate of the New Taiwan dollar against the yen and US$ 
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(A.4.2) Foreign exchange rate system and foreign reserves 
Until1979, Taiwan's currency was pegged to the US dollar at US$1:NT$38. Then in 
1979, it was allowed to float in a managed band. Over the past eight years, the 
exchange rate ofthe New Taiwan dollar against the US dollar has been stable except 
for a small appreciation between 1990 and 1995. By contrast, it depreciated against 
the yen during the same period of time until mid 1995. Nevertheless, the strength of 
the yen has benefited Taiwan's exports in world markets in terms of price-
competitiveness. 
(A.4.3) Current account balance 
Despite strong export growth of around 4% to 9% brought about by the strong yen in 
the early 1990s, the current account surplus almost halved from the peak of US$12 
billion in 1991 to US$5.5 billion in 1995 as shown in Figure 1.47. This could have 
been offset by the growing demand for imports from the private sector. 
Figure 1. 4 7 Taiwan 's current account balance 
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Source : EIU Country Profile : Taiwan ( 1995-1998) 
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(B) Taiwan Stock Exchange 
(B.J) Formation 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange was set up under the supervision of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in October 1961 and commenced its operation in February 
1962. There were only 18 listed companies at that time. The number of listed 
companies increased to 23 in 1963 and did not exceed 40 until 1971. It finally 
reached about I 00 by 1980. The stock exchange started to soar in 1988 when new 
licenses for brokerage firms were issued by the government and the Computer 
Assisted Trading System was installed to improve trading. 
(B.2) Market structure 
Shares in the Taiwan Stock exchange are divided into three categories: category A, B 
and C. Categorisation is based upon listed companies' paid-up capital, pre-tax net 
profit, operating income, net worth, number of shareholders and distribution of 
shares. The listing criteria for categories A and B shares are summarised in Table 1.6. 
Table 1. 6 Listing criteria for categories A and B shares in Taiwan 
Criteria I Categorisations A B 
Years of operation after 5 full fiscal years 5 full fiscal years 
incorporation 
Amount of capital stock in the last NT$600 million NT$300 million 
2 years 
Profitability: 
Pre-tax profit as a % of capital in I 0% or higher not less than 6% 
par value in the last 2 years 
Dispersion of share-holdings 
(1) No. of share-holders Not less than 2000 Not less than 1000 
(2) Minimum no. of shares held by 10 million or 20% of 10 million or 20% of 
public shareholders total no. of shares total no. of shares 
issued issued 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange Fact Book (1995) 
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Shares of high tech companies are usually classified as Category C shares and a more 
relaxed set of listing criteria is applied. For instance, the applying company is not 
required to have five full fiscal years of operation after incorporation. It only needs to 
be certified by the central authority as a technology-based enterprise, having 
successfully developed a product with market potential. The required capital in par 
value is NT$200 million and the net asset of the most recent fiscal year should be no 
less than two-thirds of the paid-in capital. 
(B.3) Market characteristics 
(B.3.J) Market capitalisation 
Taiwan had the second largest market capitalisation among the Four Tigers after 
Hong Kong. The year 1990 was the most hectic year for the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
since its establishment. Volatility in the market broke historic records with the highs 
and lows of Taiwan's Weighted Price Index in the year differing by 10,000 points. 
Thus many investors were scared off and market capitalisation dropped by more than 
half from US$23 7 billion to US$1 00 billion. The down-sliding of the market 
continued for two more years until 1993 when it picked up again, like every other 
Asian market did during this time. By 1996, Taiwan's market capitalisation stood at 
US$327 billion, 47% of which, according to the Emerging Market Fact-book, ts 
represented by the financial sector. 
(B. 3. 2) Number of listed domestic firms 
Figure 1.49 shows a steady increase in the number of listed domestic firms in the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange although the pace of growth became faster since 1991. 
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According to the Taiwan Stock Exchange Fact book 1995, individual domestic 
investors accounted for 60% of shareholders in listed firms in aggregate by the end of 
1994. Foreign ownership accounted for just 7.5%. 
(B. 3. 3) Total value of shares traded 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange is the most liquid market amongst the 'Tiger' countries. 
Its turnover has constantly been above US$200 billion per annum. After a big drop 
from 1990 due to market volatility, trading became more active again in 1993 and 
1994 as shown in Figure 1.50. This could be due to the cut in US prime interest rates 
which had encouraged many western investors to buy into emerging markets. Then 
the buying spree cooled off when US interest rates rose again in the subsequent year, 
inducing some of the western investors to return to their home markets. The surge in 
trading value in 1997 was most likely the result of the capital flight from the market in 
response to the financial crisis elsewhere in the Asian region. 
(B. 3. 4) Foreign portfolio investment 
Before 1991, foreign direct portfolio investment was non-existent in Taiwan and 
therefore was not shown in Figure 1.51. The opening ofthe Taiwan Stock Exchange 
on 1 January 1991 for the first time to foreign institutional investors did not result in a 
surge of net foreign portfolio capital inflow. The volatile local market condition could 
have deterred foreign participation during this period. Then, from 1993 onwards, net 
foreign portfolio investment increased rapidly to above US$2.5 billion per annum. In 
1997 there was a net outflow of foreign portfolio investment of US$1. 6 billion when 
foreign investors retreated from the market due to the Asian financial crisis. 
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Figure I. 48 Market capitalisation of the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Market capitalisation 
(end of period levels) 
Source: IFC Emerging Market Fact Book (1996) 
Figure 1.49 Number of listed domestic firms in the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
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Source: IFC Emerging Market Fact Book (1996) 
Figure 1. 50 Total value of shares traded in the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
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Source: EID Country Profile: Taiwan (1995-1998) 
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Figure 1.51 Foreign portfolio investment in the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Foreign Portfolio Investment 
(end of period stocks) 
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Source : EIU Country Profile : Taiwan (1995 - 1998) 
(B.3.5) Stock market indicator 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange introduced 14 indexes to provide investors with 
information on both the overall market movement and different industrial sectors' 
performance. They fall into two main categories according to the method of 
computation, namely market value indexes and price average indexes. The Taiwan 
Weighted Price Index is the most widely quoted index of all the TSE indexes. The 
base year is set to 1966 and is adjusted in the event of new listing, delisting, and right 
issues to eliminate the influence of these non-trading activities on the index. This 
weighted price index covers a wide spectrum of stocks and only preferred stocks are 
excluded. Up to now, about 300 issues are selected as component stocks from the 
3 82 listed issues on the Exchange. 
(B. 3. 6) Trading system and trading hours 
(B. 3. 6.1) Order-driven trading 
The trading system of the Taiwan Stock Exchange is order-driven. After opening an 
account with a broker, an investor can place an order to buy or sell securities in 
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person or by telephone. The orders have to be made in standard units of 1000 shares 
with stocks par value ofNT$10 per share or multiples of standard units. Government 
and corporate bonds have NT$ 10,000 face value as one trading unit. The order is 
processed and executed by the trading system according to price and time priority. 
Higher price buy order takes precedence over lower price buy order and lower price 
sell order takes precedence over higher price sell order. Same price orders, on the 
other hand, are determined by their entering time-stamps. 
(B. 3. 6. 2) Computerised trading system 
In autumn 1985, the Exchange launched the Computer-Assisted Trading System of 
most of the Category B stocks. Later in 1988, all listed stocks in the Exchange were 
traded under this computerised system. It was upgraded in 1993 to a fully automated 
securities trading system and all securities including stocks, bonds and beneficiary 
certificates were traded through this system. 
(B. 3. 6. 3) Price limit rule 
In order to maintain a stable stock market, daily price limits of stocks and convertible 
bonds are set at 7% of the closing price of the preceding business day. For other 
bond issues, the limits are set at 5%. 
(B. 3. 6. 4) Trading hours 
The trading hours of the Exchange are from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, Monday 
through Friday, and 9:00a.m. to 11:00 a. m. on Saturday. 
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(B. 4) Cost of dealing and taxation 
(B.4.1) Commission rates 
Table 1. 7 Commission rates on securities transactions in the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange 
Types of securities Transaction amount Most recent Commission 
rates 
Stocks and beneficiary certificates Any 0.1425% (minimum 
NT$20 or US$0. 76) 
Corporate & government bonds below NT$5m 0.1% 
(US$0.19m) 
from NT$5m up to 0.075% 
NT$50m 
above NT$50m 
Convertible bonds Any 
Source : Taiwan Stock Exchange Fact Book (1995) 
(B.4.2) Securities taxation 
0.05% 
0.125% 
Table 1.8 Securities taxation in the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Types of tax Most recent tax rates 
Securities transaction tax 0.3% levied on the sellers 
Corporate bonds transaction tax 0.1% 
Tax on dividends 15% for residents and 35% for non-residents 
Tax on interest income 10% for residents and 20% for non-residents 
Capital gains tax Nil 
Government bonds transaction tax Nil 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange Fact Book (1995) 
(B. 5) Market regulation and investors protection 
(B.5.1) Market regulation 
The Securities and Exchange Commission was set up in 1960 to regulate and 
supervise capital market operations. It has power to order a listed company to submit 
a detailed financial disclosure to it. Moreover, it also requires that all directors, key 
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employees and shareholders owning more than 5% of a company's outstanding shares 
must disclose their holdings. Many private companies do not like this disclosure 
requirement and therefore refuse to list on the Exchange. 
(B.5.2) Investor Protection 
There was no compensation fund for investors who incurred losses due to fraud or 
default by brokers or dealers before 1987. Now, each brokerage firm is required to 
deposit a certain amount of money in the Settlement and Clearing Fund and Business 
Guarantee Fund. In addition to that, the Taiwan securities industry has also set up an 
Investor Protection Fund with a total amount ofNT$1016 million (US$38.72 million) 
to protect investors in case ofbroker's default. 
(B.5.3) Insider dealing 
Insider dealing is not treated as a criminal offence. The Securities Transaction Law 
only requires persons trading on inside information to disclose their profits made from 
such information. 
(V) Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter has shown the importance of the four Asian countries in 
their economic developments over the past ten years as well as the institutional 
changes that were undertaken in their stock markets. Although the four countries 
differed in their economic policies, they all had a high rate of economic growth 
compared to the industrialised world. They had also implemented measures to 
improve or liberalise their stock markets within the past ten years and all of them had 
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experienced a sharp increase of foreign portfolio capital inflow, particularly between 
1992 to 1994. There are, however, differences in many aspects of their economic 
and financial policies and regulations, details ofwhich are listed in Table 1.9. 
Table 1.9 Differences in economies and stock markets of the Four Tigers (1987-96) 
Hong Kong Singapore South Korea Taiwan 
Av. real GDP 7.0% 7.5% 7.4% 6.3% 
growth 
Major economic services and manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing 
sector finance and finance and finance and finance 
Economic policy laissez faire intervention intervention protection 
Major export re-export electronic serru- machinery 
trade goods and re- conductors 
export 
Current account deficit on each surplus on deficit on each surplus on 
position year each year year each year 
Foreign exchange pegged to heavily heavily managed 
rates regime US$ since weighted weighted floating 
1983 towards US$ towards US$ 
and yen 
Stock market US$446 bn US$ 84 bn US$200 bn US$274 bn 
capitalisation (end of 1996) (end of 1996) (end of 1996) (end of 1996) 
Securities 0.25% on 0.3%-1% on 0.5% on 0.3% on 
transaction tax contract value contract value contract value contract value 
Tax on capital Nil Nil 0 for residents Nil 
gains 25% for non-
residents 
Tax on dividend Nil Nil 20% for 15% for 
residents residents 
25% for non- 35% for non-
residents residents 
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These differences in their economic and financial polices and state would be useful in 
explaining why price movements and volatility of the four Tiger markets might react 
to foreign market developments and news in different or similar ways. For instance, 
the varying degree of openness of their stock markets to foreign investors and the 
level of intervention by their governments in stabilising the markets might affect the 
ways the four Tiger markets are integrated with the world's leading markets. The 
information in this chapter thus raises several issues that need to be further 
investigated regarding the price and volatility behaviour of the four Asian stock 
markets. In particular, with the four markets becoming more liberalised and foreign 
portfolio investment on the increase, it is interesting to find out whether these changes 
have any impacts on (i) the nature of volatility of each individual markets; (ii) the level 
of influence that major world markets have on the price movements of the four Asian 
markets; and (iii) the response of volatility of the four Asian markets to foreign news. 
These issues will be addressed in turn in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Two : Foreign Investment And Price Volatility In Asian 
Stock Markets 
(I) Introduction 
Having discussed major characteristics relating to the economies of the four countries 
of interest, this chapter sets out to examine the nature of price volatility in the stock 
exchanges of these countries. As we have seen, economic growth in the Four Tigers 
of Asia - Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan - has been consistently 
high in the period since the late 1980s, averaging 6%-8% per annum as discussed in 
Chapter One. Sound economic conditions have led to the stock exchanges in these 
countries being of considerable interest to many foreign institutional investors from 
around the world. They were attracted by the opportunities for further international 
portfolio diversification and the high rates of return offered. Although the economic 
performance in these countries has been attractive, until recently foreign participation 
in the stock exchanges was limited due to formal restrictions on foreign investment or 
concerns about the efficient operation ofthe markets. For example, as we have seen 
in the previous chapter, the stock exchanges of Taiwan and South Korea were closed 
to foreign investors before the early 1990s. Although Singapore in theory did not 
formally ban foreign investment in its stock exchange, it did place certain limitations 
on the foreign ownership of local shares which had the effect of reducing foreign 
investment to low levels. These restrictions have been eased in recent years. In the 
period since 1991/1992, Taiwan and South Korea have begun to open up their 
markets to foreign investment and more foreign participation in the Singapore Stock 
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Exchange has also been encouraged. Similarly, while the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
has not placed major restrictions on foreign investment, since the late 1980s it has 
introduced changes designed to increase confidence in the market. However, 
encouragement of foreign investment was made against a background in which 
governments were cautious not to open their markets too rapidly. This caution 
results from a general fear that an influx of foreign investors may destabilise the 
market, making prices more volatile. This in turn may increase perceived riskiness 
and, thus, threaten the growth of the economy as a whole. 
How has the volatility of Asian markets changed with the increased opportunities for 
participation of foreign investors? Is such a change desirable or not when compared 
with an entirely closed market situation? The degree to which foreign direct 
participation impacts on the price volatility of the Four Tigers is an important issue for 
two reasons. First, it may lead to a changing perception about the risk in investing in 
these developing markets in the light of their increased openness. Second, it would 
also affect governments' decisions on further liberalisation of their markets and their 
attitude towards foreign investors. This, in turn, will have important implications for 
the ability of firms in emerging markets to raise capital and, therefore, will impact on a 
country's ability to maintain a high level of long-term growth. However, although the 
issues of stock market integration and volatility spill-over between mature and 
emerging stock markets have been widely addressed, there have been no direct studies 
on the impact of the openness to foreign investment on the nature of volatility of 
individual Asian stock markets. Such a study is of importance in its own right, and, it 
is believed, should come before examinations of volatility spill-over, since it will 
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provide insights not only on the changing nature of volatility through time, but also 
the structure of volatility. 
We seek to address this gap in the literature in this Chapter, by examining the nature 
and structure of volatility in the stock exchanges of the Four Tigers, both before and 
after the opening up of these markets to foreign investors. Two main questions will 
be addressed. 
( 1) How has the volatility of Asian markets changed with an increasing participation 
of foreign investors? 
(2) Is such a change desirable or not when compared to an entirely closed market 
situation? 
Undertaking such an analysis will allow determination of the impact of increased 
foreign investment opportunities on the nature of local stock market volatility and the 
extent to which the concerns of regulators in the developing markets about 
liberalisation are justified. It will be argued that while increased openness does raise 
the possibility of foreign investors having a destabilising impact by rapidly moving into 
and out of the market, it is also the case that increased openness for foreign investors 
may lead to an increase in the number and influence of informed traders in the local 
market. This may reduce the effect of noise trading and positive feedback trading on 
market volatility, which in turn may affect volatility persistence and the asymmetric 
response of volatility to news. Such effects, far from being detrimental to the stock 
exchange in question and the broader economy, may improve efficiency, increase 
investor confidence and bring tangible benefits to the economy. 
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section II gives the background to 
foreign participation in Asian markets. Section Ill briefly discusses arguments about 
the possible link between foreign investment and local stock market volatility. In 
section IV previous relevant work on Asian stock markets is reviewed and 
shortcomings of this work identified. Section V provides an outline of the recent 
major changes in each of the four stock markets in relation to foreign investment. 
Empirical design and data description are given in section VI, while section VII 
reports and discusses the empirical results. Finally, section VIII provides concluding 
remarks and discusses the implications of the findings. 
(D) Factors behind the increased foreign participation in Asian stock markets 
(A) Pull factors 
(A. I) Strong economic growth in Asia 
Strong economic growth in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan 
between 1987 and 1996 has drawn attention from international investors of the 
industrialised world. Their average annual growth rates were around 7% over the 
past ten years while that ofthe industrialised countries was about 1% to 3% as shown 
in Figure 2.1 below. Such a high rate of economic growth has given potential foreign 
investors the confidence of obtaining higher rates of returns by investing in these 
markets. 
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Figure 2.1 Real GDP growth rate of the US, the UK and Japan (1987-96) 
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(A.2) Financial market deregulation in Asia 
Deregulation of financial markets took place in many Asian countries during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. These include South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. They relaxed restrictions on foreign direct investment in their stock 
markets either by imposing an investment ceiling or by lifting the existing ceiling to a 
higher percentage. Capital account barriers were also eliminated, making it more 
attractive for foreigners to invest in these markets. 
(A.3) Increased international capital mobility 
During the 1970s and 1980s, many industrialised countries removed their restrictions 
on international capital movement. For instances, the UK abolished its foreign 
exchange control in 1979. Outward investment especially portfolio investment was 
no longer prevented. Germany and Switzerland relaxed their exchange controls during 
1980, enabling non-residents' access to their stock markets. Italy lifted its restrictions 
upon domestic residents' ability to invest abroad in 1985. France also abolished its 
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25% withholding tax on dividend earnings by non-residents and raised the ceiling of 
investment abroad by French residents from 25% to 50% during 1985. Such removal 
of official barriers to international capital movements, together with reductions in 
transaction costs, technological change in communications and management of 
information had greatly increased international capital mobility. As a result, both 
direct investment and portfolio investment in developing economies, particularly in 
Asia, have expanded rapidly. 
(B) Push factors 
(B.J) Low interest rates and low growth in developed countries 
Interest rate and exchange rate developments in US and European countries during 
the early 1990s have pushed western investors to seek higher return investments from 
emerging markets. Between 1992 and 1993, US and Japan experienced unusually low 
interest rates of 2% to 4% as shown in Figure 2.2. Meanwhile, the European 
exchange rate parity was under attack. Many countries had to either devalue their 
currencies within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (e.g. Spain, Portugal and Ireland) or 
float their currencies (e.g. UK and Italy). Official interest rates were raised by the 
authorities to support their currencies which inevitably led to weak growth. Investors 
in these industrial countries were thus attracted to high-investing yields in emerging 
markets such as those in Asia. 
(B.2) Growth ofinvestmentfunds 
During the 1990s, investment funds in higher-income countries such as the US and the 
UK grew rapidly. For instance, American mutual funds' total net assets rose from 
75 
Figure 2.2 Short term interest rates of the US and Japan (1987-96) 
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US$1.4 trillion in 1992 to US$4.2 trillion in 1996. UK's pension-fund sector now 
also has over a trillion US dollars in assets. These funds were operated under great 
competitive pressures to maximise returns and minimise risk. Diversifying into 
developing markets such as Asian stock markets thus became attractive. By 1996, 
American mutual funds allocated 49% of their assets to world equity markets while 
Britain's unit trusts invested 90% of their assets in equities both domestically and 
abroad (Source: The Economist, 25th October 1997). 
As a result of these factors, foreign portfolio capital flow to emerging markets in 
Latin America and Asia rose dramatically between 1985 and 1995. As shown in 
Figure 2.3, net foreign portfolio investment grew from US$0.1 billion in 1985 to 
US$46 billion in 1993, ofwhich two-thirds was destined to Asia. South Korea and 
Taiwan had also recorded a sharp rise in foreign portfolio investment since they 
relaxed the ban on foreign direct participation in their stock markets in 1992 and 1991 
respectively. This is shown in Figures 1.39 and 1.51 in Chapter One. An increase in 
foreign participation in Asian markets during the 1990s thus became evident. 
76 
Figure 2.3 Foreign portfolio investment in emerging markets 
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(ill) The link between foreign investment and local stock market volatility 
The short-termism of foreign investment is often said to be a potential danger to the 
stability of local stock markets, because the presence of foreign investors in the local 
stock markets tends to increase stock price volatility. It is feared that foreign 
investors would magnify price fluctuations in the local market when they sell their 
shares at the time when it is weak. Alternatively, a sudden withdrawal of funds by 
foreign investors would cause liquidity problem in the local market which in turn 
might lead to higher market volatility. In an IMF Occasional paper in 1995 , Khan 
and Reinhart argue that 'large capital inflows into a developing country are often 
associated with a rapid expansion of money and credit, inflationary pressures, a real 
exchange rate appreciation and they also tend to have a substantial impact on the 
stock market. If the capital inflows are purely short term, then these problems will 
intensify as the probability of an abrupt and sudden reversal increases' (p.15). 
Underlying this fear of the possible adverse effect of increasing foreign investment on 
a local stock market's stability is the belief that foreign investors are the major source 
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of stock market volatility and that without their participation, the market would be 
better off in the hands of local investors. 
Such a perception may be unfounded, since foreign investors could also help improve 
information efficiency in a local developing market. For those who decide to 
participate in Asian stock markets may well be well-informed traders, particularly 
institutional investors, as cross-market investment usually involves high transaction 
and information costs. Prior to entry into a new market it is likely that there will have 
been detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses, and of the potential and 
riskiness of the market. In the absence of detailed analysis and obtaining reliable 
information, foreign investors may well prefer investing in a market with which they 
are familiar, that is their home stock market, rather than taking on unnecessary and 
potentially unquantifiable risk. Therefore, it is quite possible to believe that foreign 
investors as a group will be informed traders rather than uninformed speculators or 
noise traders. In contrast, local investors, who are mostly private individual investors, 
may not be as well informed with world market movements as those foreign 
institutional investors. These local investors put their money into the stock markets 
either because of the low interest rates offered by their local banks, as in the case of 
Hong Kong, or the tax advantages offered by their local governments, as there is no 
capital gains tax for residents in all four Tiger markets. The common source of 
information they get to assist their trading is from their local newspapers, financial 
reports or even words of mouth. Moreover, not all of them have the expertise and 
resources to assess the relevance and implication of a piece of local or overseas news 
to their market movements. Hence taking lead from their local big investors or 
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following the general public's opinion would be common practice among individual 
private investors in the local markets. It is therefore perceivable that foreign 
institutional investors would be relatively better informed than local private investors 
in general. The increased participation of well-informed investors in developing 
stock markets could thus be expected to improve market efficiency, increase the rate 
of information flow, improve the quality and reliability of information and, hence, 
reduce the persistence of volatility to a shock. As a result, foreign investment can 
alter the nature of an individual market's volatility. 
Another influence that foreign investment may have on the volatility of an emerging 
market is that they may help reduce the influence of noise trading. In his paper, Black 
( 1986) discusses his thinking and arguments on the meaning, functions and possible 
causes of noise trading in financial markets. He believes that not all investors are 
rational when making their buy and sell decisions. He thinks that 'noise is a major 
reason for the use of decision rules that seem to violate the normal axioms of 
expected utility. Because there is so much noise in the world, people adopt rules of 
thumbs' (p.535). He terms investors who do not exhibit rationality in this context as 
noise traders, who trade on noise as if it were information. If their trading forms a 
significant part of the total trading in a stock market, the price of a security is likely to 
be driven away from its fundamental value. This price discrepancy may well provide 
an opportunity for arbitrage activities so that the security price would eventually be 
driven back to its fundamental value. However, Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue 
that arbitrageurs' counteraction against noise trading is limited by various risks, such 
as that associated with the problem of identification, fundamental risk and noise 
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traders' risk. They point out that arbitrageurs themselves might act as noise traders 
without realising it and help drive prices further away from fundamentals, making the 
problem of noise trading even worse. In addition to noise traders, Shleifer and 
Summers (1990) identify another group ofirrational traders who base their investment 
decisions on trend chasing. This group buy when stock prices rise and sell when 
stock prices fall. Very often, this behaviour is related to an element of over-reaction 
to news. These trend chasers are usually known as positive-feedback traders. In 
markets where the influence of well-informed investors is low, it is the actions of 
noise and feedback traders that may have the greatest influence in setting security 
prices, because the price discrepancies they help cause cannot easily be arbitraged 
away. 
The impact of noise traders on stock market volatility can manifest itself in the form 
of the asymmetric response of volatility to news, meaning that the response of traders 
to a piece of good news and bad news is asymmetric. Two main arguments have been 
put forward as possible explanations for observed asymmetries. First, the leverage 
effect has been seen as the cause of this asymmetric response of volatility to news. 
The financial leverage hypothesis (Christie (1982)) says that as prices fall, the financial 
and operating leverage of firms rise and, hence, there is an increase in the required 
rates of return of equity holders, which causes prices to fall more. As a result, 
negative returns are likely to be associated with greater volatility than positive returns. 
The second explanation relates news asymmetry to noise trading behaviour. In his 
paper, Black (1986) cites the findings ofTversky and Kahneman (1982) that 'people 
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will take certain gambles to avoid losses, but will refuse the same gambles when they 
involve prospective gains' (p.535). This could be due to the fact that investors are 
more sensitive to losses than to gains so that when they face losses, they would be 
prepared to take on more risks or gambles in an attempt to recover their losses. 
Alternatively, such behaviour might be related to a limited number of heuristic 
principles that people rely on when assessing the probability of an uncertain event 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1982, p.3). For instance, 'people may be affected by the 
illusion of validity whereby the confidence they have in their prediction depends 
primarily on the degree of representativeness, that is, on the quality of the match 
between the selected outcome and the input, with little or no regard for the factors 
that limit predict accuracy' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982, p.9). In other words, they 
may be too confident in their own forecasts that they inevitably introduce bias into 
their actions. This could be the reason why people are willing to take on gambles to 
avoid losses but will refuse the same gambles when they involve prospective gains. If 
the finding of Tversky and Kahneman (1982) is true, then the reaction to a piece of 
bad news is expected to be greater than that to a piece of good news. Sentana and 
Wadhwani ( 1992) also argue that 'large price declines possibly lead to more positive 
feedback trading as compared with large price rises. The reason is that those who 
trade on margin and make large losses after price declines, often have no choice but to 
sell their holdings in order to meet their obligations.' (pp.421-422) 
If asymmetries arise from the leverage effect, then changes in foreign investment 
activity would have little impact on the extent of any asymmetries. However, if the 
second explanation of asymmetric responses is correct, then increasing activity by 
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well-informed foreign investors might be expected to reduce the impact of noise and 
feedback traders, reduce observed asymmetries and, thus, alter the nature of local 
stock market volatility. Thus, while opening up a market to foreign investors may, as 
feared, impact on volatility, if asymmetries are the result of undesirable noise trading, 
changes in volatility may be seen as desirable. A reduction in asymmetries thus 
becomes an indication of a decrease in the impact of noise trading on volatility. 
Changes in asymmetric responses following regulatory changes to open a market to 
foreign investors would thus provide evidence that foreign investors do impact on 
volatility in a market, but far from that impact being undesirable it is possible that 
foreign investors have a positive impact on the operation and behaviour of the market. 
(IV) Literature review 
Most empirical studies of Asian stock markets to date have focused on the issues of 
stock market integration and volatility spill-over between mature and emerging stock 
markets. No work has previously been undertaken on the changing nature of 
volatility of individual Asian stock markets in response to changes in the openness of 
markets to foreign investors. The paper by Ng et. al. (1991) is the most closely 
related work to the subject being examined in this chapter. It looks at the effects of 
relaxing restrictions on foreign investment in the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1986 and 
the Securities Exchange of Thailand in 1987 on the transmission of volatility among 
national stock markets. A GARCH(1,1)-M model is fitted to the daily return of four 
markets namely Japan, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan over a three year period 
between 1985 and 1987. The first two represent markets undergoing liberalisation 
changes while the latter two remain closed to foreign direct investment. The impact 
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of the most recent US news on each of the four markets is proxied by the squared 
difference of the observed daily US return and its conditional mean return, and is 
included into each market's conditional variance equation. They only find evidence of 
volatility transmission from the US to the two open markets Japan and Thailand while 
South Korea and Taiwan are not responsive at all to US news. To further investigate 
whether implementing liberalisation measures would intensify the spill-over effect, the 
full sample period is partitioned according to the time Japan and Thailand introduced 
their liberalisation measures. Results show that only in Japan are there signs of 
intensification post-liberalisation. They believe that the lack of evidence for Thailand 
is down to the short post-liberalisation sample period. 
The important role of cross-market stock investment in inducing volatility spill-over 
from one market to another is also highlighted in Chowdhury ( 1994) and Rogers 
(1994) and Cheung and Mak (1992). Chowdhury (1994) looks at the transmission 
mechanism of stock price movements from the US and Japan to Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan over a four year period from 1986 to 1990. 
Daily rates of return on the six stock market indices are fitted into a six-variable 
vector autoregressive (V AR) model. The dynamic responses of each of the markets 
to a shock in a particular market are then traced out using the impulse responses of 
the estimated V AR system. He finds that out of the four newly industrialised markets, 
only Hong Kong and Singapore, which do not have restrictions on foreign investment, 
are responsive to shocks from the US and Japan. South Korea and Taiwan, which 
stay closed during the sample period, are not responsive to any foreign shocks, thus 
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confirming his argument that cross-country direct investment ts the key to 
international volatility transmission. 
Rogers (1994) uses the same V AR technique to address the issue of volatility 
transmission from well developed to newly developed stock markets in Asia and Latin 
America surrounding the 1987 world market crash period. His results show that price 
spill-over from the US occurs only in markets without stiff foreign entry barrier such 
as Thailand and Chile. In Taiwan and South Korea, such price spill-over is non-
existent because they are the most restrictive of all markets under investigation. 
Cheung and Mak (1992) use the Granger-causality tests to investigate the pnce 
relationships between two developed markets and eight Asian-Pacific markets. Most 
Asian-Pacific markets show signs of being Granger-caused by the US except Taiwan 
and South Korea. They remain unaffected by weekly return changes in the US market 
over the period of 1977 to 1988. This finding is again attributed to their different 
degree of market openness. 
Not all studies agree that foreign investment opportunity is a requirement for volatility 
spill-over. The flow of public world information and/or market contagion could be 
responsible for that too. For example, Eun and Shim (1989) and Becker, Finnerty and 
Tucker (1995) argue that cross-market volatility transmission is a result of common 
reaction to public world information such as US news. King and Wadhwani (1990) 
and Lin, Engle and Ito ( 1994) on the other hand, believe that volatility spill over is 
driven by market contagion. 
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Eun and Shim ( 1989) are the first to use variance decomposition derived from the 
V AR method to investigate the issue of market inter-dependence. Examining the 
period ofDecember 1979 to December 1985, they find evidence ofhigh correlation of 
stock returns between the Asian-Pacific markets (including Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan and South Korea) and the United States, regardless of their varying degrees 
of market openness. They argue that this may reflect the importance of US news in 
affecting the world markets because of its dominant position in the world economy. 
Becker, Finnerty and Tucker (1995) examine the short-term correlation structure 
between the US overnight returns and current intra-day UK stock returns to find out 
whether international markets are linked in a way which supports the public 
information hypothesis or the over-reaction hypothesis. They find that the UK market 
does respond to US news over the sample period of mid 1986 to end of 1990, 
particularly inflation and merchandise trade figures. Market volatility in the UK also 
appears to be higher on US announcement days than non-announcement days. They 
therefore conclude that the results are supportive of the public information hypothesis 
as an explanation of international equity market linkages. 
King and Wadhwani (1990) disagreed with the view that public information is the key 
mechanism for volatility transmission. They recognise that investors in individual 
markets might make their investment decisions by extracting information on global 
factors from price changes in other markets as if it were public information. Such 
contagious market psychology might cause international markets to move up or down 
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in unison even when the move is not justified by economic fundamentals of the 
individual market. They argue that this is exactly the case for the uniform decline of 
world markets during the 1987 world market crash. 
Lin, Engle and Ito (1994) echo King and Wadhwani's (1990) argument in finding 
evidence from the signal extraction model that Japanese traders are not able to extract 
the global information optimally from the observed price changes in the US market. 
Instead, information from the US that should only have a local impact is also reflected 
in the pricing of stocks in Japan. This is suggestive that market contagion psychology 
is at work. Thus they conclude that their empirical results are consistent with the 
contagion effect hypothesis ofK.ing and Wadhwani (1990). 
All the aforementioned papers have their own merits. They have either helped in 
broadening the understanding of market integration between developed stock markets 
and emerging Asian markets or in devising new methods to investigate the issue of the 
international volatility transmission mechanism. What is missing though is that they 
have not directly addressed the issue of how volatility in individual Asian developing 
markets changes after the opportunity for foreign investment in local stocks has 
increased. This might be due to the fact that the samples used in these papers mainly 
cover the two to three year period surrounding the 1987 crash. The most recent 
samples in these papers are only up to the year 1990. Yet for most markets in Asia, 
liberalisation of one form or another took place after 1991. Now the availability of 
post liberalisation data make it possible to address the issue of the changing nature of 
volatility in an individual Asian market directly. As each stock market is unique with 
86 
its own economic and political background, the study of the changing nature of 
volatility in an individual market forms an important basis for understanding the 
impact of market openness on volatility. Furthermore, it will provide insights about 
volatility which may be important in subsequent analysis of volatility transmission 
between these markets. If increased foreign investment opportunities do impact on 
volatility, then while the existence of trade relations, or the effect of market contagion 
may be partly responsible for volatility spill-over, it would suggest that there is also a 
need to take account of the regulatory framework of the market with respect to 
openness to foreign investors. It will also be indicative of a need to partition time 
periods for the analysis of volatility transmission with respect to different periods of 
market openness. 
Further limitation of previous studies is that they have not taken account of the 
asymmetric response of volatility to news. Previous work has assumed that positive 
and negative news of a given magnitude have the same effect on stock market 
volatility. However, as Black (1986) and Engle and Ng (1993) point out, this might 
not necessarily be the case. Negative news is very likely to have a greater impact on 
volatility than positive news. Thus by examining the change in asymmetric effects as 
the opportunity for foreign participation changes, we might be able to infer whether 
the impact of noise trading has been reduced as a result of the institutional change. 
This will also provide insights into the causes of asymmetries. If there is no change 
following the opening up of a market this would suggest that leverage arguments 
provide the most appropriate explanation of asymmetries. On the other hand, a 
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change in asymmetries would suggest that noise trading arguments are more 
persuasive. 
In summary, the contributions of this chapter to an understanding of the issue of 
volatility are twofold. First, it provides the basis for an understanding of the possible 
link between the changing nature of an individual market's volatility and the changing 
opportunities for foreign investors. As most Asian stock markets relaxed their 
restrictions on foreign investors after 1991, the effects of foreign investment on an 
individual market's volatility before and after the change can be directly compared. 
The study also sheds light on whether foreign investment leads to the local market 
becoming more volatile, which has important implications for regulators. Second, the 
effect of noise trading on volatility in an individual market can also be traced by 
examining how asymmetric responses have changed after restrictions on foreign 
investors are relaxed. In general, a reduction in the asymmetric effects would indicate 
a fall in the influence of noise trading in the market. 
(V) Key changes in the four Asian stock markets 
The four markets studied in this chapter differ not only in their level of financial 
market openness, but also in the way their economies operate (see Chapter One) and 
the political changes and uncertainties which they face. For example, the uncertainty 
over the handing over of Hong Kong back to China in 1997 and the threat of military 
invasion from mainland China and North Korea to Taiwan and South Korea 
respectively. These factors may all influence the nature of volatility in their stock 
markets. However, while these factors may be important, the focus of our attention 
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here is on the importance of foreign investment opportunities and market openness on 
volatility. In order to examine this issue, key changes in markets which have led to a 
rise in foreign investment opportunities must be identified, as must the time at which 
the changes were implemented. This will allow the partitioning of data into times 
before and after increased market openness. Analysis of these sub-periods will enable 
identification of the impact of liberalisation on market volatility. A summary of the 
key changes in each market is given below, together with the date at which the data 
will be partitioned for analysis for each market. A comparison of the size of foreign 
equity investment in the Four Tigers in the post-liberalisation periods is also provided. 
(A) South Korea 
According to the classification of Rhee et. al. (1991), the stock exchange of South 
Korea (KSE) was a restricted market as of December 1987. At that time it had very 
severe foreign exchange and stock ownership controls, making it almost impossible 
for foreign investors to invest directly in Korean stocks. These controls have been 
gradually lifted, beginning in January 1992 when foreign investors were allowed to 
hold up to 10% of a Korean company's shares in aggregate. This ceiling was 
marginally raised to 12% in December 1994, to 15% in June 1995 and 18% in April 
1996. Since the first relaxation is likely to have been of most importance and since 
subsequent further relaxations have been taken in relatively small stages, the post-
liberalisation period is taken to be from January 1992. 
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(B) Taiwan 
Like South Korea, Taiwan had a tradition of being a strictly controlled market, since 
it did not allow any foreign direct investment in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). 
While it may be considered slightly more liberalised than the KSE in that since 1987 
domestic investors could invest up to US $5 million per year abroad, it was not until 
January 1991 that the TSE was opened to foreign investment. At that time a ceiling 
for foreign ownership of 10% of any company's stock was set, although only foreign 
institutional investors were allowed to participate. Foreign individuals were still 
prohibited from direct investment until February 1996. Following the relaxation in 
1991, the ceiling was raised to 12% in February 1995, 15% in September 1995 and 
20% in February 1996. Over the same period, measures which encourage foreign 
investment were also introduced. For instance, the rate of securities transaction costs 
was halved to 0.3% in 1993. In January 1996, limits on the repatriation of profits 
earned by foreign investors on the TSE were also abolished. While all of these 
changes are likely to have been of influence, it is again the first of these which appears 
to be of most importance and, hence, the post-liberalisation sample period is taken as 
commencing in January 1991. 
(C) Singapore 
Fixing a precise date which is appropriate for examining the impact of changing 
opportunities for foreign investment in the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) on 
volatility is not as straight forward as it is for the previous two markets. On the 
surface, there are no exchange controls nor restrictions on foreign investment in local 
firms except in specific areas of investment like banking and strategic companies. 
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However, in practice, foreign investors do face certain limitations. For example, 
foreign institutional holdings of an individual company's share is limited to a 
maximum of 49%. Similarly, the bylaws of specific Singaporean companies can and 
often do restrict foreign holdings in many listed firms. Many of the largest and most 
popular issues, such as Singapore Airlines, also have limits on foreign ownership. 
Furthermore, foreign brokerage operations in the SES were also restricted prior to 
1992. Their participation in local brokerages was limited to 49% of ownership. All 
of these restrictions indicate that foreign investment in the SES may have been 
constrained and limited. 
Between 1992 and 1993, a number of institutional changes took place which had the 
effect of reducing some ofthe above constraints and encouraging foreign participation 
in the market. For example, in 1992, seven foreign brokerage companies were 
admitted to the exchange as international members to deal freely in SES securities on 
behalf of non-resident firms and individuals. By 1993, the 49% limit on foreign 
ownership of local brokerages was raised to 70%. In October of the same year, the 
government offered a 7.3% stake in Singapore Telecom, the communications 
monopoly, to public ownership. Many more state-owned utilities and companies 
were also planned to be part-privatised and some of their shares would be offered to 
the public. Given that these measures, taken together, would give more opportunities 
for foreign investors to participate in the market and, in turn, could be expected to 
increase the level of foreign investment, the post-liberalisation period will be 
designated to start from October 1993. 
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(D) Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) has always been open to foreign investors 
with no restrictions since it was established in April 1986 by unifYing four existing 
stock exchanges. There is no obvious change in the market which marks a sudden 
increase in opportunities for foreign investment. However, while there were no 
formal restrictions on foreign participation, there may have been practical 
considerations which led foreign investors to be less willing to participate. In 
particular, it is possible that foreign investors lacked confidence in the operation and 
regulatory framework of the market. In late 1989 the Securities and Futures 
Commission was established in the HKSE with the aim of cleaning up and 
modernising the market. With the introduction of this new regulatory apparatus 
designed to prevent fraud, it is likely that foreign investors would have increased 
confidence in the market. Thus 1989 is chosen to mark the start of the post-
liberalisation sample period. 
During their post-liberalisation periods, the size of foreign equity investment in the 
Four Tigers differed not according to their degree of openness, but rather to the 
actual investment opportunities that existed in individual markets. Thus South Korea, 
one of the least open markets among the Four Tigers, had attracted more foreign 
equity investment than the relatively more open market in Singapore. It amounted to 
a total of US$22.8 billion for South Korea between January 1992 and July 1996, 
compared to a total of US$3. 7 billion for Singapore between October 1993 and July 
1996, and a total ofUS$11.8 billion for Taiwan between January 1991 and July 1996 
(Source: Economist Intelligence Unit). As for Hong Kong, due to data constraint, 
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only the equity investment from the US in part of its post-liberalisation period is 
available. Between 1990 and 1993, total US equity investment in Hong Kong stood 
at US$ 11.9 billion (Source: Khan and Reinhart, 1995). However, a survey of foreign 
share-holdings in individual companies in each of the Four Tiger markets indicates 
that Hong Kong had the largest proportion of its listed companies with foreign 
holdings of their shares of about 50% in 1996. This is compared to 3% for 
Singapore, 17% for Taiwan and 33.5% for South Korea in the same year (Source: 
Asian Company Handbook). 
(VI) Empirical design and data description 
(A) Empirical design 
Engle (1982) has shown that ARCH type models are suitable for examining financial 
variables which typically are not normally distributed, but instead are characterised by 
fat-tails, with constant means and variances that change over time. Engle's (1982) 
ARCH model was the first formal model capable of capturing these stylised facts. In 
1986, Bollerslev proposed an extension of the conditional variance function which he 
termed generalised ARCH (GARCH). The specification of conditional variance in a 
GARCH(p,q) model is given in (1) below. 
(1) 
where ht is the conditional variance of the residual; 
and Elr-1 is the squared residuals ofthe conditional mean equation. 
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In practice, numerous studies have demonstrated that a GARCH(l, 1) specification is 
most appropriate. This specification has the advantage that the coefficients are easily 
interpreted, with the estimate of a1 showing the impact of current news on the 
conditional variance process and the estimate of P1 the persistence of volatility to a 
shock or, alternatively, the impact of'old' news on volatility. 
However, the use of this simple GARCH model is inadequate and inappropriate for 
the purpose of our study, since it does not allow for the asymmetric response of 
volatility to news. In many markets there is evidence of asymmetries (see, for 
example, Engle and Ng (1993) and Kim and Kon (1994)). Furthermore, whether there 
exist asymmetries and the extent to which any asymmetries change as markets are 
opened up are central issues in this chapter. The estimation of asymmetries forms a 
crucial basis from which to draw inferences about noise trading and whether its effect 
on volatility has been reduced by an increase in the opportunities for foreign 
investment. Therefore the simple GARCH model is an inadequate model for our 
analysis. Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1989) (GJR) extend the simple 
GARCH(1,1) model to allow for asymmetric effects by including an indicative dummy 
as shown in equation (2)1. 
(2) 
The indicative dummy s;_1 takes on the value of 1 if E1•1 < 0 and 0 otherwise. The 
impact of a piece of negative news in this equation is given by the sum of a1 and a2 . 
The impact of a piece of positive news is estimated by a
1 
alone, because the indicative 
1 Tllis specification of asymmetric GARCH effects is preferred to the E-GARCH specification 
following the findings ofEngle and Ng (1993) and Kim and Kon (1994). 
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dummy s;_ 1 is 0 is this case. The persistence of volatility to any kind of shock is 
estimated by P
1
. Engle and Ng (1993) find that the GJR model captures the 
asymmetries of the Japanese stock index most accurately among other alternative 
models. 
To take account of the impact of the stock market crash on volatility, equation (2) is 
augmented with a dummy variable for the five weeks surrounding the October 1987 
crash period. It takes on the value of 1 if the observations fall in this period and 0 
otherwise2. Thus the conditional variance equation estimated for periods including the 
stock market crash is: 
(3) 
where DC= 1 if1987:10:19 ~t ~ 1987:11:21. 
This model is estimated only for the pre-change period for Hong Kong. All other 
sample periods start after the crash. 
(B) Data description 
In order to examine the volatility of prices we begin by constructing a returns series 
for each market to be investigated. The returns series are constructed using an 
appropriate market index for each market to allow a market wide measure of volatility 
to be determined. In view of the importance of the indexes in both measuring and 
reflecting the level of activity in the market, their underlying structure and weighting 
are important considerations in appraising their accuracy and representativeness. 
2 The model was also estimated without the crash dummy and the broad pattern of results were 
unchanged. 
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Therefore, the indexes used in this chapter are all value-weighted. The constituents of 
these indexes are generally made up of large capitalisation stocks that are actively 
traded in the markets. The use of value-weighted indexes is preferred to the use of 
All Shares Indexes because the former are more representative in reflecting the real 
level of trading activities in the markets, minimising the impacts of infrequent trading 
activities of smaller capitalisation stocks on the indexes. Hence in this chapter the 
indexes used are the Hang Seng Index (Hong Kong), Korea Composite Price Index, 
Singapore Straits Times Industrial Index and Taiwan Weighted-Price Index. They are 
calculated using the market-value weighted formula defined by : 
Current Index= (Current AMY I Base AMY) x Base Index 
where AMY stands for the aggregate market value. The base index and base date 
vary from one exchange to another. Daily returns expressed in percentages for each 
market are computed as logarithmic price relatives: 
(4) 
A number of studies on individual Asian markets have found the existence of market 
anomalies such as day-of-the-week effects and a January effect (see for example Lee 
(1992) and Huang (1995)). In order to concentrate only on the unpredictable part of 
the return series when estimating the conditional variance, adjustments are made to 
the data along the lines ofEngle and Ng (1993). The procedure involves two steps 
which removes any predictability from the return series. First, actual returns are 
regressed on a constant and four day-of-the-week dummies and the residuals from this 
regression are saved. Second, this residual series is then regressed on a constant and 
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its own six lags to remove possible auto-correlation. The residuals from this second 
regression then become our unpredictable return series. Making adjustments to the 
series in this way is important to ensure correct observation of any asymmetric effects. 
To ensure that the impact of other major changes in the markets under investigation 
are minimised, we choose the beginning of our pre-liberalisation period to coincide 
with the onset of a computerised trading system in each market. Thus the returns 
series for the HKSE, SSE, KSE and TSE start from April 1986, March 1989, March 
1988 and January 1988 respectively. For all markets the sample period ends at July 
1996. The samples are split into pre-change and post-change periods according to the 
time when foreign investment opportunities in each individual market increased, as 
explained in section V. Thus, the sample sizes for the pre-change period are 849, 
1197, 1001, and 782 for the HKSE, SSE, KSE and TSE respectively and the 
corresponding figures for the post-change period are 1848, 739, 1196 and 1457. 
(Vll) Empirical results 
Summary statistics of preliminary data analyses for the four daily return series are 
reported in Table 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. In table 2.1.1, the value of the kurtosis statistic is 
extremely large for Hong Kong over its full pre-change sample period, suggesting that 
the underlying data is heavily tailed and sharply peaked about the mean when 
compared with the normal distribution. When some extreme observations, such as the 
period surrounding the world stock market crash and the immediate aftermath of 
Beijing' s Tien-an-man Square Massacre, are dropped from the full pre-change sample 
period as shown in columns three and four of the table, the values of the kurtosis 
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statistics fall substantially. This suggests that the presence of outliers is the major 
cause of the extreme kurtosis found in the full pre-change sample period. 
Nevertheless, the kurtosis in all four markets over both sample periods is still high, 
indicating that their daily return series have a fat-tail distribution. This fat-tail nature 
of the return distribution supports the use of the autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model for the variance processes ofthe returns. 
Asymmetric GARCH models along the lines of Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkel 
(1989) shown as equation (2) or equation (3) are estimated for each of the four 
markets as appropriate. Tables 2.2 to 2.5 show the results of estimations for the pre-
and post-change periods for Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan 
respectively. 
Table 2.1.1 Preliminary data analyses over the pre-change period 
Country HK(J) HK(2) HK(3) Singapore S. Korea Taiwan 
Daily 
return: 
Mean 0.000 0.06 0.087 -0.000 -0.009 -0.000 
Std. Dev. 2.182 1.60 1.36 1.005 1.414 2.898 
Skewness -8.30 -4.27 -0.25 -1.023 0.277 -0.064 
Kurtosis 144.2 66.46 9.74 15.23 3.194 1.031 
Sample periods : 
HK(l): 1986:4:1 - 1989:6:30 
HK(2) : 1986:4:1 - 1989:6:30 with the 5 week-period surrounding the world stock 
market crash (i.e. 1987: 10:19 - 1987:11:21) dropped from the full sample. 
HK(3): same as HK(2) but with an additional outlier dropped from the full sample as 
well. This outlier is found on the 5th of June 1989, a day immediately following the 
Tien-an-men Square massacre in Beijing. 
Singapore: 1989:3:1- 1993:9:30 
S. Korea : 1988:3:3- 1991:12:31 
Taiwan : 1988:1:1 - 1990:12:31 
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Table 2.1.2 Preliminary data analyses over the post-change period 
Country Hong Kong Singapore Korea Taiwan 
(Sample (89:7:3- (93:10:1- (92:1:1- (91:1:1-
period) 96:7:31) 96:7:31) 96:7:31) 96:7:31) 
Daily Return: 
Mean -0.026 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
Std. Dev. 1.340 0.943 1.266 1.762 
Skewness -0.473 -0.162 0.313 -0.021 
Kurtosis 4.782 3.283 2.604 2.975 
Table 2.2 GJR-GARCH results for the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
ao <Xi az @I y 
Pre-change 0.1177 0.0408 0.2812 0.8022 17.5499 
(1986:4:8- (0.0105) (0.0075) (0.0012) (0.0050) (2.0918) 
1989:6:30) 
Post-change 0.1511 
(1989:7:3- (0.0043) 
1996:7:31) 
0.0727 0.0900 
(0.0041) (0.0080) 
0.8108 
(0.0029) 
214.378 
(0.0000) 
An asterisk * denotes test statistic for test of equality of asymmetry coefficients over 
the two sample periods with probability value shown in parenthesis. Standard errors 
of the estimated coefficients are given in parentheses. 
Table 2.3 GJR-GARCH results for the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
ao a I az ~I r}* 
Pre-change 0.3571 0.1116 0.4055 0.3250 
(1989:3: 1 - (0.0044) (0.0183) (0.0348) (0.0076) 
1993:9:30) 
Post-change 0.1914 0.3033 0.1497 0.3775 18.308 
(1993:10:1- (0.0107) (0.0311) (0.0622) (0.0191) (0.0000) 
1996:7:31} 
*Footnotes as table 2.2 
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Table 2.4 GJR-GARCH results for the Korea Stock Exchange 
ao a. az f3t x/* 
Pre-change 0.2831 0.1281 0.1434 0.6646 
(1988:3:3- (0.0138) (0.0121) (0.0277) (0.0086) 
1991: 12:31} 
Post-change 0.0848 0.0762 0.0430 0.8500 13.167 
(1992: 1:1 - (0.0064) (0.0052) (0.0114) (0.0048) (0.0003) 
1996:7:31} 
*Footnotes as table 2.2 
Table 2.5 GJR-GARCH results for the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
ao a. az ~I "!.!* 
Pre-change 0.1870 0.0492 0.1454 0.8572 
(1988:1:1- (0.0376) (0.0085) (0.0176) (0.0072) 
1990:12:31} 
Post-change 0.1078 0.0482 0.0338 0.8975 40.175 
(1991: 1:1 - (0.0054) (0.0029) (0.0054) (0.0022) (0.0000) 
1996:7:31} 
*Footnotes as table 2.2 
In each of the markets there is clear evidence of an asymmetric response of volatility 
to news both before and after the opening up of the market to foreign investors. In 
the pre-change periods, negative news impacts on the volatility of the four markets, 
which are measured by the summation of a1 and a2, are 8 times, 5 times, 2 times and 
7 times higher than positive news impacts of an equal magnitude for Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan respectively. This might suggest that during the 
pre-change periods, negative news could have more prolonged and significant 
influence on the development of the markets than positive news. Examples of 
negative news during these periods include the world stock market crash in 1987 and 
the political uncertainty following the massacre of protesting students in Beijing, 
which greatly affected Hong Kong in particular, as well as the outbreak of the Gulf 
War in 1990. Such big negative news were likely to have prolonged effects on market 
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movements as well as investors' confidence, as they were uncertain about how these 
crises might affect the political, economic and financial stability of both the local and 
world markets. In times of uncertainty, it would be difficult to distinguish noise from 
information. As was mentioned in Section Ill, most local investors are private 
individual investors who do not have the expertise to analyse the implications of 
world and local news to their local markets. Thus noise and feedback traders might 
become more active in the markets during this time, chasing the trend of local and I or 
overseas markets, and following the lead of big investors in their local markets in 
making their investment decisions. The high persistence of volatility to shocks during 
the pre-change periods in three out of four markets might also support the view that 
the news they encountered had far-reaching impacts, probably not only on the stock 
markets alone but on their economies as well. The impacts of news on the economies 
would later have feedback effects on the stock markets, resulting in a higher 
persistence of volatility to news. Therefore, the finding of an asymmetric response of 
volatility to news over the pre-change period along with a significant beta for each of 
the four markets could be reasonable. 
The results for the post-liberalisation period show that the estimated asymmetry 
coefficients have gone down by approximately two-thirds in all four markets from the 
pre-liberalisation period, suggesting that the opening up of the markets to foreign 
investors has substantially reduced the asymmetric response of volatility to news. If 
the assumption that foreign institutional investors are mostly informed traders and that 
local private individual investors generally tend to be noise or feedback traders is to 
be accepted, then such a reduction in news asymmetries following liberalisation could 
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be interpreted as an indication of a reduction in the impact of noise trading activities 
in the local markets. The increase in informed traders in the local markets could also 
be the reason why news persistence have become higher than in the pre-change 
periods. For noise and feedback traders might mis-interpret or over-react to a piece 
of news and hence their trading activities would drive prices away from their 
fundamental values. When the markets have an increasing number of informed 
traders, Black ( 1986) suggests that their research and actions might help offsetting the 
noise that noise traders put into stock prices, until the prices of stocks are moved 
back to their fundamental values. It is such counter-actions taken by informed traders 
against noise traders' reaction to a piece of news that make it possible to reduce the 
impacts of noise trading activities in the markets whilst causing the news to become 
more persistent in affecting volatility of the markets. 
Alternatively, the reduction in news asymmetries over the post-liberalisation periods 
might be due to the fact that the negative news during this period had less prolonged 
damaging effects on the markets or on investors' confidence than before. In fact, 
after the four markets' liberalisation, there had been no major warfare or financial 
crises threatening their political stability and economic developments. Instead, 
positive news such as a higher rate of economic growth above the world average and 
a rapid expansion of their export and financial markets was prevalent. As a result, 
there might be a lesser extent of asymmetric response of volatility to negative news in 
the post-liberalisation period than before. 
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As for the increase in news persistence in the four markets following liberalisation, if 
it is not due to the attempts of informed traders to counteract noise traders' activities 
and thus delaying the impounding of information into prices, it might imply that the 
four markets were less efficient than they were before liberalisation. This then would 
be contrary to the finding of Antoniou et. al. (1997), in which regulatory changes in 
an emerging market, namely the Istanbul Stock Exchange, are found to help improve 
information quality and lead to prices impounding information more rapidly. It would 
also differ from the argument of Bekaert and Harvey ( 1997) that capital market 
liberalisation in emerging markets does not drive up volatility. The difference of our 
findings from other studies might indicate that the true impact of market liberalisation 
on the four Asian markets has not been fully captured by a before-and-after snapshot 
in this study. After all, liberalisation is a gradual process and perhaps different stages 
of the regulatory changes should have been taken into account during the empirical 
analysis. 
(Vlll) Conclusion 
In this chapter, we seek to measure directly the impact of increasing foreign 
investment opportunities in local stocks on the nature of volatility of four Asian stock 
markets, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Previous research 
on volatility in these markets has focused on the link between foreign stock 
investment and volatility transmission. However, without first establishing the 
evidence that local market volatility can be changed by increased foreign investment 
opportunities, and gaining an understanding of the nature and structure of volatility in 
the individual markets, assessment of volatility spill-over appears premature. The 
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opening up ofthe Taiwan and Korea Stock Exchanges and the institutional changes in 
Hong Kong and Singapore in the late 1980s and early 1990s which have led to an 
increase in foreign investment opportunities have provided an opportunity to assess 
the impact of increased openness for foreign investors. In addition, this chapter 
provides the first direct examination of the asymmetric responses of volatility to news 
in these Asian stock markets, both before and after they became more liberalised or 
attractive to foreign investors. 
The results show that the effect of increasing foreign investment opportunities in local 
stock markets might come through a reduction in asymmetries in the four markets. 
Asymmetric effects have fallen substantially in all markets following their 
liberalisation. If the assumption that foreign investors are generally more informed 
than local investors who lack the expertise and resources to assess relevant market 
information is to be accepted, then the reduction in news asymmetries might support 
the view that asymmetries are caused by noise trading, rather than by leverage effects. 
As the opportunities for foreign investment increased, more informed traders became 
active in the market, and thus the impact of noise trading on volatility was reduced. 
Their counter-actions against noise traders' response to a piece of news until prices of 
stocks return to their fundamental values might also explain why persistence of 
volatility to news in the post-liberalisation period would have gone up. Alternatively, 
the absence of negative news that had similar prolonged damaging effects on the four 
markets as before might be related to the reduction in news asymmetries during this 
period. Moreover, if the increase in news persistence over the post-liberalisation 
period was not related to informed trading and noise trading, it might suggest that the 
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true impacts of market liberalisation in the four Asian markets have not been fully 
captured by the before-and-after snapshot. Thus there could be a need to take into 
account the different stages of regulatory changes when assessing the impacts of 
liberalisation on market volatility in future studies. 
Having examined the changing nature of volatility in each of the four Asian markets, 
we will go on to look at their market inter-relationships with other world leading 
markets in the next chapter. The finding of a possible increase in the influence of 
informed traders also suggests that price eo-movement and volatility spill-overs may 
exist, but have not, as yet, been examined formally. Such links between markets have 
important implications for foreign institutional investors to assess their global 
investment strategies, as well as for the Asian governments to determine on their 
market liberalisation measures. Hence we will turn to the issues of market inter-
relationships between the four Asian markets and other leading world markets in the 
next two chapters. 
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Chapter 'fbree : Foreign Investment And Integration Between Asian 
And World Stock Markets 
(I) Introduction 
In Chapter Two, it was established that the nature and structure of stock market 
volatility in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan had undergone changes 
following their liberalisation to allow or attract more foreign direct participation. 
Asymmetric responses to local news were found to have reduced following their 
liberalisation. This has been argued as an indication of a reduction in the impact of 
noise trading activities. The increase in foreign participation in the markets has 
resulted in more informed trading. Thus while noise traders and positive feedback 
traders typically may over-react to negative news, such over-reaction appears to have 
reduced since financial liberalisation. Volatility in the individual Asian markets post-
liberalisation could now be seen as a manifestation of the dominance of information 
flow rather than noise trading effects. 
Given that the four Asian markets have undergone changes in their volatility structure 
since lifting their restrictions on foreign investment, it is logical to continue by 
examining whether the way they interact with other world markets has changed as 
well. Such an examination has important policy implications for both foreign 
institutional investors as well as the Asian governments. First, if the developing 
markets become more integrated with the world markets following liberalisation, then 
there would be little benefits of risk diversification for buying into developing 
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markets. Foreign investors might be deterred from committing themselves to invest in 
these markets long term. Instead, they would reshuffie their investment capital more 
frequently across national markets in search for the best and safest investment returns 
which a market can offer. Second, if opening up the markets results in local stock 
price movement being more influenced by other markets, then the government might 
become sceptical about further liberalisation. They might even consider tightening up 
their markets once again. On the positive side though, increasing market integration 
not only enables developing markets in Asia to tap the growing pool of global capital 
to raise investment, but also enhances the spill-over of information and knowledge to 
their markets. This is often achieved through direct participation of institutional 
investors in these markets who are equipped with advanced communication 
technology for use in transmitting information across markets. The establishment of 
foreign brokerages could also help improve financial operations in developing markets 
in that their expertise can be shared by local firms. Thus if developing markets are 
found to be more integrated with the world markets, governments would have to face 
a decision of whether to sacrifice 'independence' of their stock markets in exchange 
for foreign investment capital. 
Apart from having policy implications, investigating the changing pattern of linkages 
between developing and developed markets could also give more insight into the 
significance of cross-market portfolio investment in strengthening international market 
integration. As was established in Chapter Two, increased participation of foreign 
investors in Asian markets brought with it an increase in informed trading to the 
markets. Market news from both local and foreign sources would be transmitted 
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across borders almost immediately while its implication for the local markets is 
assessed and generates a response. If the news is seen to be relevant to the pricing of 
stocks in the local markets or crucial in affecting the investment strategies of global 
institutional investors, then price movements in one market would certainly spill over 
to another market. Such spill-overs would become more frequent and the links 
between world markets become closer as more institutional investors are participating 
in the local markets. Thus the increasing opportunities for participation by foreign 
investors in Asian markets following liberalisation should help strengthen their links 
with other world stock markets. 
To date, evidence on the impacts of foreign investment on market integration is mixed 
with regard to the causal relationships of national stock price movements. Some 
suggest that the US is the dominant leader of price movements among the Asian-
Pacific markets (e.g. Eun and Shim (1989) and Cheung and Mak (1992)), while 
others argue that Japan and the UK play a significant role too (e.g. Chowdhury 
(1994), Liu et. al. (1996), Masih and Masih (1997) and Rogers (1994)). Moreover, 
those markets with the strictest entry barriers, like Taiwan and South Korea, are 
commonly believed to be the least affected by changes in other national markets (e.g. 
Chowdhury (1994) and Rogers (1994) and Cheung and Mak (1992)). This is 
disputed in Liu et. al. (1996) who report that Hong Kong, the least restricted market 
of all developing markets, shows no significant linkage with other markets. Masih 
and Masih ( 1997) also give evidence that stock prices in South Korea are constantly 
led by Singapore, Taiwan by South Korea and Singapore by Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
These inconsistent results on the same issue of market linkage between developing 
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and developed markets may be due to the different choice of sample period, data 
frequency and estimation method. 
In most papers, an arbitrary sample period of four (e.g. Rogers (1994)) to thirty years 
(e.g. Chan et. al. (1997)) is chosen to investigate the pattern of market linkages. In 
one or two papers only, Bracato (1994) and Liu et. al. (1996), the full sample period 
is split in half to investigate if there is a changing pattern of market inter-relationship 
after the 1987 crash. If we were to obtain an economic understanding as to how and 
why national markets are linked the way they are, the sample period used in the 
empirical analysis ought to be specifically chosen. The period surrounding the four 
Asian markets' introduction of liberalisation measures serves this purpose well. A 
comparison of the pre- and post liberalisation period results could enable us to infer 
whether foreign investment in developing markets can help strengthen international 
market integration. 
The data frequency used in previous studies also varies widely from daily data to 
weekly and monthly data. The use of monthly data does not appear to be an 
appropriate choice in the study of stock market integration. The reason is that if 
markets are efficient, information is expected to be incorporated into prices rapidly. It 
is very rare that information from one market a month ago can still impact on other 
market's prices. Though the choice of daily data is more suitable, the problem of 
over-lapping trading hours between regional markets could make interpretation of the 
results very difficult. Whether one market is reacting to information originating from 
another market that has over-lapping trading hours or merely to its response to other 
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common world news would be difficult to discern. One way to mitigate this problem 
is to use weekly closing data because only the prices shown on the last trading day of 
the week would actually suffer from this problem, the rest of the week would not. 
The use of different estimation methods is another possibility that leads to the 
inconsistent findings of market linkage pattern. Three methodologies are used in 
previous studies, namely (i) the variance decomposition analysis (e.g. Eun and Shim 
(1989), Bracato (1994), Chowdhury (1994) and Rogers (1994)), Liu et. al. (1996)), 
(ii) the Granger causality test (e.g. Cheung and Mak (1992) and (iii) the cointegration 
test (e.g. Alien and MacDonald (1995), Corhay et. al. (1993), Masih and Masih 
(1997)). The first method gives a descriptive picture of how much of a market's error 
variances are explained by its own shock and how much by external shocks. The 
second method investigates whether past prices in a market are able to explain price 
changes in another market. Both of these methods focus on the short-run nature of 
market inter-relationships. The third method, cointegration analysis, gives a more 
comprehensive picture of how markets are linked in the long- and short-run. Since 
government policy on further liberalisation or institutional investors' decisions on 
global investment strategies will not rely on the markets' short-term behaviour alone, 
it is worth investigating world markets' long run relationship as well. 
Given that most previous studies have not directly examined the impact of foreign 
investment on market integration between Asian developing and world developed 
markets, it is necessary now to turn to empirical evidence to ascertain if foreign 
investment has a role to play in strengthening world market integration. We will 
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investigate the issue of market integration between Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan, the US, the UK and Japan using the multivariate cointegration 
method with weekly closing stock price series. The full sample period of mid 1986 to 
mid 1996 that surrounds the four Asian markets' liberalisation is specifically chosen to 
reflect the possible impact of foreign investment on market integration. The finding of 
a changing pattern of volatility in the four markets individually in Chapter Two 
implies that there is a need to partition the sample period into two according to the 
time when market liberalisation was introduced in the four markets. A comparison of 
the pre- and post-change cointegration results give an insight into the changing 
pattern of market inter-relationships over time as the four markets become more open 
or attractive to foreign investors. We find a significant cointegrating relationship 
between two Asian markets and one developed market following their liberalisation 
but none before that. This is attributed to the improved efficiency in the local stock 
markets in transmitting information into prices through more contacts with foreign 
financial institutions and information technology. It is also argued that the major 
industrial market which has the closest link with the developing markets is the one 
with a relatively larger investment in their equities. Similarly, the Asian developing 
markets which exhibit the closest link with the developed markets are the ones 
without much government intervention into the stock markets. Thus only the UK, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan are found to be cointegrated following their market 
liberalisation. 
The remaining chapter will be organised as follows. Section 11 describes the link 
between foreign investment and international market integration. Section Ill 
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summarises the literature to date on the issue of market integration. Section IV 
describes the data set and gives an account of the empirical design. Section V reports 
the estimation results and a concluding remark is given in Section VI. 
(11) The link between foreign investment and market integration 
An increase in cross-market investment opportunity following liberalisation could 
strengthen market integration between developed and developing markets in two 
ways : through an improved efficiency in information flow and institutional investors' 
portfolio shifts. As cross-country investment involves higher risk (such as political 
risk and exchange rate risk), a thorough research of the market and the target 
companies is essential for foreign investors. This information has to be transmitted 
across markets efficiently and accurately so that foreign investors can act upon them 
swiftly. However, this information gathering and transmitting exercise incurs high 
costs so that large institutional investors like unit trust and mutual fund companies can 
afford to invest in foreign markets. An increase in foreign investment opportunities in 
the four Asian markets after liberalisation creates the need for foreign investors to 
possess advanced information technology. As a result, information flow between 
markets becomes more efficient and this allows national stock prices to respond 
simultaneously to common world news. 
The flow of portfolio capital across borders will also become more frequent as 
institutional investors seek to maximise their expected returns. They will adjust their 
international portfolio position according to internal factors of the developing markets 
as well as developments in other world markets. If it emerges that investing in their 
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home markets is becoming· more favourable, they will pull out their capital from the 
developing markets and reinvest in the developed markets. Due to the large size of 
total assets of institutional investors, even relatively small portfolio shifts towards or 
away from the developing markets would impact on the movement of stock prices 
there. Such portfolio shifts might result in a negative relationship between developing 
and developed markets' price movements as institutional investors abandon one in 
favour of another. Thus an increasing opportunity in cross-market stock investments 
accompanying liberalisation in the developing markets could impact on international 
market relationships. Thus we will argue that comovement of national stock prices 
will occur only in the post-liberalisation period. 
(ID) Literature review 
Previous research on the Issue of integration between emergmg and developed 
markets can be divided according to the method of study used, namely variance 
decomposition analysis, Granger causality test and cointegration method. 
Eun and Shim (1989) are the first to study the international transmission of stock 
market movements by estimating a V AR. They examine 9 markets: 6 developed 
markets in Europe and America and three in Asia. Using daily rates of return to stock 
markets over the period of 1980 to 1985, they try to find out if the US is the source 
of price movements in the rest of the world and how rapidly do other markets respond 
to its innovations. The results are supportive of a uni-directional causality from the 
US and the transmission of a US shock to other markets is found to be rapid within a 
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matter of days. This they argue is consistent with a notion of informationally efficient 
stock markets. 
Brocato ( 1994) uses the variance decomposition analysis to examine a slightly 
different aspect of market integration. He aims to test whether world stock markets 
have become more integrated over the 1980s as the financial ties between major 
world equity exchanges grow. His data set considers six internationally active stock 
exchanges (the US, the UK, Canada, Japan, Germany and Hong Kong) trading over 
the sample period of 1980 to 1987, which is split in half to make the sample size in 
both periods equal. The estimation results using a weekly rate of return average for 
each index suggest that there are significant linkage alterations over the decade of the 
1980s. The dominant role of the US market in influencing price movements in others 
has eroded. Instead, other markets appear to have absorbed much of the linkage 
strength lost by the US. For instance, West Germany increases its linkage to Canada, 
as does Hong Kong to West Germany and Britain, Japan and West Germany to Hong 
Kong. Despite these findings of a changing market linkage pattern, Brocato has not 
explained how this phenomenon is related to growing world financial integration 
during the sample period. Therefore, it remains unknown as to why increasing world 
financial integration would undermine the leadership role of the US, but make other 
markets become more influential . 
Chowdhury ( 1994) is among the first to investigate the relationship between the 
Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) and other major markets. In this paper, he 
argues that markets with severe restrictions on cross-country investing are not 
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responsive to innovations in foreign markets. Thus Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
least restricted markets of the NIEs included in the study, should be more influenced 
by changes in major markets, such as the US and Japan, than Taiwan and South 
Korea, the most restricted markets during the sample period of 1986 to 1990. Daily 
returns of the seven markets are fitted into a V AR Results from the variance 
decomposition and the impulse response functions indicate that a significant link exists 
only between markets with no restrictions on foreign investment, i.e. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Japan and the US. On the other hand, South Korea and Taiwan, which 
have had very tight barriers to foreign entry, are not responsive to foreign 
innovations. This paper is among the very few that reports standard errors alongside 
the variance decomposition coefficient estimates, making the results more reliable in 
this respect. 
Rogers (1994) similarly investigates the general relationship between entry barriers 
and the transmission of stock prices, particularly surrounding the crash period of 
October 1987. He argues that the 1987 crash has increased volatility of national 
stock markets. This increased volatility of individual market returns in turn provides 
an opportunity for international arbitrage. The low transaction costs relative to the 
expected return from arbitrage make this arbitrage worthwhile. As a result, price 
spill-overs from one country to another have increased. In countries with stiffer entry 
barriers, however, transaction costs are too high to make any arbitrage opportunity 
profitable after the crash. It thus prevents prices from being spilled over to them from 
other markets. On examining the daily rates of return to ten markets: the US, the UK, 
Japan, Germany, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, Argentina, Mexico and Chile, over 
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the period of 1986 to 1989, he finds evidence of volatility rises for all markets 
immediately after the crash and price spillovers from the US and Japan do not take 
place in Taiwan and South Korea which have the most severe entry barriers. 
Liu, Pan and Fung (1996) examine the transmission of the volatility of daily price 
changes (proxied by daily squared returns) among the US and six Asian-Pacific stock 
markets (Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea) over a 
period of 1984-1991. Granger causality tests are conducted within each individual 
equation of the V AR system over two sub-periods--- pre- and post-crash. They find 
that the US stock market is not the most influential market among the seven markets 
examined. Japan and Singapore have strong impacts on the Asian-Pacific markets 
too. Japan is also reported to impact significantly on the US market's return and 
return volatility after the crash. Hong Kong , shows no significant linkage in volatility 
with other markets despite it being the least restricted Asian-Pacific market. 
Corhay et. al. (1995) study stock prices ofthe five largest and least restricted Pacific-
Basin markets, namely those of Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, New Zealand and 
Singapore using cointegration. Monthly data on the stock price indices for the five 
markets over a period of twenty years from 1972 to 1992 are used in the 
cointegration analysis. They find evidence of a single cointegrating vector between 
the markets. Tests of restrictions on the significance of each of the cointegrating 
parameters suggest that Singapore and New Zealand only play a minor role in the 
long run because they do not enter significantly into the cointegrating vector, whilst 
tests of restrictions on the long run adjustment matrix show that Australia and New 
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Zealand are exogenous to the cointegrating system. They do not adjust to the price 
differences from the other three Asian markets. This is interpreted as an indication of 
regionalism among the integrated Pacific-Basin financial area. 
Alien and MacDonald (1995) also estimate a number of bivariate relationships 
between sixteen countries using the Engle-Granger cointegration method over a 
period of 1970 to 1992. The results are used to help select appropriate variables 
entering the J ohansen multivariate model because they are concerned that the 
outcome of the Johansen procedure would be sensitive to the choice of Jag length if 
the number of variables is excessive. Among the sixteen markets examined, the pair-
wise cointegration results show that Canada, the UK and Hong Kong are found to 
cointegrate with the Australian market individually. There is no evidence ofthe US or 
Japan having cointegration with the UK and Australia. The results obtained using the 
Johansen procedure confirm the existence of a cointegrating relationship between 
Australia, the UK and Canada. The presence of cointegration is again interpreted as 
evidence against the hypothesis of weak form efficiency. 
Chan, Gup and Pan (1997) conduct a brief investigation into the link between 
monthly stock prices of eighteen markets over a period of 1961 to 1992 which is split 
into three sub-periods, the 1960s, the 1970s to the mid-1980s and after 1988. They 
divide the markets into seven regional groups and test for cointegration within each 
region. No details on the cointegration test results are given and no restriction tests 
on the cointegrating vectors are made. It is reported that markets in some regions are 
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found to eo-move and the number of cointegrating stock prices appear to have 
increased before the October 1987 crash. 
Masih and Masih (1997) employ a mixture of techniques to investigate the linkage 
between the Four Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) with 
Japan, the US, the UK and Germany. They first use the multivariate cointegration 
technique to search for possible relationships between the four Asian markets and one 
of the other developed markets in four separate five-dimensional models. Zero 
restrictions on each parameter of the cointegrating vectors in the four models are also 
tested. Then, they carry out the variance decomposition analysis and estimate the 
impulse response functions for each market within the four different models to 
'quantify their temporal causality results.' ( Masih and Masih, p.68). Their results 
show that there is a single cointegrating vector in each of the four models using 
monthly stock price indices for the eight markets from 1982 to 1994. Temporal 
causality tests based on four vector error correction models (VECM) reveal that 
Hong Kong and all the developed markets are weakly exogenous. They do not 
respond to deviations from the equilibrium relations. Singapore and Taiwan, on the 
other hand, have to bear the brunt of short-run adjustments to long run equilibrium. 
Most interesting of all, their VECM results show that Taiwan is consistently found to 
be led by South Korea, South Korea by Singapore and Singapore by Hong Kong and 
Taiwan in the short term. This linkage pattern, however, is not exactly consistent 
with their variance decomposition results. 
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Finally Cheung and Mak (1992) conduct a series of causality tests to see if the eight 
chosen Asian-Pacific markets are influenced by the US and Japan, a proxy for global 
factors and regional factors respectively. They try to find out whether market returns 
in these Asian-Pacific markets are individually affected by past return movements in 
the US and Japan over six two-year periods that spanned from 1978 to 1988. They 
find evidence of causality from the US market to most of the Asian-Pacific markets 
with the exception of South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. This, they argue, is 
attributed to their limited degree of openness. Japan, on the other hand, is found to 
have a less significant impact on the Asian-Pacific markets. They also argue that the 
results are indicative of market inefficiency in these markets because the significant Jag 
structure found in the regression models invalidates the hypotheses of instantaneous 
information dissemination. 
The major shortcoming of the studies above is their choice of sample periods. The 
arbitrary choice of sample periods in most studies makes it hard to explain why some 
markets are linked to or Granger caused by other markets whilst others are not. In 
most cases, it is asserted that the linkage pattern is related to the degree of market 
openness. With the onset of market liberalisation in Asian markets in recent years, 
particularly in Taiwan and South Korea, the possible effects of such institutional 
changes can now be tested directly. Moreover, the use of monthly data in some of the 
papers is inappropriate because it aggregates a lot of information about the day to day 
movement of individual market's stock prices. The finding of no integration between 
several markets may not actually reflect the real world situation. 
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(IV) Empirical design : data, sample and methodology 
(A) Data 
The data set consists of end-of-week closing stock price indices of seven stock 
markets including Hong Kong (HK), Singapore (S) , Korea (K), Taiwan (T), Japan 
(J), the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). The indices used for each 
of them are respectively the Hang Seng Index, Singapore Straits Times Industrial 
Index, Korean Composite Price Index, Taiwan Weighted Price Index, Nikkei 225 
Average Stock Index, Dow Jones Industrial Index and the FTSE 100 Index. These 
indices are the most representative indicators of each market's performance because 
they are either made up of stocks which constitute the largest amount of market 
capitalisation or the most active stocks traded in the market. They are transformed 
into logarithmic form prior to estimation. The number of observations for all markets 
in the pre-change period (April 1986 to June 1989) and the post-change period 
(October 1993 to July 1996) are respectively 169 and 147. 
To be consistent with the practice in the previous chapter, daily data should have been 
used in this chapter. However, the emphasis of this chapter is on the long-run eo-
movement of stock prices in the seven markets and how they adjust themselves to the 
price discrepancies that might arise in the short run to re-establish the long-run 
equilibrium relationship. The use of lower frequency data like weekly data might be 
more appropriate than the use of daily data as the latter would require a higher order 
of vector autoregression to yield serially uncorrelated residuals when estimating 
cointegration. It is noted in Charemza and Deadman (1992) that the use of long lags 
in the V AR would diminish the power of the Johansen cointegration test. Thus end-
120 
of-week prices instead of daily prices are used in this chapter , although they still do 
not overcome the problem of non-synchronicity of time zones among the four Asian 
markets and two of the three major world markets, namely the US and the UK. 
(B) Sample period 
The finding of changing volatility behaviour in each individual market in Chapter Two 
is indicative of the possibility that the pattern of market linkage between the Four 
Tigers and the three major world markets, the US, the UK and Japan would have also 
undergone some changes too. Thus two sub-sample periods will be used to estimate 
a seven-dimensional model and the results compared. The data are 'extracted' from 
the longest full sample period used in Chapter Two which spanned from April 1986 to 
July 1996. The reason is that market liberalisation took place at different times in the 
four markets. In order to make possible the formulation of a V AR system for use in 
the cointegration test, a common sample period or the same number of observations 
for the markets has to be used. Therefore, the pre-liberalisation period can only be up 
to the time just before the first market began to liberalise, while the post-liberalisation 
period can only begin after the last market has introduced its liberalisation measures. 
The time when some markets have tried to open up or improve themselves while 
others are still having strict restrictions on foreign participation will be left out from 
the sample period. As a result, the pre-and post-liberalisation period will span from 
April 1986 to June 1989 and from October 1993 to July 1996 respectively. 
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(C) Methodology 
(C. 1) Testing for the order of integration 
As a prerequisite for testing for cointegration we must verify that all series involved 
are stationary and share common integrational properties, i.e., they are all integrated 
of the same order. The danger of using non-stationary time series in regression 
analysis is that spurious regression would be yielded whereby unrelated variables can 
be shown to produce apparently meaningful relationships. If a non-stationary series 
must be differenced d times to make it stationary, Engle and Granger (1987) define it 
as integrated of order d denoted as : 
There are several different types of procedures available in testing for the degree of 
integration of univariate time series. One of them is that proposed by Dickey and 
Fuller (1979). Suppose we wish to test the hypothesis that a non-seasonal variable Xr 
is integrated of order one, that is x1 is generated by equation (1 ). The Dickey-Fuller 
test is a test of the hypothesis that in equation (2), p = 1, 
xt = f.1 + xt-1 + st 
xt = fYXt-1 + Bt 
(1) 
(2) 
The unit root test is based on the estimation of an equivalent regression equation to 
(2), namely: 
where 
Lixt = /ixt-1 + Bt 
J= p-1 
(3) 
If 8 i=- 0, it implies that p i=- 1 and the process cannot therefore be modelled as a 
random walk. The null hypothesis 8= 0 implies that the data are 1(1). The t-ratio of 
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o (i.e. t8) from equation (3) does not have a standard t distribution. Instead it is 
shown to be distributed as a Dickey-Fuller distribution (Fuller (1976)). 
A weakness of the original Dickey-Fuller test is that it does not take account of 
possible auto-correlation in the error process &1. If &t is auto-correlated, then the OLS 
estimates of equation (3) will not be efficient and t-ratios will not follow the tabulated 
DF distribution. A simple solution, advocated by Dickey and Fuller (1981) is to use 
lagged left-hand side variables as additional explanatory variables to approximate the 
auto-correlation. This test is known as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) and 
the testing procedure is the same as before. The ADF equivalent of (3) is shown as 
equation ( 4): 
k 
Llxt = J.i +at+ lixt-I + L P;Lht-i + &t (4) 
i=l 
where k is the minimum number of lags required to remove auto-correlation. The 
practical rule for establishing the value of k (the lag length of Lixt-i) is that it should be 
relatively small in order to save degrees of freedom, but large enough to remove auto-
correlation in Bt. The strategy is to start running the regression from a lower order k 
and then use the !M test (see Charemza and Deadman (1992) p.196) to test if the 
null of no serial correlation in the error term can be accepted. If not, then we 
sequentially test for a higher order k until the null of no serial correlation can be 
accepted. 
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(C. 2) Testing for cointegration 
Once the order of integration of each series is established, a V AR system can be 
formulated to test for cointegration. A simplified account of cointegration inference 
in a V AR model is given below. Starting from an unrestricted V AR model: 
k 
1; = I Ari ;Yt-i + &t 
i=l 
(5) 
where Y1 contains all n variables of the model and Bt is a vector of random errors; 
the order of V AR lag lengths is determined by minimising Akaike' s Information 
Criterion (AIC). 
The V AR model (5) can be represented in the form given in (6): 
k-1 
.11; = I~ LtJ;_i + m-k + &t 
i=l 
(I is an identity matrix) 
(6) 
Since there are n variables which constitute the vector Yt, the dimension of ll is n x n 
and its rank can be at most equal to n. It follows from the Granger Representation 
Theorem (Engle and Granger (1987) that: (i) If the rank of matrix ll is equal to n, 
that is equal to the total number of variables explained in the V AR model, the vector 
process Yt is stationary; (ii) If the rank of matrix ll is equal to 0 < r < n, there exists a 
representation of ll such that: 
n = af3' (7) 
where a and f3 are both n x r matrices. 
Matrix P is called the cointegrating matrix and has the property of f3'Yt (the 
disequilibrium error) - /(0), while Y1 - /(1). This in turn implies that the variables Yt 
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are cointegrated, with the cointegrating vectors fJ1, p2, ... , p, being the columns of the 
cointegrating matrix fJ. The coefficients a measure the adjustment to past equilibrium 
errors. Note that in the case where II is of reduced rank, the term flY"r-k represents 
an error correction mechanism. Equation (7) is therefore referred to as a Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM). 
To determine the number of cointegrating vectors from equation (6), two test 
statistics are used : the maximum eigenvalue statistics and the trace statistics. In the 
trace test, the null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors is tested 
against a general alternative hypothesis (i.e. Ho is not true), while in the maximum 
eigenvalue test, the null hypothesis of at most r cointegrating vectors is tested against 
the alternative of r + 1 cointegrating vectors where r is an integer. In both tests, we 
start off by assuming r = 0. If this is rejected, then we sequentially go on to assume r 
= 1, r = 2, ... , r = n until we cannot reject Ho and determine the number of 
cointegrating vectors. The decision rule is that if the test statistic is smaller than the 
critical value, accept Ho and reject otherwise. 
(C.3) Hypothesis testing 
The hypothesis of a closer link between developed and developing markets following 
liberalisation can be tested through imposing zero restrictions on both a and p in ( 10). 
Tests of zero restrictions on p allow us to identity which variables enter the 
cointegrating relationship significantly. If pi = 0 cannot be rejected, that means the 
corresponding market does not enter the cointegrating relationship significantly. 
Those markets whose corresponding Ps are statistically different from zero represent 
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the key elements of an underlying relationship that the cointegrating vector is actually 
picking up. 
The tests on a show whether the burden of adjusting to any long run dis-equilibrium 
is borne by all markets or just a few. According to Johansen (1995 p. 77), the 
hypothesis of zero coefficients in a for a certain subset of equations means that the 
subset of variables is weakly exogenous. If the restriction holds, then the long run 
solution to X, for instance, is not affected by the level of Y and in particular departures 
from the equilibrium defined in the cointegrating vector will not determine X in the 
long run (see Hall and Milne 1994 p. 600). They define this as long run causality and 
note that it is a necessary condition for Granger Causality. These tests on individual 
cointegrating parameters are distributed as chi-squared variates with one degree of 
freedom. 
(V) Empirical results 
(A) Tests for unit roots 
Table 3.1 Unit root tests for the order of integration 
Pre-change Period Post-change Period 
(April86- June 93) (October 93 -July 96) 
Market Level pt Difference Level pt Difference 
Hong Kong -2.5193 (2) -9.2007 (0)* -2.0777 (2) -10.893 (0)* 
Singapore -2.5488 (2) -9.9459 (0)* -2.8611 (2) -10.772 (0)* 
Korea -1.3138 (2) -12.782 (0)* -2.8125 (2) -10.772 (0)* 
Taiwan -0.6357 (2) -9.4095 (0)* -2.7635 (2) -11.121 (0)* 
Japan -1.4313 (2) -15.162 (0)* -1.6613 (2) -13.173 (0)* 
United States -1.7455 (2) -11.858 (0)* -0.1459 (2) -12.883 (0)* 
United Kingdom -2.0106 (2) -9.1016 (0)* -0.8637 (2) -13.604 (0)* 
N.B. Figures in parentheses are the number oflags used in the ADF equation. 
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Table 3 .1 shows the ADF test statistics from the unit root regressions under the null 
hypotheses that the variables are not stationary against the alternatives that they are 
stationary in levels or after taking first differences. The numbers in parentheses 
represent the number of lags included in each unit root regression. The critical value 
for all regressions with a time trend is -3 .44. An asterisk denotes that the null of non-
stationarity in the corresponding market can be rejected. Results in Table 3.1 show 
that the null hypotheses of non-stationarity when variables are in levels cannot be 
rejected. However, after taking first differences, all variables become stationary 
because the null hypotheses of non-stationarity can be rejected in these cases. 
(B) Cointegration test 
Table 3.2.1 Cointegration test for the pre-liberalisation period 
rank trace small 95% maximum small 95% 
statistics sample critical eigenvalue sample critical 
statistics value statistics statistics value 
r=O 46.71 * 42.82 45.3 125* 114.5 124.2 
r=1 27.47 25.18 39.4 78.24 71.72 94.2 
r=2 20.85 19.11 33.5 50.77 46.54 68.5 
r=3 14.55 13.34 27.1 29.92 27.43 47.2 
r=4 9.805 8.988 21.0 15.37 14.09 29.7 
r=5 3.821 3.502 14.1 5.563 5.099 15.4 
r= 6 1.742 1.597 3.8 1.742 1.597 3.8 
(N.B. V ~IJ is used in the cointegration test) 
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Table 3 .2.2 Cointegration test for the post-liberalisation period 
rank trace small- 95% maximum small- 95% 
statistics sample critical eigenvalue sample critical 
statistics value statistics statistics value 
r=O 54.96* 52.31 * 49.4 163.8* 155.9* 146.8 
r=1 35.05 33.36 44.0 108.9 103.6 114.9 
r= 2 25.52 24.29 37.5 73.83 70.27 87.3 
r=3 18.96 18.04 31.5 48.31 45.98 63.0 
r=4 13.87 13.2 25.5 29.35 27.93 42.4 
r=5 10.61 10.1 19.0 15.48 14.73 25.3 
r=6 4.869 4.634 12.2 4.869 4.634 12.2 
(N.B. V ~l) is used in the cointegration test) 
In Tables 3 .2.1 and 3 .2.2, the null hypothesis of the trace test that there are at most r 
cointegrating vectors is tested against a general alternative hypothesis (i.e. Ho is not 
true), while in the maximum eigenvalue test, the null hypothesis of at most r 
cointegrating vectors is tested against the alternative of r + 1 cointegrating vectors. 
The test statistics using a small-sample correction as suggested by Reinsel and Ahn 
(1992) are also reported in Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. It is noted in Richards (1995 p. 
634) that the asymptotic critical values provided by Johansen and Juselius (1990) may 
be misleading in small samples. The empirical size (the rejection frequency when the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration is true) of the Johansen tests is increased (i.e. 
worse) in cases of small samples and a high number of explanatory variables. An 
asterisk indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% 
significance level. In Table 3.2.1, the small sample statistics for both the trace and the 
maximal eigenvalue tests are smaller than the 95% critical values, the null of no 
cointegration cannot be rejected. This apparently contradicts the results given by the 
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unadjusted sample test statistics, shown in columns two and five of the tables. 
However, concerns over misleading results when using small sample size in the 
Johansen test lead us to favour the small sample test statistics. Accordingly, there is 
no cointegrating relationship between the seven markets in the pre-liberalisation 
period. In Table 3.2.2, both the asymptotic values and the small sample statistics are 
greater than the 95% critical value for r = 0, thus indicating that there exists a single 
cointegrating vector during the post-liberalisation period. 
(C) Test of restrictions on the cointegrating parameters 
To find out which markets enter significantly into the cointegrating relationship, zero 
restriction tests on the cointegrating vector (/3) are performed using the likelihood 
ratio test. If {3; = 0 can be rejected, that means the corresponding markets enter 
significantly into the cointegrating relationship. Otherwise, they are insignificant 
within the relationship. The test statistic is distributed as i- variates with 1 degree of 
freedom. The null of zero loading for the corresponding market will be accepted if the 
test statistic is smaller than the critical value, otherwise, it will be rejected. Results on 
the restriction tests are shown in Table 3.3. 
In Table 3.3, the p-values associated with the i statistics are given in parentheses. 
An asterisk indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% 
significance level. It is found that in the post-liberalisation period, the cointegrating 
vector is actually picking up cointegration between the UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
We proceed with a model to include only these three markets which enter significantly 
into the cointegrating vector. 
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Table 3.3 Test of zero restrictions on pin the post-change cointegrating vector 
Markets Ho:P;=O 
Hong Kong 19.377 (0.0000)* 
Singapore 0.9248 (0.3362) 
Korea 0.0155 (0.9009) 
Taiwan 5.3757 (0.0204)* 
Japan 0.8845 (0. 7662) 
United States 1.0267 (0.311 0) 
United Kingdom 9.7639 (0.0018)* 
Table 3.4 Cointegration test on the parsimonious model 
rank trace small- 95% maximum small- 95% 
statistics sample critical eigenvalue sample critical 
statistics value statistics statistics value 
r= 0 45.28* 44.87* 25.5 64.17* 62.85* 42.4 
r = 1 12.19 11.94 19.0 18.35 17.97 25.3 
r=2 6.162 6.035 12.2 6.162 6.035 12.2 
(N.B. V ~Il is used in the cointegration test) 
The test statistics in Table 3.4 confirm that a significant cointegrating relationship 
exists between the UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan during the post-change period. The 
estimates of the long-run parameters p' normalised on the UK are given below: 
A p '= (1.00, 0.278, -0.159) 
with the corresponding estimates of a : 
a'= (-o.o13, o.oo9, o.oll) 
Test results on the zero restrictions on a are given in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 :Test of zero restrictions on a in the parsimonious model 
Markets Ho: ai = 0 
UK 12.906 (0.0003)* 
Hong Kong 13.385 (0.0003)* 
Taiwan 15.149 (0.0001)* 
All test statistics in table 3.5 are distributed as ·l (1 ). Associated p-values of the test 
statistics are given in parentheses and an asterisk indicates that the corresponding null 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level. The results show that all 
markets involved in the relationship are endogenous to the system in the post-change 
period. They all Granger-cause each other in the long run although the speeds of 
adjustment to the price discrepancies from the other markets within the cointegrating 
system are slow, as illustrated by the estimated adjustment matrix a of less than 0.02 
in real terms for all three markets. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the causal 
relationship between the UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan is multidirectional instead of 
unidirectional. 
(D) Discussion of results 
(D.J) No long-run relationships when cross-market investment opportunity is limited 
Though the US, the UK and Japan are major trading partners to the four Asian 
markets, there is no cointegration between their stock prices during the pre-
liberalisation period. It seems that the presence of a significant trade relation between 
the seven countries in the goods market alone is not sufficient to foster a similar 
relationship in their capital markets. The lack of direct foreign investment 
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opportunities in the Asian markets could be the main reason for the non-existence of a 
long-run relationship between their stock prices. During this period, both the stock 
markets in South Korea and Taiwan were closed to direct foreign investments. 
Singapore did not have such a restriction on foreign investments but the opportunities 
offered to them were limited. At least no foreign brokerages were allowed to be set 
up during this period and many large companies were state-owned. The Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange was newly established in 1986 by merging four existing exchanges 
together and foreign investors could be expected to have reservations about the 
efficient functioning of this new establishment. The lack of foreign direct investment 
opportunities in these four markets is therefore obvious. As such, cross-market 
information flows would be less efficient and developing markets would remain 
predominantly affected by their own economic and political developments. Thus it is 
not surprising that developing and developed markets do not have a long run price 
relationship when foreign direct investment in the former is limited or even non-
existent. 
(D.2)Foreign investment could strengthen market integration for some Asian markets 
With an increased opportunity for foreign investments in Asian developing markets 
after liberalisation, there is cointegration between the major and developing markets. 
In particular, a significant cointegrating relationship is found between the weekly 
stock prices of the UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan from October 1993 to July 1996. 
The integration of Taiwan into other regional and world markets only after allowing 
foreign direct participation in its stock market provides some support that foreign 
investment does help promote a closer link between international markets. Figure 
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1. 51 in Chapter One shows that foreign portfolio investment in the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange between 1993 and 1996 was at its record high of around US$2 billion to 
US$3 billion per annum. With such an influx of foreign capital, it is reasonable to 
expect that price movements in other stock markets could spill over to Taiwan, 
particularly when the movement prompts an adjustment to the international investors' 
world-wide position. Thus foreign investment is likely to impact on international 
market integration. 
As for Hong Kong, it is closely related to the UK both politically and economically. 
It was a British colony until 1997 and most of its local public construction and 
development projects were undertaken by British firms between 1993 and 1996, for 
example the construction of a new international airport and a cross harbour bridge, as 
well as the extension of the underground railway network. Twenty-eight large 
capitalised Hong Kong-based stocks were cross-listed in the London stock exchange 
in December 1997. Similarly, a few UK-based companies, for example British 
Telecom, were cross-listed in Hong Kong. This kind of direct involvement in each 
other's stock market is a potentially important mechanism for the transmission of 
price movements. It is therefore not surprising to find a cointegrating relationship 
between the UK and Hong Kong. 
(D. 3) Government intervention could prevent market integration 
While Taiwan has experienced a closer link with other national stock markets after its 
liberalisation, South Korea does not seem to have any significant relationship with 
other markets despite opening its market to foreign investment as well. One obvious 
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reason is the state interventionist policies adopted by the Korean government to 
influence its stock market. Though the Korean stock exchange was open to foreign 
investors for the first time in 1992, the government is reluctant to raise their 
investment ceiling. It fears that too large an inflow of foreign funds would push up 
the nominal exchange rate and, via inflation, push the real exchange rate up even 
further. Thus it frequently intervenes to keep the market from what it believes to be 
over-heating. For instance, it was alleged to have put pressure on the nation's three 
investment trust companies to sell off shares in order to depress stock market prices 
during 1994 when the market was thought to be overheated. In the run up to 
parliamentary elections in April 1996, however, the government told the official stock 
market stabilisation fund to purchase stocks so as to push up prices. Thus the 
performance of the Korean stock market is subject to state intervention and the 
possible impact of foreign investment on its relationship with other markets would be 
distorted. 
A similar situation happens in Singapore where the government influences its stock 
market by directly holding stakes in individual companies throughout the spectrum, 
from high-tech defence contractors to low-tech service industries. Public utilities and 
land and housing development are all controlled by the government despite their part-
privatisation in 1993. This complex web of government involvement in industry 
enables the government to encourage the development of certain industries without 
competitors knowing exactly what is going on. Privately owned firms may be 
disadvantaged by these government-linked firms. As a result of such intervention 
practices, opportunities for foreign participation in both the South Korea and 
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Singapore stock exchanges are still limited. Market information is imperfect and 
stock price movements may be inconsistent with their economic fundamentals. All 
these can prevent their prices from interacting with those in other foreign markets 
during the post-liberalisation period. 
(D. 4) Why does the UK integrate more with the Asian markets than the US and 
Japan? 
Stock prices in the US and Japan do not appear to have a close link with those in the 
liberalised Asian markets. This may be attributed to their lesser investment in the 
Asian markets' equities compared to UK investors. Figures 3.1 to 3.3 show that 
despite having the largest international portfolio investment between 1988 and 1995, 
Japan did not have any foreign equity holdings at all in the world markets. Instead, all 
its international portfolio investment was devoted to debt securities. As for the US, 
although it invested more in international equity securities than the UK between 1993 
and 1995, more than 75% ofits activity in foreign equities was concentrated in Japan, 
the UK and Canada. Only a fraction of its capital was actually invested in emerging 
markets. For instance, in 1993 net purchases of equities in the four Asian developing 
markets by US investors was less than US$9 billion in aggregate as shown in Table 
3.6. US investors' interest in developing markets was largely focused on debt and 
equity issues in Latin America. This is in contrast to the UK investors who are 
reported to be more interested in buying assets in Asia (Khan and Reinhart, 1995, 
p.l2). 
The reason for low investment in the stock markets of Asia by US and Japanese 
investors relative to the UK investors could be related to their changing economic 
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conditions since 1994. During the recession of major industrial countries between 
1989 and 1993, US investment in emerging markets' equities increased significantly. 
Examples ofthis can be found in Table 3.6 where Hong Kong and Mexico were the 
two main beneficiaries. However, with economic recovery firmly established again in 
the US in 1994, as a result of its policy of low interest rates to stimulate demand, 
domestic stock markets rose strongly. The strength of the recovery and the rising 
expectations of corporate earnings began to divert some funds from the emerging 
markets. The fall in US participation in the developing markets thus could have 
prevented a close link being formed between the US and the four Asian markets' price 
movements during the post-liberalisation period. 
As for Japan, a strong yen discouraged Japanese investors from investing in dollar-
denominated foreign assets between 1994 and early 1996, even at apparently 
attractive interest rate spreads (EIU Country Profile: Japan 1997 p.35). An increased 
government demand stimulus to expand domestic production facilities could also have 
made Japan's cross-border transactions in bonds and equities fall from 120% of its 
GDP in 1990 to 82% in 1996. In fact, the recession in Japan and the uncertainty of 
recovery during this period were the major causes of its sharp fall in stock prices 
despite a boom in overseas equity markets in mid-1996. Hence Japan is not expected 
to be closely linked with the four Asian markets' price movements during the post-
liberalisation period. 
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Figure 3. 1 International portfolio investment by Japan, the UK and US 
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Figure 3.2 International investment in equity securities by Japan, the UK and US 
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Figure 3. 3 International investment in debt securities by Japan, the UK and US 
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Table 3.6 Net purchases of foreign equities by US investors (in US$ billions) 
Markets 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Hong Kong 0.3 -0.3 0.6 1.1 3.6 6.3 
Singapore - 0.4 0.5 -0.2 0.5 1.2 
S. Korea - - - - 0.5 1.3 
Taiwan - - - - - 0.1 
Chile - 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.3 
Mexico - - 1.1 2.1 2.8 5.2 
(Source : Khan and Reinhart, 1995) 
(VI) Conclusion 
The inter-relationships between the four Asian stock markets (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan) and three major world markets (Japan, the US and the UK) 
are investigated over two sub-sample periods. The need to split the samples into two 
periods stems from the fact that significant measures to liberalise the markets in the 
four Asian markets is found to have a crucial impact on their changing volatility 
pattern individually in the previous chapter. Thus the full sample period of April 1986 
to July 1996 cannot be treated as a single period. It is believed that such institutional 
changes should also have an impact on their relationships with other world markets. 
The results obtained from our cointegration tests confirm this argument. When the 
opportunities for foreign direct investments in the Asian developing stock markets 
were not available or limited before market liberalisation, there was no significant link 
between the movements of prices in the seven markets. After liberalisation, a 
significant cointegrating relationship between the UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan exists. 
The reason we offer to explain this changing pattern of relationship is that the 
opportunities for cross-market stock investment play a part in linking world markets 
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together. When most of the four Asian markets were still closed or less attractive to 
foreign investments during the pre-liberalisation period, domestic factors were the 
main determinants of local stock price movements. External developments were 
much less important. With an increase in foreign investors, particularly institutional 
investors, following liberalisation, foreign developments become more important in 
moving local prices. This is the result of an improved information flow, aided by 
institutional investors' use of advanced information technology, to ensure that 
common world factors are reflected in price changes in individual national markets. 
In addition, foreign developments might also require institutional investors to make 
portfolio shifts away or towards the developing markets which in turn might cause 
price movements in world markets to be negatively related. 
A brief examination into the economic background of the US and Japan as well as 
government policies of Singapore and South Korea in dealing with their stock 
markets reveals that world market integration could be prevented in two ways even 
after liberalisation of the developing markets. First is the low level of actual 
investment on the part of foreign investors from developed markets and second is the 
intervention policy on the part of local governments. That could be why only a 
significant cointegrating relationship is found between the stock prices of the UK, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan following liberalisation in the latter two developing markets. 
As far as policy implications are concerned, institutional investors seeking to diversify 
their investment risk could still find it beneficial to buy into a number of developing 
markets. No two developing markets could be treated as the same as each of them 
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would have their own strengths and weaknesses, although they might share some 
common market characteristics. As for local governments' fear of their markets being 
led by foreign developments, evidence from this chapter indicates that there should be 
little cause for alarm. The reason is that even when developing markets are found to 
cointegrate with other world markets, the forces that drive price changes in all 
markets involved are multidirectional rather than unidirectional. Thus, local 
developing markets are not bound to be under the influence of developed markets 
alone, they could influence price movements in developed markets too. Yet in both 
cases, the magnitude of influence is minimal as suggested by the estimated a of the 
final parsimoniously cointegrating vector between the UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Therefore, governments of local developing stock markets should not be frightened 
away by their markets being more integrated with other world markets. 
While the cointegration results indicate a weak influence of foreign markets on the 
price movements of the four Asian markets in the long run, no inferences can be 
drawn on the responses of volatility in the four markets to foreign news in the short 
run. As local governments often worry that opening up their markets to foreign 
investors would make them becoming more volatile, an investigation into the impacts 
of foreign news on the volatility of individual Asian markets is necessary. Moreover, 
the finding of a changing nature of volatility in individual Asian markets following 
their liberalisation in Chapter Two suggests that volatility spill-overs may exist, but 
has not as yet been formally examined. This is what we will turn to next. 
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Chapter Four: Foreign Investment, Trade Relations And Volatility 
Transmission To Asian Stock Markets 
(I) Introduction 
It was established in the previous two chapters that while the nature and structure of 
volatility in the individual stock markets of the Four Tigers have substantially changed 
over time, their long run price relationships with the world's leading markets have 
little change. Long run price relationships between the four newly developed and the 
major developed markets were non-existent before the lifting of the ban on foreign 
investments. After they were relaxed, there was just one cointegrating relationship 
between the UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan, showing signs of a common trend in their 
price movements. Singapore, South Korea, the US and Japan were not found to enter 
significantly into the cointegrating relationship. This, we argue, is supportive of the 
view that foreign investment could help strengthen world market integration through 
an improved cross-market information flow brought about by institutional investors. 
The need to adjust their international portfolio position as world market conditions 
change could also influence the way national markets relate to one another. We also 
argue that low levels of actual participation in the Asian developing markets from the 
developed markets such as the US and Japan could prevent the formation of a close 
link between them. Similarly, active government intervention in influencing local 
stock prices, as is the case in South Korea and Singapore, could have the same effect 
on world market integration. Hence, these four markets are not found to enter the 
long-run cointegrating relationship significantly during the post-liberalisation period. 
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However, as cointegration essentially deals with the existence of a stable long-run 
equilibrium between markets, it says little about the short-term linkages and 
interactions between those markets without a long run cointegrating relationship. In 
addition, the presence or absence of a long run price relationship between world 
markets gives no information on the relative significance of local and world news in 
affecting developing markets' volatility. Such short term dynamic interactions 
between developing and developed markets are highly likely for they have close 
trading relations and/or increasing foreign portfolio investments over the past decade. 
News that increases a major market's volatility could also impact on the volatility of 
other developing markets within a short space of time. The purpose of this chapter is 
to provide additional insights into the mechanism of cross-market volatility spill-over 
and the differing roles local and foreign news play in affecting market inter-
relationships, particularly in the short-term. 
The issue of volatility transmission has been widely addressed in the finance literature 
during the past decade. With regard to the markets examined, Japan, the US and the 
UK are the most frequently researched markets. Volatility transmission amongst these 
countries' markets is well documented, as is volatility transmission from them to other 
smaller markets (e.g. Eun and Shim 1989, Hamao et. al. 1990, Lin et. al. 1993). 
Recent interest has also emerged in investigating the volatility link between regional 
markets, such as European markets (e.g. Booth et. al. 1997, Koutmos 1996). 
Findings to date are mixed and no single general pattern of volatility transmission 
structure can be identified, such as the dominant role of the US market, as a source of 
volatility spill-over. This may be due to a number of differences in these studies, 
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which include the use of different indices for the same markets, data frequency and 
methodology as well as sample periods used. Whilst most papers only report 
evidence of the various ways different markets could be linked together through 
volatility transmission, only a few offer insights into the nature and mechanism of 
volatility transmission. King and Wadhwani (1990) suggest that a contagion effect is 
the main reason for volatility spill-over between markets, where pricing mistakes in 
one market can be transmitted to another market without changes in its economic 
fundamentals. N g et. al. ( 1991) on the other hand, argue that cross market direct 
portfolio investment is a key channel to facilitate volatility spill-over. The possibility 
of a changing pattern of volatility spill-over through time is documented in von 
Furstenberg and Jeon (1989). Last but not least, volatility interaction between 
markets could be asymmetric as shown in Booth et. al. ( 1997), Koutmos (1996) and 
Bae and Karolyi (1994). This means that negative news in a given market produces 
higher volatility spill-over to other markets than does positive news of an equal 
magnitude, in a way which is similar to the issues investigated in Chapter Two. 
Motivated by the arguments and findings from these aforementioned papers, this 
chapter seeks to add further insights into various aspects of volatility transmission 
from developed to developing markets. The same set of markets examined in Chapter 
Three will be used, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, the 
US and the UK. Three main issues will be addressed. 
(1) The transmission mechanism of volatility from the major markets to the 
developing Asian markets. 
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(2) The changing importance of foreign news in affecting volatility of the local 
developing markets. 
(3) The asymmetric effects of local and foreign news on local developing markets' 
volatility and their implications. 
We will argue that the forces behind cross-market volatility transmission are inter-
related. The importance of substantial trade relations as the key mechanism for 
volatility transmission could be inferred from the differing asymmetric effects of 
foreign news on local markets' volatility, which is highly dependent on the nature of 
the markets' economic ties. While the presence of trade relations is sufficient to cause 
volatility spill-over across markets, the opportunities for cross-market direct 
investment in the developing markets could affect the actual size of spill-over. As 
such, markets which are most restrictive to foreign investors would be less affected by 
foreign news even though the foreign market might be their main trading partners. 
Alternatively, the actual size of volatility spill-over could be affected by the level of 
investment in the developing markets. If the foreign market has little exposure to the 
four markets' equities despite being their main trading partner, volatility of these 
markets would not be significantly affected by its news either. We will also argue that 
contrary to the fear that increasing foreign investment in the local markets would 
make the markets more vulnerable to foreign shocks, foreign news impacts would 
actually fall as there is an increase in better informed trading following liberalisation. 
Investors would be more able to discern the relevance of foreign news impacts on the 
local markets' economic fundamentals before making any move, thus reducing the 
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risk of over-reacting to foreign news. Such effects, far from being damaging, could 
improve market efficiency and investor confidence in the local developing markets. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 11 sets out the 
theoretical issues regarding cross-market volatility interactions. Section Ill reviews 
some existing literature and Section IV describes the data set, sample period and 
methodology used. Discussion of empirical results are given in Section V and Section 
VI concludes the study. 
(11) The key mechanism for cross-market volatility transmission 
The need to identify the key channel of volatility spill-over across markets is 
important because it has implications for assessing investment risks and the benefits 
of diversifying into developing markets. Two main channels for volatility transmission 
have been identified in previous research, namely the contagion effect and the 
presence of cross market direct portfolio investment. 
(A) Contagion effect 
According to the World Bank Policy Research Report (IMF, 1998), two types of 
contagion can be distinguished, pure contagion and fundamentals contagion. 
(A.l) Pure contagion 
Pure contagion takes place when shocks in one country affect investments in other 
countries, even if the economic fundamentals of the latter have not changed. It is this 
kind of pure contagion that King and Wadhwani (1990) proposed when they found a 
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uniform fall in stock markets during October 1987 even though they all had differing 
economic circumstances before the crash. In their paper, they argued that: 
'contagion between markets occurs as a result of attempts by rational agents to infer 
information from price changes in other markets. This provides a channel through 
which a 'mistake' in one market can be transmitted to other markets.' (King and 
Wadhwani 1990, p.5) 
If this sort of contagion effect is responsible for cross-market volatility transmission, 
we should expect to find a uniform and simultaneous rise and fall of national markets, 
regardless of their individual economic circumstances or their degree of openness to 
foreign direct participation. Exposure to developing markets could thus help little in 
diversifying risks for international institutional investors. Moreover, such a pure 
contagion effect can manifest itself in the form of foreign news asymmetry, whereby 
negative foreign news causes higher volatility in the local developing markets than 
does positive foreign news. The reason is that local investors could be over-reacting 
to negative foreign news when it bears little significance to their own economic 
fundamentals. Movements of the markets are thus driven by a 'herd effect' or 
contagion market psychology. If the pure contagion effect is responsible for volatility 
transmission to the four developing markets, we should expect to find a uniform 
asymmetric response of their volatility to negative foreign news. In other words, 
negative foreign news from each of the three major markets, the US, the UK and 
Japan should all induce higher volatility in the four Asian developing markets than 
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does their positive news. If not, then the importance of pure contagion in causing 
cross-market volatility transmission should be in doubt. 
(A.2) Fundamentals contagion 
Fundamentals contagion occurs when a shock in one country affects investments in 
other countries because the countries share similar fundamentals or are exposed to 
common external shocks. Or it is possible that the shocks in one country are 
transmitted through trade or financial channels and thereby affect the economic 
fundamentals of other countries. This in turn means that volatility in the developed 
stock market could be transmitted to the developing markets via this route with or 
without cross-market stock investment. Figures 4.1 to 4.4 show that the four Asian 
developing markets all have significant trading relationships with Japan and the US, 
accounting for an average of one-third to one-half of their total export and import 
trade in aggregate between 1993 and 1996. Thus there is a possibility that news from 
Japan and the US might impact on the four markets' volatility under the fundamentals 
contagion hypothesis. Evidence of volatility spill-over from the US, Japan and the 
UK to the four Asian developing markets, particularly to South Korea and Taiwan 
before they were opened to foreign investors would support this fundamentals 
contagion argument. 
If fundamentals contagion ts the key channel, it means that diversifying into 
developing markets is still beneficial because economic fundamentals of the 
developing and industrial markets are not identical. Shocks arising from the changing 
economic fundamentals of the developing markets' trading partners may or may not 
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have similar impacts on the volatility of their markets. Moreover, the same piece of 
foreign news could have differing impacts on each individual developing market. It 
all depends on the nature of economic ties they have with the industrial countries. 
Consider the following two cases. 
Case 1 
If the developed country is the main export market of the developing country, a 
contraction in economic growth of the former would result in a fall in demand. This 
would have knock-on effects on corporate earnings of the export companies traded in 
the latter. In this case, the foreign shock should have a similar effect on the price 
volatility ofboth markets. 
Case 2 
If the developed country is the main source of raw materials import of the developing 
country, the story would be totally different. The same sort of economic contraction 
experienced in the developed market would not cause similar effects on the volatility 
of the latter. Instead, depreciation of currency to boost exports on the part of the 
developed country, for example, would cut importation costs for companies in the 
developing country relying on such imports. Hence their profitability would rise 
and this in turn would help boost the stock market. In this case, therefore, a foreign 
shock which has a negative impact on the source market's volatility could have a 
positive impact on the developing market instead. 
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Figure 4.1 Hong Kong's main trading partners between 1993 and 1996 
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Figure 4.2 Singapore's main trading partners between 1993 and 1996 
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Figure 4.3 South Korea's main trading partners between 1993 and 1996 
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Figure 4.4 Taiwan's main trading partners between 1993 and 1996 
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The fact that negative foreign news could have totally different impacts on the 
volatility of different developing markets under the fundamentals contagion argument 
may suggest different implications for foreign news asymmetry. Instead of having 
negative foreign news causing higher local market volatility, positive foreign news 
might do the same too if the positive news has a negative effect on the local markets' 
economic fundamentals or vice versa. In that case, the interpretation of foreign news 
asymmetry should be related to the fundamentals contagion effect rather than the pure 
contagion effect described above. Thus, the extent to which there is an asymmetric 
response of volatility to news, and the nature of this response is an empirical issue. 
(A.3) Foreign direct portfolio investment 
Foreign direct portfolio investment is the second possible channel for volatility 
transmission suggested by Ng et. al. (1991). They argue that the presence of 
merchandise trade relations between markets is not sufficient to induce volatility spill-
over between national stock markets, even though their economic fundamentals are 
linked through the trade relation. This argument is supported by their finding that 
there is no volatility spill-over to South Korea and Taiwan from the US prior to their 
liberalisation, although the US is their major trading partner. Instead, they find that 
cross-country stock investment is the key channel to facilitate the transmission of 
volatility. As has been argued in previous chapters, the presence of foreign investors 
in developing markets could help improve information flow from developed markets 
through their advanced information technology and thus increase the level of informed 
trading. French and Roll (1986), Ross (1989) and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), 
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among others, all agree that market volatility is related to the flow of information to 
the market. The improved rate of information flow across markets and the increase in 
informed trading based on the arrival of information following market liberalisation in 
the developing markets could thus induce volatility to be spilled over to them. In this 
case, investment risks in developing markets should be reduced rather than increased 
as more trading is based on information rather than on noise. The finding of volatility 
spill-over from the US, Japan and the UK to the four Asian developing markets only 
after they have liberalised would thus be supportive of the view that foreign direct 
portfolio investment is the key mechanism for volatility transmission. 
To sum up, discussion in this section has three implications to the testing and 
interpreting of volatility interactions in this chapter: 
( 1) If volatility spill-over only takes place following market liberalisation, particularly 
in South Korea and Taiwan, then cross-market stock investment opportunities in a 
given local market are a vital key for volatility transmission 
(2) If volatility spill-over is also found in the period before liberalisation, regardless 
of whether there are cross-market stock investment opportunities, it suggests that 
either pure contagion or fundamentals contagion is at work in causing volatility 
transmission. 
(3) If there is a lack of uniform asymmetric response of volatility in the four Asian 
developing markets to all negative foreign news and if such negative news does not 
always cause higher volatility in the developing markets, it would be indicative of the 
importance of fundamentals contagion as the mechanism for volatility transmission. 
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(lli) Literature review 
The issues of market integration and volatility transmission between national stock 
markets have been widely addressed. Eun and Shim (1989) provide the pioneering 
work on the international transmission of stock market movements in which six 
developed markets in Europe and America and three in Asia are examined using a 
V AR model. Daily rates of return of stock markets over the period of 1980 to 1985 
are fitted to the model. Variance decomposition coefficients and impulse response 
functions derived from the model show that the US is the major source of price 
movements to the rest of the world. Since the publication of their work, a number of 
studies using the same V AR methodology have been published, but results regarding 
the way stock markets are linked together are mixed. For examples, Brocato (1994), 
who uses weekly data over the sample period of 1980 to 1987, which is equally split 
into half, finds that the dominant role of the US in influencing price movements in the 
UK, Canada, Japan, Germany and Hong Kong has eroded over time. Chowdhury 
( 1994) reports that US innovations impact on the daily returns volatility of the least 
restricted newly developed markets only, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. Those 
with the strictest entry barriers, like South Korea and Taiwan, remain unaffected 
between 1986 and 1990, a period before these two markets were open to foreign 
investors. Similarly, Rogers ( 1994) investigates the general relationship between 
entry barriers and the transmission of stock prices surrounding the crash period of 
October 1987. He also finds that prices in South Korea and Taiwan, which have the 
stiffest entry barriers, do not respond to innovations from the US and Japan over the 
period of 1986 to 1989. 
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Despite the usefulness of impulse response functions derived from a V AR model in 
depicting the dynamic response of a local market to foreign innovations, there are 
limitations of examining market volatility interaction along this line. First, the 
variance decomposition coefficients derived from the V AR can only give a qualitative 
or descriptive picture of market linkage patterns. No statistically significant causal 
inferences regarding the linkage pattern can be made from the findings. Second, the 
mechanism that links markets together cannot be established from the estimated 
variance decomposition coefficients. One can only assert that it is due to the level of 
market openness (e.g. Rogers 1994; Chowdhury 1994 and Brocato 1994) or market 
' 
contagion (e.g. von Furstenberg and Jeon 1989). Third, since the foreign shocks used 
in the V AR are simulated, we cannot tell whether such shocks are country-specific or 
world-wide. Hence the variance decomposition coefficients cannot be used to 
distinguish whether the news affecting a local market's price or volatility movements 
is country-specific or global in nature. 
The use of GARCH type models in studying volatility spillover between markets has 
o-,;erc·)me some of these problems. The first paper in which price and volatility spill-
overs are analysed within a GARCH type model is that by Hamao et. al. (1990). They 
divide daily close-to-close returns data into daily open-to-close and daily close-to-
open returns data for Japan, the UK and the US over a three year period between 
April 1985 and March 1988. They then fit them into a moving average GARCH-in-
the-mean model, MA(l )-GARCH-M model, shown as the conditional mean and 
conditional variance equations in (la) and (1b) respectively. Since the ARCH models 
a~sume that the conditional error is serially uncorrelated, they therefore add the 
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conditional variance term and one lagged error term into the conditional mean 
equation to remove serial correlation from the stock returns' first moment. By 
estimating this model, they want to analyse whether the spill-over effects of a foreign 
innovation reflect country-specific changes or global economic changes. The former 
is manifested through an impact of foreign open-to-close returns changes on domestic 
close-to-open returns changes, whilst the latter is shown by the impact of foreign 
close-to-open returns changes on domestic open-to-close returns changes. 
Alternatively, if the coefficient corresponding to the proxy of foreign surprises 
appended into the conditional variance equation is found to be statistically significant, 
then there is volatility spill-over from the foreign to the domestic market. If the spill-
over effect reflects the influence of a common economic effect on the volatility of all 
three stock market indices, introducing a second foreign market is unlikely to add 
much incremental explanatory power. 
h,,~ = a;o + ail&i~-~ + r;h,,t-1 + L8i1Xf,t-I 
f=l 
where Ru is the returns for market i, 
hu is the conditional variance of R;,t, 
(la) 
(lb) 
.xf,t-I is the a proxy for innovations of foreign market j. The proxy is the lagged 
squared residuals of a standard GARCH-M model fitted with the returns series 
of market). 
Building on this GARCH framework, Lin et. al. (1993) estimate market 
interdependencies between Tokyo and New York and they find evidence of a bi-
directional spill-over between the two markets using intra-daily data. Like King and 
Wadhwani (1990), who use the correlation method to examine volatility behaviour of 
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world markets surrounding the 1987 Crash period, Lin et. al. (1990) conclude that 
world markets are linked through the contagion effect. The term contagion effect 
means that local investors make their investment decisions by extracting information 
on global factors from price changes in other markets. As a result, an internationally 
contagious psychology which is not justified by the economic fundamentals of an 
individual market could spread across world markets causing uniform market decline 
during the crash period. 
Ng et. al. (1991) also follow the framework used in Hamao et. al. (1990) to study 
volatility spill-over from the US to four Asian markets, namely Japan, Thailand, 
Taiwan and Korea. However, their argument about the mechanism for volatility 
transmission is entirely different from that ofKing and Wadhwani (1990)'and Lin et. 
al. (1993). They apply daily closing returns data to model (la) and (lb) and include a 
dummy variable in the model to mark the implementation of institutional changes in 
Japan and Thailand to encourage foreign investors. They argue that if cross-country 
stock investment is the key channel for volatility spill-over, only Japan and Thailand, 
which have opened themselves up, should be affected. No spill-over effects should 
exist in the two most restricted markets, Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, the new 
measures to attract more foreign investors should intensify the spill-over effects to 
Japan and Taiwan. These are exactly what they have found in their study and they 
therefore conclude that international volatility transmission is not caused by a 
contagion effect, but by the presence of cross-market stock investments. 
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These papers which use standard GARCH type models to examine volatility spill-over 
have shown an improvement over those using the V AR method. For instance, the 
impact of local news and global news, as well as foreign market's country specific 
news and world-wide market news can be separated with the use of intra-daily data. 
The causal relationships between national markets volatility changes can also be 
established from the empirical findings. However, these studies have ignored the 
possibility of asymmetric volatility interactions between markets in which foreign 
negative news might have a greater impact on local market volatility than positive 
foreign news of an equal magnitude. The exponential GARCH model (EGARCH) 
and GJR-GARCH type models (named after the work of Glosten, Jagannathan and 
Runkle 1989) is able to address this issue directly. Studies by Booth et. al. (1997), 
Koutmos (1996), Koutmos and Booth (1995) and Theodossiou and Lee (1995) 
employ either the bivariate or multivariate EGARCH method while Bae and Karolyi 
(1994) adopt the GJR-GARCH method. Booth et. al. (1997) use daily closing returns 
data to examine the asymmetric volatility interaction between four regional 
Scandinavian markets. They find evidence that negative innovations in the foreign 
market have a higher impact on the volatility of the local market than positive 
innovations. In other words, the volatility transmission mechanism is asymmetric. 
Similar findings are also reported in Theodossiou and Lee (1995) who study 
European and US markets; in Koutmos ( 1996) who examines four European 
markets; and in Koutmos and Booth (1995) and Bae and Karolyi (1994) in which the 
three world leading markets namely Japan, UK and US are investigated. 
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Our findings in Chapter Two of the thesis show that volatility in the each of the Four 
Tigers is responding asymmetrically to their own past innovations. This is suggestive 
of the possibility that volatility spill-overs to these markets could also be asymmetric. 
Yet whether negative innovations in a foreign market produce a higher volatility spill-
over in the local market than do positive innovations depends on the nature of 
economic ties between the developing and developed markets. Therefore, m 
investigating the issue of volatility spill-over to the Four Tigers in this Chapter, we 
will use a similar asymmetric GARCH type model along the lines of GJR (1989) 
instead ofthe commonly used GARCH-M models. The reasons are two-fold. First, 
the emphasis of this chapter is the inter-relationship between markets, not the inter-
temporal relation between risk and expected returns. The issue of whether there is a 
trade-off between risk (as measured by the volatility of the stock market) and 
expected returns is of secondary importance. Second, the aim of specifying the 
conditional mean equation as a MA(1)-GARCH-M process shown in equation (la) is 
to extract serial correlation from the stock returns' first moment, for ARCH models 
assume that the conditional error is serially uncorrelated. Since the returns series used 
in this Chapter have been pre-filtered in the same way as shown in Chapter Two, we 
can drop the MA process in our conditional mean equation and simply apply the GJR 
type GARCH model in this Chapter. The key advantage of using this model is that 
the loglikelihood estimate of the model is often found to be superior to the EGARCH 
model (Engle and Ng, 1993; Antoniou, Holmes and Priestley, 1998). In addition, 
Engle and Ng (1993) found that the GJR model is the best at parsimoniously 
capturing the asymmetric effect of news on market volatility. 
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Our study is the first attempt in the finance literature to investigate the possible 
foreign news asymmetric effects on the volatility of the Asian Four Tigers. Moreover, 
the availability of daily data after the liberalisation of markets in Taiwan and South 
Korea has opened a new opportunity for us to assess the conflicting theories about the 
key channels for cross-market volatility transmission, by comparing the findings for 
pre- and post-liberalisation periods. Given the big differences in the size of the 
markets under investigation, news originating from the major markets is expected to 
impact more on the newly developed markets' volatility than vice versa. Thus this 
chapter will only concentrate on the examination of volatility transmission from the 
three leading world markets to the four newly developed markets. 
(IV) Data and methodology 
(A) Data 
The same data and sample period for the four local markets are used as in Chapter 
Two. For Japan, the US and the UK, Nikkei 225 Average Stock Index, Dow Jones 
Industrial Index and the FTSE 100 Index are used respectively. These indices are the 
most representative indicator of each market's performance because they are either 
made up of stocks which constitute the largest amount of market capitalisation or the 
most active stocks traded in the market. In order to examine the possible changing 
nature of volatility spill-over from the world markets, the full sample period for each 
of the four Asian developing markets is partitioned as in Chapter Two. 
To study the bivariate volatility interaction between a foreign and a local market, 
returns series for Japan, the UK and the US have to be partitioned in the same way as 
each local market does. Since there are four local markets under investigation, 
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returns series for these three major markets are partitioned in four different ways. 
One advantage of investigating volatility spill-over to the four local markets over 
different periods is that our results are not time-period specific or event-related. In 
other words, we are not looking at the significance of a particular piece of US news, 
for example, on the four local markets simultaneously. Instead, an overall impact of 
US news on these markets during their pre- and post-liberalisation periods can be 
inferred from the results. 
One thing we should be aware of however, when interpreting the differing impacts 
between Japan, UK and US news on the four local markets is the issue of over-
lapping trading hours. Figure 4. 5 shows the sequential opening time of all seven 
markets studied in terms ofUK Greenwich Mean Time. 
Figure 4. 5 A time line showing the sequential opening time of seven stock markets 
in Greenwich Mean Time 
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Between Japan and the four markets, there are substantial overlapping trading hours. 
News relating to the Japanese market during trading hours would thus have an 
immediate impact on the four regional markets. Therefore, conditional volatility of 
Hong Kong at timet is expected to be more affected by news from Japan within the 
same calendar day. The UK and the US markets, on the other hand, open sequentially 
after all the four Asian markets are closed. Thus New York returns at time t may 
affect returns in Hong Kong at timet+ 1 (and not time t). The same is true for UK 
news. As lagged foreign innovations are included in our model of estimation, it is 
comparatively easy for us to distinguish between foreign news impacts from the US 
and the UK and local news impacts, but is not so clear with Japanese news impact. 
Hence, Japanese news impact could vary with UK and US news impact on the four 
markets in our results. 
Due to the presence of non-overlapping trading hours between the four Asian 
developing markets, the UK and the US, it is not known whether any correlation of 
stock returns found between them should be classified as contemporaneous 
correlation or lagged spill-over. Theoretically, this problem could be solved if we 
divide daily close to close returns for these markets into open to close (i.e. daytime) 
returns and previous close to open (i.e. overnight) returns. The correlation between 
foreign daytime returns and domestic overnight returns is an indication of 
contemporaneous spill-over from foreign to local markets. The correlation between 
foreign daytime returns and subsequent domestic daytime returns would indicate the 
presence of lagged spill-over from the foreign market. The unavailability of intra-
daily data in all four developing markets has prevented us from identifying these two 
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possible types of spill-over. Therefore, all findings of volatility spill-over from Japan, 
the UK and the US to the Four Tigers would be regarded as the impact of their most 
recent surprises on the four local markets. 
(B) Empirical design 
A number of methodologies have been employed in the study of volatility transmission 
and market integration. These include vector autoregressive regression; Granger 
causality tests; standard univariate GARCH models, univariate and multivariate 
exponential GARCH models as well as an asymmetric GARCH type model called 
GJR-GARCH model named after Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1989). The first 
three methods named above do not deal with the possibility of an asymmetric 
response of local volatility to foreign news and therefore are not appropriate for use in 
our study. Although the EGARCH type models can help detect the existence of news 
asymmetry, they tend to over-estimate the conditional variance of a market in cases of 
more extreme shocks (Engle and Ng, 1993, p.1776) By contrast, the GJR asymmetric 
GARCH type model is regarded by them as the best model to capture asymmetry. 
Thus the GJR model will be adopted and modified to include asymmetric foreign news 
terms into the conditional variance equation shown in (2b) to examine the asymmetric 
volatility interaction between the seven markets. 
Let: 
Ri.t be the returns for market i at timet, where, i = 1,2,3,4 (1 =Hong Kong, 
2 = Singapore, 3 = South Korea and 4 = Taiwan); 
Y0.t-J be the most recent squared residuals as proxies of foreign news for market i, 
where j = 1,2,3 (1=Japan, 2=UK and 3=US) 
ilt-1 be the information set available at time t-1; 
f..l;,t be the conditional mean of R;,t such that U;,t = E(R;,t I ilt-1 ); 
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h;,r be the conditional variance of R;,r such that h;,r = Var(K.r I flr-1 ); 
6;, 1 be the stochastic error conditional on the information set flr_J; 
S1_1 be an indicative dummy that takes the value of 1 if e;,r-I or X;.r-1 is negative and 
0 otherwise, 
R;,t = Jli,t + B;,r where i = 1 to 4 (2a) 
where)= 1 to 3 and i;tj 
The returns data used in the conditional mean equation are pre-ftltered in the same 
way as in Chapter Two. The main aim is to utilise only the unpredictable part of the 
returns series when estimating the conditional variances of each market. Thus all 
possible day-of-the week effects as well as autocorrelation effects have been removed 
in the two-step procedure. The implication of such data adjustments to equation (2a) 
is that f.J;, r is expected to be close to zero, because all predictable parts of the raw data 
series should have been accounted for by the two pre-filtering procedures. 
p; is the coefficient on the lagged variance term. It is picking up the impact of price 
changes relating to days prior to the previous day. In other words, it reflects the 
impact of past local news which arrived before yesterday. In theory, the value of p; 
should fall as the rate of information flow within the market increases with an increase 
in foreign participation. In practice, however, the availability of information on 
publicly traded companies in the developing markets is limited and the quality of 
information is not comparable to those available for developed markets' securities. 
Thus it might take foreign investors a longer time to assess the implication of local 
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news on their investment strategies and to monitor any new developments. As a 
consequence, the impact of past local news could remain persistently high even when 
there are more informed traders in the market. 
The two lagged squared error terms, iu.1 and S;,t-Iiu-I shown in (2b), represent 
changes in returns on the previous day due to local factors. The coefficients 
associated with them, au and a;,2, relate to the impact of yesterday's local news that 
cause market returns changes on current volatility. The value of au indicates the 
impact of a piece of positive local news, while the sum of au and a;,2 estimates the 
impact of a piece of negative local news on current returns volatility. A high value of 
a;J or the sum of a;,1 and a;,2 implies that recent news has a greater impact on current 
returns volatility. A higher (lower) value of a;,1 or the sum of a;J and a;,2 found 
during the post-liberalisation period is indicative of local recent information being 
impounded more (less) quickly into prices. 
The second last term of equation (2b ), JV. 1.1, is the most recent squared innovations or 
news from either Japan, the UK or the US. It is a proxy for the most recent foreign 
news in these major markets obtained from equation (2a). The term S1;1•1Xp-I is 
designed to capture the possible additional impact of negative foreign news in 
affecting local market's current volatility. The coefficients corresponding to these 
two terms indicate the effects of positive and negative foreign news in affecting local 
market volatility. Positive foreign news impact is given by (}ifJ, while the summation 
of 8y;I and 8y;2 indicates the impact of negative foreign news on local market volatility. 
If none of them are found to be statistically significant, then market j' s volatility does 
not spill over to market i. When (}ifJ+ 8if,2 is significantly positive and at the same time 
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BiJ.1+ BiJ,2 > BiJ,l, it implies that there is negative foreign news asymmetry. Negative 
foreign news has a greater impact on local volatility than positive foreign news of an 
equal magnitude. On the other hand, if BiJ. 1+ BiJ,2 < By, 1, then there is positive foreign 
news asymmetry. 
(V) Empirical results 
(A) Preliminary data analyses 
Summary statistics for all seven markets' unpredictable returns series are reported in 
Tables 4.1 to 4.4. They show that the unpredictable mean returns are similar across 
markets, no matter what sample periods for the four Asian markets are used. They 
are either zero or very close to zero, suggesting that no one single market 
outperformed or lagged behind other markets. This is an indication that all unexpected 
returns in each market are caused by market surprises rather than predictable factors 
like day-of-the-week effects which have been pre-filtered. The standard deviation of 
each market's daily unpredictable returns distribution for all markets in the four 
tables all decrease over the post-change period, with only two exceptions- Japan 
over Hong Kong and Taiwan's post-change period. As far as the four Asian 
developing markets are concerned, the observed decrease in standard deviation means 
that they have lower total risk than before liberalisation. When compared with the 
other three major markets, however, each of these four markets still has relatively 
higher total risk than the latter markets during their respective pre- and post-change 
sample periods. Given the size and maturity of the two sets of local and major 
markets, such a finding is reasonable. 
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics for Hong Kong and three overseas markets' 
unpredictable returns series 
Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis LB(24) LB2(24) 
deviation 
HK 1 -0.001 2.182 -8.730 144.2 44.04* 6.563 
2 -0.026 1.340 -0.473 4.782 24.24 365.8* 
Japan 1 -0.001 1.127 -3.087 55.03 24.99 64.47* 
2 -0.066 1.416 0.447 5.570 40.05 326.1 * 
UK 1 -0.002 1.152 -2.330 28.75 30.38 546.7* 
2 -0.003 0.788 0.167 2.460 27.39 193.6* 
us 1 -0.001 1.484 -6.246 105.6 18.96 14.13 
2 -0.001 0.764 -0.550 6.531 24.90 82.10* 
*N.B. Rows marked with 1 and 2 represent pre- and post-change sample period 
respectively used for each of the four Asian markets. 
Pre- and post- change period for the four local markets are: 
1986:4:1 to 1989:6:30 and 1989:7:1 to 1996:7:31 for Hong Kong 
1989:3:1 to 1993:9:30 and 1993:10:1 to 1996:7:31 for Singapore 
1988:3:1 to 1991:12:31 and 1992:1:1 to 1996:7:31 for Korea 
1988:1:1 to 1990:12:31 and 1991:1:1 to 1996:7:31 for Taiwan 
Skewness = coefficient of skewness 
Kurtosis = coefficient of kurtosis 
LB(24) and LB2(24) are Ljung-Box statistics for 24th order serial correlation for daily 
and squared daily unpredictable returns respectively. An asterisk denotes that the null 
of no dependencies can be rejected at either 1% or 5% significance level. 
Table 4.2 :Summary statistics for Singapore and three overseas markets' 
unpredictable returns series 
Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis LB(24) LB2(24) 
deviation 
Singapore 1 -0.000 1.005 -1.023 15.23 14.89 130.8* 
2 0.000 0.943 -0.162 3.283 27.49 192.4* 
Japan 1 0.000 1.484 0.503 6.064 35.19 232.8* 
2 0.000 1.220 0.197 3.915 18.80 87.09* 
UK 1 0.000 0.839 0.261 2.709 34.25 102.2* 
2 0.000 0.694 -0.213 0.237 21.58 75.08* 
us 1 -0.000 0.830 -0.507 6.611 20.33 41.32 
2 0.000 0.640 -0.483 2.016 17.08 32.18 
Footnotes as table 4 .1. 
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Table 4. 3 : Summary statistics for South Korea and three overseas markets' 
unpredictable returns series 
Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis LB(24) LB2(24) 
deviation 
S. Korea 1 -0.009 1.414 0.277 3.194 23.28 285.6* 
2 0.000 1.266 0.313 2.604 19.69 341.3* 
Japan 1 -0.095 1.264 0.376 11.17 52.76 268.23* 
2 -0.000 1.349 0.420 3.284 21.76 216.87* 
UK 1 0.002 0.818 -0.135 0.885 22.42 85.40* 
2 0.000 0.748 0.313 3.673 20.41 146.8* 
us 1 -0.095 1.264 -0.475 5.245 12.57 19.86 
2 0.000 0.629 -0.376 1.707 19.69 37.69 
*Footnotes as table 4.1. 
Table 4.4 :Summary statistics for Taiwan and three overseas markets' unpredictable 
returns series 
Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis LB(24) LB2(24) 
deviation 
Taiwan 1 -0.000 2.898 -0.064 1.031 25.43 746.5* 
2 -0.000 1.762 -0.021 2.975 37.73 414.6* 
Japan 1 -0.000 1.231 0.602 15.40 65.43* 240.3* 
2 -0.000 1.341 0.355 3.121 20.27 226.3* 
UK 1 -0.000 0.822 -0.236 1.096 20.59 77.68* 
2 0.000 0.760 0.319 3.041 18.87 130.27* 
us 1 0.000 0.967 -0.697 5.341 12.33 19.35 
2 0.000 0.682 -0.051 3.179 15.32 40.76* 
Footnotes as table 4. 1. 
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The kurtosis and skewness coefficients for most returns senes are significantly 
different from zero, indicating that these distributions are non-normal with fat tails 
and mostly left skewed. Moreover, there is strong evidence of non-linear dependen-
cies in most unpredictable returns series. Linear and non-linear dependencies of the 
unpredictable returns series are measured by Ljung-Box statistics4 for up to 24 lags 
denoted by LB(24) and LB2(24) respectively. With only a few exceptions, LB(24) 
statistics shown in all tables suggest that a majority of markets' unpredictable returns 
series are linearly independent. On the contrary, independence of the squared return 
series is rejected at the 5% level for all markets. Thus the non-linear dependencies are 
much more prevalent than the linear dependencies. In sum, the fat-tail distribution 
and non-linear dependencies of the returns series are supportive of the use of an 
auto regressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model for the variance 
processes of the returns data. 
(B) Bi-variate GJR-GARCH models estimation results 
The model and the estimation results for the impact of news from Japan, the UK and 
the US to market volatility of the four Asian markets are given in Tables 4.5 to 4.8. 
In each of the four tables, local (foreign) news impacts are measured by coefficients 
aa and a;2 ( Bif.I and Bif,2). Provided that the local (foreign) news asymmetry 
coefficient a;2 ( By;2), is statistically significant, the summation of au and a;2 (By; 1 and 
By;2) measures the impact of negative local (foreign) news on local market volatility. 
4 The formula for the Ljung-Box statistic is LB(k) = T(I+2)lfj-J,Jj; (f-J), where rj is thejth tag 
autocorrelation, k is the munber of autocorrelations, and T is the sample size. The statistics follow x2 
distribution with k degrees of freedom. 
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These sums are provided in each of the four tables for quick reference. Positive local 
news impact is measured by au (By;2) alone. The terms 'local' and 'foreign' news 
here cannot be strictly interpreted as news purely originating from local and foreign 
markets because daily close-to-close returns data used in this study may reflect both 
the influence of foreign news when the local market has closed and local news during 
its trading hours. The unavailability of open-to-close and close-to-open data for the 
four Asian markets means that we have to assume B;,r-1 and JV.r-1 are good proxies for 
local and foreign news. 
(C) Analyses and discussion of the estimation results 
(C. I) Foreign news impacts ( BiJ.l and B!l.l + By;2) 
Four interesting points can be observed from tables 4. 5 to 4. 8 regarding foreign news 
impacts on the four individual Asian markets. First, news from Japan, the UK and the 
US does spill over to the four developing markets even before their liberalisation. 
Second, not all developing markets experience an intensification of foreign news 
impacts on their market volatility after liberalisation. Third, negative foreign news 
does not cause a uniform decline in all four stock markets. Instead, each individual 
developing market has a different asymmetric response to foreign news, good and bad 
alike. Fourth, foreign news impacts on the four Asian markets on the whole diminish 
following their liberalisation. The first three observations have important implications 
for the key mechanism of volatility transmission to the four developing markets. 
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Table 4.5 : Volatility spill-over to Hong Kong .from Japan, UK and US 
(1986:4: 1 to 1989:6:30 and 1989:7:1 to 1996: 7:31) 
Pre-change 12eriod Post-change fl.eriod 
Countries I Japan UK us Japan UK us 
Parameters 
aJO 0.0803* 0.0319* 0.0294* 0.1205* 0.0231 * 0.1193* 
au 0.0845* 0.0423* 0.0682* 0.0622* 0.0624* 0.0986* 
a/2 0.1340* 0.1796* 0.1653* 0.0911 * 0.0872* 0.0639* 
au + a12 0.2185 0.2219 0.2335 0.1533 0.1496 0.1625 
81);1 -0.0195 0.2063* 0.1588* -0.0070* -0.0356* -0.0588* 
8n 
./. 0.0565* -0.1698* -0.1198* 0.0179* 0.0725* 0.2751 * 
81};/ + 81p 0.0565 0.0365 0.0390 0.1090 0.0369 0.2163 
/31 0.8088* 0.8096* 0.7841 * 0.8236* 0.8249* 0.7749* 
( 1) Jl.i.t are found to be statistically insignificant in every case and therefore are not 
reported. 
(2) An asterisk indicates that the corresponding estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at 5% significance level, except for the fourth and seventh rows which give 
the summation of the positive and negative news estimates based on their individual 
statistical significance. 
Table 4. 6 : Volatility spill-over to Singapore from Japan, UK and US 
(1989:3:1 to 1993:9:30 and 1993:10:1 to 1996:7:31) 
Pre-change !2f}.riod Post-change 12eriod 
Countries I Japan UK us Japan UK us 
Parameters 
a2o 0.3386* 0.0623* 0.1545* 0.1562* 0.1488* 0.1627* 
a21 0.1040* 0.1237* 0.1344* 0.0873* 0.0970* 0.1301 * 
a22 0.2833* 0.2003* 0.2293* 0.1974* 0.1781* 0.1753* 
a21 + a22 0.3873 0.3240 0.3637 0.2847 0.2751 0.3054 
821 J. -0.0040 -0.0092* 0.1614 0.0082 0.0417 0.1323* 
82p 0.0701 * 0.2650* 0.0760* -0.0040 0.0394 0.0530 
821+822 
'.1· '). 0.0701 0.2558 0.2374 0 0 0.1323 
/32 0.3601 * 0.4010* 0.4182* 0.6202* 0.6023* 0.5091 * 
Footnotes as table 4.5. 
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Table 4.7: Volatility spill-over to South Korea from Japan, UK and US 
(1988:3:1 to 1991:12:31 and 1992:1:1 to 1996:7:31) 
Pre-change ]2_eriod Post-change ]2_eriod 
Countries I Japan UK us Japan UK us 
Parameters 
a3o 0.2044* 0.3617* 0.2064* 0.0890* 0.0817* 0.1018* 
a31 0.0967* 0.1479* 0.0975* 0.0585* 0.0690* 0.0717* 
a32 0.1558* 0.1670* 0.1553* 0.0672* 0.0532* 0.0522* 
a31 + a32 0.2525 0.3149 0.2528 0.1257 0.1222 0.1239 
83;;~ 0.1494* -0.0595* 0.1458* 0.0264* 0.0067 -0.0875* 
83'2 ~- -0.1378* 0.1924* -0.1337* -0.0262* 0.0049 0.1146* 
83j.l + 83j.2 0.0116 0.1329 0.0121 0.0002 0 0.0271 
[33 0.6823* 0.5792* 0.6809* 0.8363* 0.8506* 0.8452* 
Footnotes as table 4. 5. 
Table 4.8: Volatility spill-over to Taiwan from Japan, UK and US 
(1988:1:1 to 1990:12:31 and 1991:1:1 to 1996:7:31) 
Pre-change ]2_eriod Post-change ~riod 
Countries I Japan UK us Japan UK us 
Parameters 
a4o 0.1948* 0.1419* 0.2012* 0.0953* 0.0971 * 0.1058* 
a41 0.0008 0.0296* 0.0287* 0.0515* 0.0515* 0.0491 * 
a42 0.1916* 0.1622* 0.1765* 0.0326* 0.0292* 0.0329* 
a41 + a42 0.1916 0.1918 0.2052 0.0841 0.0807 0.0820 
841 
'}. 0.2647* -0.0287 -0.0232 0.0264* 0.0634* 0.0782* 
84 2 '}. -0.1438 0.2491 * 0.0706 -0.0245* -0.0402* -0.1071 * 
841 + 84 2 
'1· '1· 0.2647 0.2491 0 0.0019 0.0232 -0.0289 
p4 0.8491 * 0.8606* 0.8542* 0.8903 0.8914 0.8941 
Footnotes as table 4. 5. 
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In section 11, we have argued that volatility can be transmitted from one market to 
another through (i) the presence of cross-market stock investment; (ii) a pure 
contagion effect or (iii) a fundamentals contagion effect. The absence of volatility 
spill-over to South Korea and Taiwan in particular before their liberalisation as well 
as an intensification of foreign news impacts on Hong Kong and Singapore after 
their liberalisation would be supportive of the first channel as the key 
mechanism. However, results from tables 4. 7 and 4. 8 show that volatility in South 
Korea is influenced by news from all three major markets before liberalisation whilst 
Taiwan is influenced by news from Japan and the UK. Meanwhile, results from tables 
4. 5 and 4. 6 show that only Hong Kong has experienced a substantial increase in 
foreign news impacts such as negative news impacts from Japan and the US during 
the post-liberalisation period. Volatility spill-overs to Singapore on the other hand 
have reduced rather than intensified following its liberalisation. In addition, a higher 
level of equity investment in the developing markets from the major market does not 
necessarily lead to a greater influence on the volatility of the four developing markets. 
Take the UK news impact as an example. Although the UK has relatively larger 
exposure in the four developing markets' equities following their liberalisation as has 
been mentioned in Chapter Three, the magnitude of its news impact on the four 
markets has fallen by 25% to 100% during this period. Taken together, these results 
give a clear indication that the presence of cross-market stock investment is not 
necessarily the key mechanism for cross-market volatility spill-over. This is opposite 
to what was reported in Ng et. al. (1991) when they found no evidence of volatility 
spill-over from the US to Taiwan and South Korea before they were opened up. It 
could be due to the choice of different indices, sample periods, estimation methods as 
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well as the foreign markets included in the studies. Yet the ability to address directly 
the issue of the link between cross-market direct investment and volatility 
transmission with the availability of post-liberalisation data for both Taiwan and South 
Korea in this chapter makes our results very interesting. 
If cross-market direct investment is not the vital key for volatility transmission, it 
could either be the pure contagion effect or fundamentals contagion effect. To 
distinguish the two, we examine the asymmetric foreign news impacts on each 
individual market. If the negative news of any one of the three major markets 
simultaneously causes higher volatility in the four Asian markets than positive news of 
an equal magnitude, this would be supportive of the pure contagion argument. If, on 
the other hand, different developing markets have different asymmetric responses to 
different foreign news depending on the nature of their economic ties, then it would 
be supportive of the fundamentals contagion argument. A comparison between the 
positive and negative foreign news impacts, i.e. eiJ,/ and Oy; 1 + Oy.2 respectively, on 
each developing market for each sample period shows that only in some cases are 
there significant negative foreign news asymmetries. For example, (i) the negative 
foreign news impacts from Japan, the UK and the US on Singapore over the pre-
liberalisation period, (ii) the negative foreign news impacts from the UK on South 
Korea over the pre-liberalisation period, (iii) the negative foreign news impacts from 
Japan and the UK on Taiwan over the pre-liberalisation period and (iv) the negative 
foreign news impacts from Japan and the US on Hong Kong over the post-
liberalisation period are all higher than positive news from the same foreign markets. 
In all other cases, the negative foreign news impacts on developing markets are simply 
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non-existent or lower than the positive foreign news impacts in absolute terms. 
Therefore, the lack of a uniform response of volatility in the four developing markets 
to negative foreign news eliminates the possibility of the pure contagion effect being 
the key mechanism for cross-market volatility transmission. Instead, volatility is more 
likely to spill over through the fundamentals effect where changes in one market's 
economic fundamentals would cause a knock-on effect on the other stock market 
where there are close economic ties between them. 
Despite the importance of merchandise trade relations in inducing cross-market 
volatility transmission, the role played by foreign participation in the local developing 
markets should not be entirely dismissed. Although local developing markets do not 
necessarily need foreign direct participation for volatility to spill over to them, its 
presence could make a difference to the actual size of spill-over from the foreign 
markets. Take the US news impact on the four Asian markets as an example. Its 
influence on the volatility of South Korea and Taiwan is minimal, often less than 0.1 
per unit of US news. This is reasonable given that South Korea and Taiwan are the 
two least open markets to foreign investors in both periods. This is in contrast to 
Hong Kong and Singapore, the two least restricted markets, where US news impacts 
on their volatility could be as high as 0.22 to 0.24. It is interesting to note that all 
four local markets have the US as one of their major export destinations which 
account for about 18% to 25% of their total exports between 1993 and 1996, yet the 
size of influence from the US stock market could be so different across these markets. 
This indicates that while the presence of merchandise trade relations is the key 
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mechanism for volatility spill-over, the actual size of spill-over is affected by the 
degree of openness of the local markets. 
In addition, the actual size of spill-over could also be affected by the level of 
investment in the local markets on the part of major markets. Take the news impact 
from Japan as an example. Despite being one of the largest import and export 
markets for all four Asian markets between 1993 and 1996 as shown in Figures 4. 1 to 
4.4, news from Japan barely affects the volatility of these stock markets. Per unit of 
Japanese news typically increases or reduces volatility of the four Asian markets by 
just 0.0002 to 0.11. This could possibly be due to the substantial overlapping trading 
hours between Japan and the four regional markets. Hence news coming from Japan 
could have an immediate effect on their price volatility and lagged Japanese news does 
not make much difference at all in affecting their volatility. Alternatively, the lack of 
equity exposure of Japanese investors in these markets could be responsible for the 
low impact of Japanese news. The reason is that market movements in Japan would 
not necessarily require a portfolio adjustment from foreign investors in the local 
markets of other nationalities. That is why the actual size of volatility spill-over to 
the local markets could also be affected by the major market's level of participation in 
the local markets. 
As far as the change in the overall foreign news impacts on the four Asian markets is 
concerned, there is a significant decline of more than 50% over the four markets' 
post-liberalisation periods. This could be due to the fact that there are better 
informed investors in the markets post-liberalisation. They would be more able to 
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discern the relevance of a piece of foreign news to the local market's fundamentals. 
More emphasis would also be placed on local market-specific news as it is more 
relevant in assessing their investment risks relating to that particular local market. 
Thus the decline in the overall foreign news impacts post-liberalisation could be a 
result of an increase in informed trading in the local markets. This would be 
consistent with the findings in Chapter Two. 
(C.2) Local news impacts ( aiJJ and a!J;l + a!J;2) 
Local positive news aiJ,l and negative news a!JJ + ay,2 are all found to be significant 
for all four Asian markets in both periods with the exception of a4J,J in the bivariate 
model between Taiwan and Japan over the pre-liberalisation period. A distinguishable 
change in the overall local news impacts is that negative news impacts have declined 
in all four Asian markets following their liberalisation. This resembles the findings of 
significant reductions in local news asymmetries for all four Asian markets reported in 
Chapter Two. It thus reinforces our argument that the increase in informed trading 
following liberalisation has helped reduce the impact of noise trading that is believed 
to be the major cause of local news asymmetries. 
(C.3) Local news persistence (fi;) 
Persistence of local news has increased in all cases following liberalisation, even when 
the possible impact of foreign news has been taken into consideration. As was 
suggested in Chapter Two, this could be a result of the counteraction by informed 
traders against the response of noise traders to a piece of news so as to drive prices of 
stocks to their fundamental values, thus prolonging the impact of a piece of news on 
178 
market volatility. Alternatively, it might be the case that the true impact of 
liberalisation on market volatility has not been fully captured by the before-and-after 
snapshot as different stages of developments in the regulatory changes should have 
been taken into account during the analysis. 
(VI) Conclusion 
To conclude, the forces behind cross-market volatility transmission are found to be 
inter-related. While the presence of a merchandise trade relation is found to be the 
key mechanism for volatility spill-over to the four Asian markets, the actual size of 
spill-over could be determined by the availability of foreign investment opportunities 
and the actual level of foreign participation. Our results show that volatility spill-
over does not necessarily need to involve direct participation in local developing stock 
markets. The lack of a uniform asymmetric response of volatility in the four Asian 
markets to all negative foreign news has also precluded the possibility of a pure 
contagion effect being the most significant volatility transmission mechanism. Instead, 
the presence of substantial merchandise trade relations is sufficient to induce the 
transmission of foreign shocks through fundamentals contagion to markets like South 
Korea and Taiwan even before they were liberalised. The different nature of 
economic ties between the developing and major markets could explain why volatility 
of the four markets have different asymmetric responses to foreign news. Without the 
existence of a substantial trade relation, a higher level of equity investment in the 
Asian markets from the major markets does not necessarily lead to a greater influence 
on the volatility of the four developing markets either. This is illustrated in the case of 
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the UK which has relatively larger exposure to the four developing markets' equities, 
but only accounted for less than 2% of their total import and export trade. 
Although cross-market direct investment is not the key mechanism for volatility 
transmission, its presence has two important implications on local market volatility. 
First, it would affect the actual size of volatility spill-over from foreign markets. This 
is supported by the finding of differing impacts from the US news on the volatility of 
the four markets despite the fact that the US is their major export market. The news 
has greater impact on the volatility of Hong Kong and Singapore, the two markets 
with the least restrictions, than on South Korea and Taiwan, markets that have tighter 
restrictions. That is why we argue that the forces behind cross-market volatility 
transmission are manifold although the presence of substantial trading relations 
appears to be the basic factor. 
Second, the presence of cross-market investment could indirectly help reduce foreign 
news impacts on local markets and make local news impacts more persistent as there 
is an increase in informed trading following liberalisation. Foreign investors, 
particularly institutional investors, would pay more attention to local news because 
the main source of investment risk is likely to come from within the local markets 
themselves rather than from overseas markets. Thus they would play down the 
significance of foreign news which is irrelevant to the local markets' economic 
fundamentals. As regards the local market specific news, it might take them longer to 
assess its implications on their investment strategy because developing markets are 
expected to be less transparent. That is why cross-market direct investment could 
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indirectly help reduce foreign news impacts on local markets and make local news 
impacts more persistent. 
Results from Chapters Three and Four indicate that the inter-relationships between 
the four Asian markets and the three leading world markets, the US, the UK and 
Japan, were not strong over the past decade. Price movements and volatility of prices 
in the four Asian markets have not been increasingly driven or affected by innovations 
from the leading world markets after their liberalisation. However, similarity in the 
economic growth of most Asian countries in the past ten years may suggest that the 
Four Tigers could be more closely related to other regional stock markets than with 
the world's major markets. One possible reason is that their high rates of economic 
growth were all attractive to foreign investors, and hence they would have to compete 
for their investment capital. As a result, a negative relationship between the markets 
might exist. An upward movement of one market might cause a slowdown to another 
market when foreign investors moved their capital from one country to another. 
Alternatively, the regional markets in Asia could be moved by regional shocks in the 
same directions as they all shared similar economic fundamentals and experienced 
similar economic cycles over the past decade. The benefits of exposing to a number of 
emerging markets in Asia by foreign investors to diversify risks would thus diminish. 
Whether the Four Tigers were more integrated with their regional counterparts than 
with the three leading world markets over the past ten years is a subject that will be 
investigated empirically in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five : The Asian Financial Crisis And The Inter-
relationships Of Regional Stock Markets 
(I) Introduction 
The last three chapters ofthis thesis have examined the changing nature of volatility in 
each of the four Asian markets namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan as well as the world market effects from the US, the UK and Japan on their 
prices and volatility. While the nature and structure of volatility of each individual 
market have undergone changes following their liberalisation, their price and volatility 
inter-relationships with the three major world markets have not changed dramatically. 
An increase in foreign investment opportunities in the four Asian markets has not 
created a closer long-run price relationship between the seven national markets. This 
has been attributed to the changing economic developments in some major markets as 
well as their low level of actual participation in the Asian markets. The active 
government intervention on the stock markets in some developing markets even after 
liberalisation shared some responsibility too. The volatility spill-over effects from the 
major to the Asian markets have not intensified either with the increase in foreign 
investment opportunities. This has been argued to be a result of an increase in 
informed trading as foreign investment increases. Hence irrelevant foreign news on 
the pricing of local stocks is left aside. Instead, more emphasis is placed on local 
news as it becomes more relevant in assessing the risks of investing in these 
developing markets. 
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Despite the non-existence of substantial integration of the four developing Asian 
markets into the world markets, there might be a closer link among the Asian regional 
markets. Previous studies have shown evidence of such inter-relationships on stock 
price eo-movements as well as volatility spillover. These include Corhay et. al. 
(1995), Masih and Masih (1997), Chowdhury (1994) and Eun and Shim (1989), to 
name a few. In Corhay et. al. (1995), they find evidence that within the Pacific-Basin 
region, Asian markets are more integrated among themselves than with Pacific 
markets such as Australia and New Zealand, probably because of the geographical 
separation. In Masih and Masih ( 1997), their eo integration results show that the 
Hong Kong market predominantly led the markets of Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan between 1982 and 1994, yet no explanations have been offered for such a 
linkage pattern. In fact, the similarity in their economic and foreign investment 
growth within the last ten years as well as their trade relations might explain why they 
are linked in the ways they are. Thus in this chapter, the regional linkage patterns of 
the Four Tigers with other regional Asian markets will be investigated and the reasons 
behind their linkage patterns explored. With the emergence of the Asian financial 
crisis in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia since July 1997, affecting both the regional 
and world markets and economies alike, it would be interesting to examine whether 
the crisis has strengthened the inter-relationships among these Asian emerging 
markets. Thus, the issue of regional market linkages among the Asian markets 
surrounding the recent Asian financial crisis period would be the subject of 
investigation in this chapter. 
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No doubt, given the extensive knock-on effects the crisis in Asia might bring to the 
world economies, it has been a topic already widely written and commented about 
ever since it came to light. Yet not much empirical work has been done to help 
quantify how individual Asian markets have been affected by the crisis. Therefore, we 
seek to fill this gap in the literature in this chapter by examining the regional effects of 
the Asian financial crisis on the stock markets ofHong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan. The aim is to obtain a general picture of how Asian regional markets are 
inter-related to allow a comparison with the world market linkage pattern found in the 
last two chapters. Such information is important for international investors to 
evaluate the risks of exposing themselves to several Asian stock markets at the same 
time and the signposts to look for to make better investment decisions in potential 
markets in the future. We will argue that before the Asian financial crisis, there is 
little interaction between the Four Tigers and three regional markets namely Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Regional innovations have limited effects on the four 
markets except Singapore where the innovations have substantial impacts on its 
returns variations. However, during the crisis, their interactions become much 
stronger and impacts of the regional shocks are more persistent. Responses to the 
shocks are slow and lack direction where they may fall one day and rise again the 
following day. All these have been attributed to the market contagion effects that 
were, it is argued, at work during the crisis, which helped spread the crisis throughout 
the region. 
The rest of the chapter will proceed as follows. Section 11 gives an account of the 
Asian crisis. Section Ill discusses the links between regional effects and the Asian 
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stock markets movements. Section IV describes the methodology and data used. 
Empirical results will be reported and discussion provided in Section V. Section VI 
concludes the chapter. 
(ll) The Asian financial crisis 
The Asian financial crisis has been extensively reported in newspapers such as the 
Financial Times and business periodicals such as the Far Eastern Economic Review, 
The Economist and The Banker, to name a few. Below is an account of the origin 
and development of the crisis from a number of articles and reports based on these 
newspapers, periodicals and journals. 
(A) The crisis in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
(A. I) Background to the crisis 
July, 2, 1997 marked the beginning of the so called Asian crisis when Thailand 
abandoned its peg with the US dollar and let its currency (the baht) float in the 
market. Thereafter, Indonesia and Malaysia followed Thailand in floating their 
currencies under tremendous pressure of capital outflow. It is widely believed that 
the crisis in these three countries was an outcome of a series of cumulative factors 
that dated back to the late 1980s when they enjoyed unbroken high economic growth. 
These factors include explosion of liquidity, reliance on short-term external 
borrowing, mismanagement of macro-economic policy, local banking problems and 
export slow down. 
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(A.l.l) Explosion of liquidity and reliance on external borrowing 
Since 1987, economic growth in Thailand and Malaysia remained steadily high at 
about 8% per annum and 7% for Indonesia. Such steadiness in growth had attracted 
large capital inflows from Japan and continental Europe through direct investments as 
well as bank credit. Domestic investors were also allowed access to cheap offshore 
funds. Dollars flowed in at interest rates way below those offered by domestic banks. 
Many development projects too were funded by private foreign borrowing 
denominated in foreign currency. Figure 5.1 shows that the total external debt of 
Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia soared from US$9.6bn, US$22bn and US$26bn in 
1993 to US$50bn, US$55bn and US$44bn in 1997 respectively. The reliance on 
short-term external borrowing not only increased these economies' exposure to 
exchange rate risk, but it also made them more vulnerable to a sudden reversal of 
capital inflows. 
(A.l.2) Mismanagement of short-term macro-economic policy 
Despite the large influx of foreign capital, the three governments were reluctant to let 
their currencies appreciate during the boom years. Instead, they maintained an 
inflexible fixed exchange rate regime against a basket that had a high US dollar 
weighting. As a result, the exchange rates of their currencies against the US dollar 
remained constant in the 1990s until 1997 as shown in Figure 5 .2. They failed to 
recognise that misalignment of real exchange rates might occur when they were 
unable to manage demand within the limit required to validate the rate. As a result of 
such macro-economic mismanagement, there was an explosion of liquidity and much 
of this money was invested in property. 
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Figure 5.1 Total external debts of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
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(A.J.3) Banking problems- exposure to property loans 
Banks in these countries helped fuel an unsustainable burst of property development 
by lending to property developers and home buyers. For instance, Thai banks' 
exposure to property loans was about 13% of their outstanding credit in 1996. In 
Malaysia, as much as 23% of outstanding bank loans was linked to property. They 
failed to allow for the possibility that once their economies slowed down, large 
amounts of unwanted property would come on the market. Banks and newly 
established financial companies that had heavy exposure to the property market would 
be faced with huge losses on their property lending and might even become bankrupt. 
Such an economic downturn finally occurred with the slowdown in their exports. 
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Figure 5.2 Exchange rates against the US$ of the Thai baht, Malaysian ringgit and 
Indonesian rupiah 
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(A.J.4) Export slowdown 
The slowdown of exports came under the influence of three factors. First, demand 
for electronic goods, which are one of Asia's specialities, from the US was weak. This 
greatly reduced the terms of trade and sales growth in Malaysia and Thailand. 
Second, nominal exchange rates in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia appreciated 
sharply during the same year as the yen had weakened against the dollar, thus 
lowering their export competitiveness. Finally, competition from China with its 
export capacity had further aggravated the situation, resulting in the slowing down of 
exports. Overall, export growth in dollar terms dropped from 25% in 1995 to 1% in 
1996 in Thailand, from 22% to 5% in Malaysia and from 18% to 4% in Indonesia. 
This set the scene for the currency crisis in July 1997. 
(A.2) Onset of the crisis 
As mentioned before, economic slowdown in these countries would trigger 
misalignment of real exchange rates as they failed to manage demand within the limit 
required to validate the rate. It would also make local banks with heavy exposure to 
property loans face huge losses and companies relying on unhedged external 
borrowing run into difficulties in repaying their loans. This was precisely the effect of 
the economic slowdown in these countries. It raised doubts about the authorities' 
continued willingness to support the exchange rate by maintaining high interest rates 
as well as their banks' and companies' ability to repay their foreign debts. The 
sustainability of the existing exchange rate peg to a basket dominated by the US$ was 
questioned. At last in mid-May 1997, it prompted a run on the currency and on 2 
July 1997, the Thai government abandoned its peg and allowed the baht to float. As a 
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result, it suffered a sharp depreciation. Soon afterwards, pressure of capital outflow 
also forced Malaysia and Indonesia to follow Thailand in floating their currencies. 
Their stock markets fell sharply too, as a result of exchange rate weakness and high 
interest rates. By the end of August 1997, Malaysia's equity market was 11% down, 
Thailand was 10% down and Indonesian shares fell by 14%. 
(A.3) Reacting to the crisis 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) assembled a US$17bn (£10.6bn) rescue 
package to bail out Thailand after the baht was devalued under pressure in early July 
1997, on condition that it implemented a series of policy reforms. At first, the Thai 
government proceeded with the reforms cautiously. For instance, foreigners had been 
given permission to take majority control of suspended finance companies, but had to 
lower their stakes to 49% within five years. As time went on, the new Thai 
government was more ruthless in putting the country on the road to recovery. Its 
current account turned to surplus for a third time since the baht' s devaluation. As a 
result, the Thai stock market gained more than 200 points in the main Bangkok index 
in February 1998 and the baht was also up against the US dollar by 42% from its low 
ofBt57 to the US dollar. The dilemma facing Thailand now is that its currency may 
be at a level which is too strong to help its exporters and yet too weak to induce 
major capital inflows. Hence a full recovery of the Thai economy from the current 
financial crisis might still take a long time. 
Malaysia first reacted to its currency crisis by blaming foreigners for their speculative 
activities in its foreign exchange market. Since Malaysian shares can also be traded in 
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Singapore, it alleged that foreign speculators involved in short-selling of Malaysian 
shares via the Singapore's Central Limit Order. It therefore imposed sanctions by 
putting up impediments to sales and banning the short-selling of some stocks. The 
market sank as a result. Then within days, the prime minister moved policy in an 
opposite direction to open further its markets to foreigners. The short-selling ban was 
removed, and an indefinite delay put on tens of billions of ringgit worth of 
infrastructure projects. Since then Malaysian stock prices began to rise again. 
However, foreign banks and investors had lost their confidence in Malaysia as a result 
ofthe finger pointing and ad hoc rule changes within a short space of time. By now, 
Malaysia's main stock index had fallen by about 75%, more than any other index in 
the region. Its currency had also weakened nearly 40% against the US currency 
within a year, since the start of the crisis. Despite this setback, Malaysia did not ask 
for bailing out from the IMF. Instead, it recently passed legislation to control foreign 
exchange outflow from the country to halt its currency crisis. Share transactions must 
also go through the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange to avoid speculative attacks being 
conducted via other stock exchanges. 
As for Indonesia, it received US$3 7 billion from the IMF to bail it out. In return, it 
immediately waived foreign ownership restrictions and imposed selective currency 
controls in September to protect the rupiah from further depreciation and to ease 
domestic interest rates. Sixteen troubled private banks were also closed in an attempt 
to restore public confidence. Plans to merge four out of seven state-owned banks 
were also announced. However, on 6th January 1998, president Suharto presented a 
draft budget which breached IMF targets. Two days later the rupiah plunged and 
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sparked widespread social and political unrest in Indonesia calling for the president's 
resignation. In March 1998, president Suharto finally stepped down but the new 
president Habibie is a Suharto loyalist. This gave little confidence to both 
businessmen and Indonesian people of the new government's commitment to 
introduce democracy and modernise the country's economy. To date, Indonesia is still 
struggling with its social unrest as well as economic deterioration. 
(B) The financial crisis in South Korea 
(B.l) Background to the crisis 
South Korea was the next casualty of Asia's mix of competitive currency devaluation 
and financial market crisis. It was exposed to the same pressures that had beset the 
rest of the region. Its problems could be dated back to 1993 when Kim Y oung-Sam 
became President. He turned his country from a mild-recession into growth by 
encouraging Korea's giant diversified conglomerates to invest heavily in new 
factories, but its investment-led economic boom in 1994-95 incurred huge debts 
through borrowing and excess production capacity. Its total external debts rocketed 
from US$53 billion in 1993 to US$170 billion in 1997 as shown in Figure 5.3. By 
1996, over-capacity led to falling prices for the nation's main export products -
computer memory chips. The earnings of chip-makers fell by 90%. Cars, 
shipbuilding, steel and petrochemicals were also affected. Short-term foreign 
borrowing rose rapidly as they struggled to service their long-term debts. 
192 
Figure 5. 3 Total external debts of South Korea 
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Corporate collapses caused credit downgrades for many banks with heavy exposure 
to failed industrial groups. In January 1997, Hanbo Steel collapsed under $6bn in 
debts. The loans were given by banks under government pressure. In March, Kia 
Motor, the third biggest car maker in Korea asked for emergency bank loans to avoid 
bankruptcy. It was later nationalised by the government under public pressure, when 
the bank refused to forward the loan. Meanwhile, Jinro, Korea's largest liquor group 
became the third conglomerate to go bust in 1997. 
(B.2) Onset of the crisis 
The crisis began when international credit agencies began down grading ratings for 
banks with heavy exposure to troubled conglomerates. After the nationalisation of 
Kia in October 1997, Standard and Poor's, the US credit rating agency, promptly 
downgraded Korea's debt. It coincided with the speculative attack on the Hong 
Kong dollar and the crash of the stock markets in Asia. The two events then triggered 
an outflow of foreign capital. The South Korean won dropped sharply from 844 won 
per US$ to 1695 won per US$ between the end of 1996 and the end of 1997. 
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Foreign banks began refusing to roll over short-term loans to Korea and its foreign 
currency reserves started to deplete. 
(B.3) Reacting to the crisis 
The Korean government had to ask the IMF to help bail it out in December. By this 
time, Korea's short-term foreign debt was thought to be more than $100bn. IMF had 
arranged the biggest ever rescue package worth $55 billion for Korea for fear that the 
collapse of Korea, the world's eleventh largest economy, would have a significant 
impact on the rest of the world. Since then, Korea was co-operative in implementing 
the IMF' s rescue programme by: 
(i) raising the foreign ownership ceiling in listed companies to 55%. As a result, net 
foreign investment in the Seoul bourse totalled won 906 billion in January 1998 in the 
month when the restriction was first relaxed. 
(ii) approving hostile foreign take-over of Korean companies in an effort to attract 
overseas investment once overseas investors acquired 15% or more of a company's 
shares which has at least £710m worth of assets. 
(iii) keeping interest rates high at about 20% to 30% with an aim of tightening lending 
policies. 
One year on, these policies seemed to have stabilised the Korean market and 
prevented the Korean won from free fall, yet the cost to pay was high. A large 
number of workers became unemployed as inefficient and unproductive firms were 
shut down and troubled banks were merged or closed. To sum up, some underlying 
factors leading to the financial crisis in Korea were similar to those affecting Thailand, 
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Indonesia and Malaysia. These include exposure to foreign loans denominated in 
foreign currencies without hedging, over-investment and poor quality bank lending. 
However, the Korean government itself also played a major role in this crisis by 
pressurising banks to lend to inefficient firms and protecting them from becoming 
insolvent. 
(C) The financial crisis in Hong Kong 
The initial impact of Thailand's currency crisis on Hong Kong was fairly limited. In 
fact, share prices in Hong Kong soared to a new peak between July and August 1997 
when the smooth transition of Hong Kong back to China had boosted business 
confidence in the market. However, things got worse in October when Hong Kong 
was under immense speculative pressure to break its peg with the US dollar. Inter-
bank interest rates soared from 7% to 28% as the authority was determined to defend 
the peg. Property and bank stocks plummeted, bringing down the whole of the stock 
market. Then in January 1998, Peregrine Investment Holdings filed for liquidation, 
sending Hong Kong's market into turmoil. By the end of 1998, its market's value had 
dropped by more than half since its peak in July 1997. In order to prop up the market 
and to discourage speculation on Hong Kong's currency devaluation, the government 
took the unprecedented step of intervening in the stock market by using foreign 
reserves to buy blue chip stocks and imposing restrictions on short-selling in the 
futures market. Such intervention seems to be working for the time being but the 
future of Hong Kong's currency peg and its stock market performance remain 
uncertain. 
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The problems facing Hong Kong prior to the crisis could well be its 'asset bubble' as 
well as over-optimism on the part of investors. Property prices in Hong Kong are 
notoriously high thanks to the US dollar peg, which helped provide cheap borrowing 
and fuel the property boom. Investors gambled on continued growth and stability 
after the hand-over ofHong Kong back to China. At the height of the property boom 
in early 1997, house prices rose by 30%. Meanwhile, property companies were the 
leading players in the stock market boom in the summer of 1997. Suddenly, with the 
speculative pressure mounting in attacking the dollar peg and the government's 
determination to defend the peg by putting up interest rates, the property market 
slumped. A large quantity of unwanted properties came onto the market as many 
people were unable to repay their mortgages. Banks in Hong Kong, whose property 
loans exposure amounted to 44% oftheir total lending, faced huge losses as bad debts 
rocketed. Property companies' shares too fell sharply, dragging down the whole of 
the stock exchange. Thus as with Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, poor quality 
bank loans as well as market over-optimism are the underlying problems that 
precipitated a financial crisis in Hong Kong. 
(D) Singapore and Taiwan 
Singapore and Taiwan are the two countries in the region which do not share similar 
foreign debt and over-investments problems as in other regional countries. As shown 
in Figure 5.4, Singapore has had no foreign debts at all since 1995. Yet it should be 
noted that many of the regional countries in trouble like Hong Kong, Thailand, 
Malaysia and South Korea have significant trading relationships with Singapore either 
through exports or imports. The falling world demand for electronic goods might 
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also hit it hard, as the key exports of Singapore are computer peripherals as shown in 
Figure 1. 18 in Chapter One. It is thus possible that the Asian financial crisis would be 
spread to Singapore through such trading links. When the currency crisis broke out in 
Thailand in July 1997, the Singapore dollar, backed by large reserves and a large 
current account balance of payments surplus, only weakened moderately. However, 
the continual fall of neighbouring markets like Malaysia and Indonesia added pressure 
to its currency and the Singapore dollar began to slide. This could be attributed to the 
exposure of its banks to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, which accounted for 15% 
of their total assets. As Singapore has only a small amount of foreign debt, the 
currency's slide is unlikely to create massive repayment problems, as is the case for its 
neighbouring countries. 
Figure 5.4 Total external debts of Singapore and Taiwan 
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Taiwan is the only one of the Asian markets which was not seriously affected by the 
existing economic turmoil until mid 1998. There are several reasons for that. First, 
its exposure to foreign debts during the past five years has been constant at around 
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US$20 billion to US$30 billion and is less than that of other regional countries. 
Second, its banking sector is better regulated than other countries. Third, it does not 
protect inefficient companies at the expense of the economy. Instead, it allows them 
to become bankrupt and encourages new ones to spring up. Fourth, its current 
account remains healthily positive prior to the crisis as shown in Figure 1.47 in 
Chapter One. Fifth, its domestic political stability is considered more important than 
external shocks in affecting stock prices. For instance, in November 1997 when all 
other six markets in the region had experienced sharp falls, the market in Taiwan 
actually rose after the presidential election had removed uncertainty about who would 
be ruling Taiwan in the coming years. Moreover, the Taiwanese government is heavy 
handed in forbidding local brokerages from dealing with international speculators, 
thus avoiding the same sort of speculative problems experienced elsewhere in the 
regiOn. 
(Ill) Regional influence on the movements of Asian stock markets 
The Asian financial crisis itself has provided us with an opportunity to examine the 
effects of regional shocks on local markets' returns variation. However, an 
examination of regional markets inter-relationships based on an extra-ordinary event 
alone gives little understanding of the different ways the Four Tigers might relate to 
the regional and world markets following their liberalisation. Thus there is a need to 
examine regional markets inter-relationships over the pre-crisis period as well. Since 
cross-market equity investment among Asian stock markets is not common, except 
between Singapore and Malaysia, it would be interesting to find out if their substantial 
trade relations alone could generate stock market relationships. This would allow a 
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comparison to be made to the findings of Chapters Three and Four regarding the Four 
Tigers' relationships with three major world markets. 
As for the Asian financial crisis itself, interest will focus on the channels through 
which the impact of the crisis is transmitted across the region. There are three 
possible channels through which the crisis can be spread to regional markets. These 
include the pure contagion effect and fundamentals contagion effect as described in 
Chapter Four, as well as the presence of common risk factors. The pure contagion 
argument is well reflected in the remarks by Jeffiey Sachs, head of the Harvard 
Institute for International Development, on the Asian crisis: 
'There is no "fundamental" reason for Asia's financial calamity except financial panic 
itself. Asia's need for significant financial sector reform is real, but not a sufficient 
cause for the panic, and not a justification for harsh macro-economic policy 
adjustments (imposed by the IMF). Asia's fundamentals are adequate to forestall an 
economic contraction: budgets are in balance or surplus, inflation is low, private 
saving rates are high, economies are poised for export growth. Asia is reeling not 
from a crisis of fundamentals but from a self-fulfilling withdrawal of short-term loans, 
one that is fuelled by each investor's recognition that all other investors are 
withdrawing their claims. Since short-term debts exceed foreign exchange reserves, it 
is "rational" for each investor to join in the panic.' (Financial Times 4 December 
1997). 
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The fundamentals contagion effect differs from the pure contagion effect in that the 
former causes the crisis to spread indirectly across the region through their substantial 
trade relations. It involves a knock-on effect from the fall of one stock market to the 
economy of another regional country which then feeds through to its stock market as 
well. This chain effect is less to do with market psychology, but more to do with 
market expectation on the prospects of corporate earnings. 
The common risk factors argument, on the other hand, suggests that markets with 
similar problems to those facing Thailand, where the crisis first broke out, are more 
likely to see the spread of the crisis to them. These common risk factors include over-
indulgence in real estate and stock market investment, lax bank lending policies, over-
borrowing of short-term loans from foreign banks, as well as a worsening current 
account position. In fact, among the Asian markets that suffered from the crisis, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Hong Kong all shared the same problem of 
misusing financial resources. First, large amounts of money were invested in property 
and unproductive businesses in these countries. Second, banks' exposure to property 
loans was enormous, 23% in Malaysia, 44% in Hong Kong and 13% in Thailand. 
Third, they had sizeable foreign debt, for example, Korea had US$170 billion of 
foreign debts in 1997, Indonesia had US$ 55 billion, Thailand had US$ 50 billion and 
Malaysia had US$ 44 billion. Fourth, they all had current account deficits for many 
years prior to the outbreak of the crisis. Only Taiwan and Singapore had substantial 
current account surpluses year after year since 1987, as shown in Figures 1.21 and 
1. 4 7 in Chapter One. Hence there is a possibility that the presence of common risk 
factors is the major mechanism for transmitting the financial crisis across Asia. 
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An investigation into the major forces behind the transmission of the crisis could give 
some indication to investors about the length of time the crisis might last and the 
prospects of staying in or returning to the Asian stock markets. If the pure contagion 
effect is the major mechanism for the spreading of the crisis, we would expect a 
market correction, once investors realise that the market movements during the time 
of the crisis are not warranted by their economic fundamentals. On the other hand, if 
the fundamentals contagion effect is the main driving force, recovery of the markets 
would depend on the extent of their exposure to the troubled markets and the nature 
of their economic ties. Markets that are major exporters to the troubled markets 
would have to expect a longer road to recovery. Investors wishing to stay in the 
Asian markets might need to avoid those companies that have exposure to such 
economic risks. Alternatively, if common risk factors are the basis of the 
transmission, then recovery of those markets that share the common economic 
problems would depend on how efficiently they are dealt with so as to restore 
investors' confidence. Markets which do not have such common problems should be 
a better choice for foreign investors wishing to return to Asia. 
One way to determine which effect is the main driving force is to look at the intensity 
and persistence of the regional shocks, as well as the speed with which they are 
responded to by individual markets. If only the main trading partners experience a 
large impact of shocks from the troubled market, this would be an indication that the 
fundamentals contagion effect is the major force at work. However, if only those 
markets with common risk factors were significantly affected, it would indicate that 
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the presence of common risk factors is the main driving force. The finding of all 
markets responding to the same shock from one market in unison, with a similar 
degree of intensity would suggest that the pure contagion effect is the main channel 
for the spread ofthe crisis. The implication of the existence oftime lags in responding 
to regional shocks as well as a high persistence of the impact of the shocks are less 
clear cut. It would be further support for the market psychology argument, as an 
individual markets adopt a wait and see policy to take directions from other regional 
or world markets. Alternatively, it would suggest that the fundamentals contagion 
effect is at work, as it takes more time for the knock-on effects of a shock from a 
troubled market to feed through to the stock market of its trading partner. Thus in 
general, the finding of sluggish responses to, and high persistence of, regional shocks 
might indicate the presence of either one or both of the contagion effects in spreading 
the crisis. 
As a brief summary, four main issues will be investigated in this chapter. 
( 1) Is the degree of influence of a common initial shock from a troubled market 
different across regional markets? If so, why? 
(2) How persistent is a shock in affecting the regional markets' returns? 
(3) How rapidly does each market respond to the shocks arising from other regional 
markets? 
( 4) In what ways have these regional effects of shocks on the Four Tigers' stock 
markets changed from the pre-crisis period? 
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(IV) Methodology, data and sample periods 
A potential method in examining the main issues m this chapter is the vector 
autoregression (V AR) method. The variance decomposition and impulse response 
functions derived from the V AR modelling can give a descriptive picture of how the 
Asian regional markets are inter-related through a particular time period, with regard 
to the strength and persistence of the effect of a shock in one market on the other 
markets within the system. This method has been widely used in the finance literature 
on the subject of market integration. Examples include Eun & Shim (1989), 
Chowdhury (1994), Bracato (1994), Rogers (1994) and von Furstenberg and Jeon 
( 1990). A brief description of the V AR method is given below. 
(A) The empirical model 
The general form of the V AR models used to estimate the impulse response functions 
and variance decomposition are given in equation (1) below: 
(1) 
where Yr is a non-deterministic jointly covariance stationary column vector of n 
endogenous variables, that is, the daily price series of n stock markets. The n by 1 
vector of innovation terms, er, are assumed to be white noise. A(L) is a polynomial in 
the lag operator whereby A(L)yr = A1 Yr-I + A4)!1_2 + ...... + A.tJ!r-k.· The optimal lag 
lengths in model (1) is determined by minimising Akaike' s Information Criterion 
(AI C). It is a method of comparing alternative specifications by adjusting the residual 
sum of squares (RSS) for the sample size and the number of explanatory variables as 
shown in equation (2). 
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A re_ RSS(n + k) (2) 1
, - (n- k) 
where n is the sample size and k is the number of explanatory variables. The 
specification chosen is that which minimises AIC. 
Sims ( 1980) noted that an autoregressive system such as model ( 1) was difficult to 
describe, especially the coefficients of the regression equations containing complicated 
cross-equation feed-backs. He found that it was better to analyse the system's 
reaction to typical random shocks by tracing out the moving average representation of 
model (1) as shown in model (3) below. 
(3) 
where Y1 is represented as a linear combination of current and past one-step-ahead 
forecast errors or 'innovations'. 
Sims also proposed to apply the Cholesky decomposition method in (3) to purge the 
innovations in et of any contemporaneous correlation, which may be caused by 
system-wide shocks. The orthogonalised innovations obtained in this way have the 
property that they are uncorrelated both across time and across equations. In fact, it 
can be misleading to examine a shock to a single variable in isolation, when 
historically it has always moved together with several other variables. 
Orthogonalisation simply takes this eo-movement into account. 
Variance decomposition (VDC) and impulse response functions (IRF) are computed 
from the moving average representation shown in (3) with orthogonalised 
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innovations. The VDC shows the fraction of forecast error variance for each price 
series that results from its own innovations and from shocks to prices in other 
markets. As noted by Bracato, 'VDC provides a measure of the overall relative 
importance of the markets in generating the fluctuations in stock returns in their own 
and other markets. At any horizon, individual decomposition percentages will lie 
between 0 and 100 and the summation of all percentage magnitudes for a given 
horizon will be equal to 1 00. A market whose total error variances are explained 
mostly by its own shocks will produce percentage magnitudes close to 1 00; lower 
percentages will be recorded for markets whose error variances are increasingly 
accounted for by the comovement of other markets in the system.' (1994, p.649) 
Thus if a large percentage of a market's error variances is explained by its own 
shocks, it will be considered exogenous to other markets in the system. In other 
words, foreign shocks have little impact on its price variations. On the other hand, if 
the error variances are substantially accounted for by shocks in other markets, then it 
is said to be endogenous to the system. It is strongly affected by shocks from other 
markets. 
The impulse response functions (IRF) show the predictable response of each price 
series to a one-standard error shock to one of the system's prices. They can help 
measure the speed with which a shock is being transmitted to other markets and also 
its persistence over time. If the IRF remains high for a long horizon, it indicates that 
the shock is persistent and the market is sluggish in responding to the shock. 
However, impulse responses are highly non-linear functions of the estimated 
parameters, with a huge number of terms. This makes calculating confidence bands 
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by linearisation infeasible. Therefore, a Monte Carlo integration procedure is 
employed to estimate the confidence intervals for the IRFs. This procedure involves 
taking 500 draws for the coefficients and seeing how the responses change. The 
confidence interval or band will be shown as a two-standard deviation band around 
the point estimates in the diagrams. If this band includes zero, the effect of a shock is 
then considered insignificant. 
(B) Data and sample periods 
The data set in this chapter consists of the logarithm of daily price indices for seven 
Asian markets, namely the Hang Seng Price Index for Hong Kong, Straits Times 
Industrial Index for Singapore, Composite Price Index for Korea, Weighted Price 
Index for Taiwan, Kuala Lumpur Composite Price Index for Malaysia, Jakarta 
Composite Price Index for Indonesia and Bangkok Price Index for Thailand. These 
indices are the most representative indices in reflecting each market's performance. 
Raw data series are used in the analysis without pre-filtering for the day-of-the-week 
effects or autoregressive effects as had been the case in Chapters Two and Four. The 
main reason is that pre-filtering helps produce a series of unpredictable returns which 
is vital for examining the impact of news on volatility in previous chapters. As our 
focus in this chapter is on the strength and persistence of the effect of a shock from 
one market on another, instead of news impacts on volatility, pre-filtering of the data 
is not essential. 
There is one potential problem associated with investigating the strength and 
persistence of the effect of one market's innovation or shock on other markets in the 
206 
model. The substantial overlapping trading hours among the seven regional stock 
markets could make it difficult for us to distinguish whether a movement in a market 
is due to shifts in another market's fundamentals or 'herd' effects as noted in 
Chowdhury (1994 p.637). In theory, the use of non-overlapping data such as open-
close, close-open and intra-daily data could help resolve this problem. However, the 
unavailability of these types of data for the seven Asian markets means that we have 
to stick to overlapping data. The possible effects of such problems of overlapping 
data will be addressed when interpreting our empirical results. 
The V AR model will be examined over two sample periods, one starts from 1 
October 1993 to 31 July 1996 and the other is from 1 August 1996 to 31 July 1998 
with 739 and 522 observations respectively. The former represents the post-
liberalisation period for Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan which was used in 
Chapter Three when investigating the cointegrating relationship between these four 
markets and three major world markets. The latter represents the time surrounding 
the crisis period. It covers the one year period both before and after the Asian crisis 
broke out in July 1997. The reason for estimating the V AR model over two sample 
periods is that it allows us to trace possible differences in the way markets influence 
one another particularly during the recent financial crisis. An examination of the crash 
period alone cannot tell us whether the seven Asian regional markets have become 
more inter-related during the crisis, that is, whether they are more affected by other 
regional markets during the crisis than they were previously. Such a method of 
comparison is not uncommon in the finance literature looking at the issue of market 
integration. In Bracato (1994), the sample period of 1980 to 1987 is split in two 
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halves to examine if markets have become more integrated over the 1980s. Rogers 
(1994) divides his samples into three categories, before, during and after the 1987 
crash, so as to test whether the markets under investigation experienced an increase in 
volatility and price spillovers during and after the crash. 
(V) Empirical Results and Discussion 
(A) Unit roots and cointegration 
There are two reasons for carrying out unit root tests and cointegration tests on the 
daily price series of the seven Asian markets before examining the V AR model as 
shown in equation ( 1). First, the use of non-stationary variables in a regression model 
would invalidate the standard inference procedures. As we are interested in a V AR 
model for returns in this chapter, that is, the first differences of log prices, it is 
important to ensure that such returns series are stationary. Second, if prices of the 
seven Asian markets are cointegrated, the V AR model for returns will be incorrectly 
specified because the error correction term is omitted. Due to these two reasons, unit 
root tests and cointegration tests on the daily price series of the seven Asian markets 
will be carried out first. 
A unit root in the log level and the first difference of each series is tested using the 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test. A detailed discussion of the test is provided in Section 
IV part B of Chapter Three. Table 5.1 reports the unit root test statistics from the 
unit root regressions under the null hypotheses that the variables are not stationary, 
against the alternatives that they are stationary in levels or after taking first 
differences. Two lags are included in each unit root regression. The critical value for 
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all regressions without a time trend is -3.42. Results show that all daily price indices 
in both sub-sample periods are stationary in their first differences, thus they are all 
integrated of order one. 
Table 5.1 Unit Root Test Results 
(1:10:1993- 31:7:1996) (1:8:1996- 31:7:1998) 
Markets Level 1st difference Level 1st difference 
Hong Kong -2.3000 -18.157* -1.615 -23.476* 
Singapore -2.8875 -18.715* -2.219 -17.938* 
Korea -2.7948 -17.861 * -2.1414 -19.802* 
Taiwan -2.7996 -18.969* -1.6089 -22.491 * 
Thailand -2.8000 -17.620* -2.4568 -18.466* 
Indonesia -1.8874 -15.342* -2.1883 -18.481 * 
Malaysia -3.2030 -18.803* -2.2977 -19.574* 
An asterisk denotes that the null of non-stationarity in the corresponding market can 
be rejected. 
The hypothesis of no cointegration between the prices in the seven stock markets is 
then tested using the Johansen procedure. Details of the test can be found in Chapter 
Three Section IV. In Tables 5.2 and 5.3, the null hypothesis of the trace test that 
there are at most r cointegrating vectors is tested against a general alternative 
hypothesis (i.e. Ho is not true), while in the maximum eigenvalue test, the null 
hypothesis of at most r cointegrating vectors is tested against the alternative of r + 1 
cointegrating vectors. Results show that both the trace and the maximal eigenvalue 
test statistics are smaller than the 95% critical values, thus the null of no cointegration 
cannot be rejected for all markets in both periods. Thus we will proceed to the V AR 
analysis. 
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Table 5.2 Cointegration test results over the first sample period 
rank trace statistics 95% critical maximum 95% critical 
value eigenvalue value 
statistics 
r= 0 119.0084 132.45 36.9009 46.47 
r~1 82.1075 102.56 26.5125 40.53 
r~2 55.5949 75.98 21.6262 34.4 
r~3 33.9687 53.78 18.6018 28.27 
r~4 15.3669 34.87 8.8162 22.04 
r~5 6.5507 17.88 5.7669 15.87 
r~6 0.7837 9.16 0.7837 9.16 
(N.B. V ~5J is used in the cointegration test according to Akaike's Information 
Criterion) 
Table 5.3 Cointegration test results over the second sample period 
rank trace statistics 95% critical maximum 95% critical 
value eigenvalue value 
statistics 
r=O 37.08 41.5 109.3 110.0 
r ~ 1 26.32 36.4 72.67 82.5 
r~2 24.82 30.0 46.70 59.5 
r~3 10.92 23.8 22.23 39.9 
r~4 7.218 17.9 11.45 24.3 
r~5 4.299 11.4 4.328 12.5 
r~6 0.088 3.80 0.086 3.80 
(N.B. V ~ll is used in the cointegration test according to Akaike's Information 
Criterion) 
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(B) Variance decomposition results 
(B.J) Variance decomposition results over the first sample period 
Due to the strong evidence from Tables 5.1 to 5. 3 of the presence of unit roots in all 
seven markets and the absence of cointegration in the stock prices, the seven-market 
V AR model is estimated after transforming the daily price series into daily rates of 
return. The optimal lag order of five is determined using Akaike's Information 
Criterion. Point estimates of variance decomposition expressed in percentages for the 
seven stock market variables over the first sample period from 1 October 1993 to 31 
July 1996 are given in Table 5.4. A forecast horizon of 25 days is used to allow the 
dynamics of the system to work out. To conserve space, only the results for 3 
different days following the initial shocks are reported. The ordering of explanatory 
variables shown at the top of the table corresponds to the order in which each stock 
market series enters the V AR system. It is based on the closing time of each markets 
so that the effect of unexpected innovations from the closing market can be felt by 
other markets which are still open. If they have the same trading hours, then the 
market with relatively larger capitalisation will appear first. The markets listed in the 
first column represent the recipient markets of the regional shocks. The markets 
labelled at the top of the table represent the source markets of the regional shocks. 
The table should be read horizontally. Returns variation in each recipient market can 
be explained by the shocks to its own market and the other six regional markets. 
Percentages of forecast error variances of each market's returns due to shocks to 
other or the own markets on the first, fifth and tenth day after the shock are given by 
the numbers in the fourth to tenth entries of each row. The seven percentages in each 
211 
Table 5.4: Point estimates ofvariance decomposition (1.10.93-31. 7.96) 
Explained by shocks from 
Returns Days Forecast 
variation ahead standard Korea Taiwan HK Malay Sing Thai In do 
in 
Korea 
Taiwan 
HK 
Mal ay 
Sing 
Thai 
In do 
error 
1 1.07 100 
5 1.08 97.76 
10 1.08 97.76 
1 1.54 0.01 
5 1.57 0.01 
10 1.57 0.01 
1 1.51 0.28 
5 1.53 0.52 
10 1.53 0.53 
0 0 
1.09 0.00 
1.10 0.08 
99.99 0 
96.77 0.45 
96.67 0.52 
0 0 0 0 
0.15 0.18 0.80 0.02 
0.22 0.19 0.83 0.02 
0 0 0 0 
1.56 0.35 0.87 0.00 
1.57 0.35 0.86 0.01 
1.74 97.98 0 0 0 0 
1. 76 95.87 0.85 0.31 0.64 0.05 
1. 77 95.82 0.87 0.31 0.65 0.06 
1 1.33 0.04 0.86 25.47 73.63 0 0 0 
5 1.35 0.44 0.86 26.01 72.02 0.07 0.35 0.24 
10 1.35 0.46 0.87 26.01 71.95 0.07 0.35 0.29 
1 0.93 0.15 1.79 27.23 18.83 51.99 0 0 
5 0.95 0.87 1.73 27.67 18.94 49.84 0.29 0.66 
10 0.95 0.88 1.75 27.65 18.91 49.76 0.30 0.74 
1 1.36 1.10 0.38 22.24 7.16 
5 1.39 1.06 1.04 23.58 7.95 
10 1.40 1.07 1.04 23.61 8.00 
1 0.83 0.24 0.00 9.07 5.01 
5 0.89 0.27 0.03 
10 0.90 0.28 0.04 
11.07 9.31 
11.55 9.81 
1.71 67.40 0 
1.70 64.67 0.01 
1.70 64.56 0.02 
3.66 0.25 81.77 
3.35 1.66 74.32 
3.32 1.80 73.20 
(V ~5) is used based on AIC) 
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row represent the impact strength that a one-standard deviation shock from each 
source market might have on a recipient market. At any horizon, individual 
decomposition percentages will lie between 0 to 100 and the seven percentages in 
each row should sum up to 100. A market whose total error variance is explained 
mainly by its own shocks will produce a percentage magnitude close to 1 00. A 
market whose total error variance is substantially accounted for by shocks from other 
markets will have lower percentages for its own shocks. 
There are two major findings from the VDC results in Table 5.4. The first finding is 
that there is no strong evidence of the Four Tigers being significantly affected by 
regional innovations following their liberalisation except for Singapore. South Korea, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong are the most independent markets within the region while 
Singapore is found to be the market most affected by regional shocks. Variations in 
the stock returns of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong are explained mostly by 
their own innovations. They account for more than 95% of their forecast error 
variances at all time horizons shown. Only Singapore has just 50% of its variance 
accounted for by its own innovations, 27% of its error variance is accounted for by 
innovations from Hong Kong and 19% from Malaysia. Among the other three 
regional emerging markets, only Malaysia is found to have a substantial influence on 
one of the Four Tigers - Singapore. Thailand and Indonesia have only negligible 
influences on their returns. Thus the interaction between the Four Tigers and the 
three regional emerging markets is not strong. 
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The lack of response from the markets of South Korea and Taiwan to regional shocks 
could be related to its limited degree of openness and a low level of direct 
participation by regional markets. They are the least open markets among the seven 
regional markets, with foreign investment ceilings below 20% of each company's 
shares, even after their liberalisation during the sample period. Moreover, each of 
them have contingency plans to stabilise the markets. In South Korea, market 
stabilisation funds are used to prop up the market when it is too low and sell when the 
market is overheated. In Taiwan, daily price limits are used to avoid excessive price 
fluctuations. Political factors, such as its relationship with mainland China as well as 
its local and presidential election activities, are often known to have a great influence 
on its market movement. That could be why they are the least inter-active markets 
within the region. 
The insensitivity of Hong Kong to movements in other regional markets, on the other 
hand, could be attributed to its importance as a major regional financial centre after 
Japan. It is the most open market within the region and has the largest market 
capitalisation among the seven markets. Instead of being driven by the regional 
markets, most of them are taking the lead from it. For instance, shocks to Hong 
Kong account for more than 20% of returns variations in Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand and 11% for Indonesia over the sample period. Therefore, regional markets 
have no influence on the Hong Kong market at all while the opposite is true instead. 
Singapore is the market among the Four Tigers most sensitive to regional effects 
particularly from Hong Kong and Malaysia. The reason could be due to Singapore 
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being more exposed to regional financial markets and economies. For instance, as at 
31 December 199 5, 1 0 Hong Kong stocks and 112 Malaysian stocks were quoted on 
CLOB International, Singapore's over-the-counter market and 25% of the volume in 
Malaysian shares is executed on the CLOB International (Source : Stock Exchange of 
Singapore Fact Sheet, 1995 and the South China Morning Post 1 September 1998). 
This could be why nearly half of Singapore's returns variations are due to shocks to 
other markets within the region, especially from Hong Kong and Malaysia. 
As far as the three emerging Asian stock markets are concerned, only Malaysia is 
found to exert some influence on one of the Four Tigers - Singapore. This could be 
due to its substantial trade relation with Singapore and the high level of cross-market 
equity investment between them. In contrast, shocks to Thailand and Indonesia bear 
little significance in explaining returns variations in other regional markets. They 
hardly explain more than 1% of the forecast error variances of any markets in the 
region. Their relatively less developed financial systems and small market 
capitalisation could be responsible for this. Thus on the whole, the Four Tigers are 
not strongly linked with their regional markets. Regional effects have limited impact 
on their market movement before the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. 
The second major finding is that the spill-over effects of innovations from the three 
regional markets to the Four Tigers are constant over different time horizons. When 
comparing the percentages of variances in the Four Tigers which are accounted for by 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia over the three horizons, there are no noticeable 
changes. The same is true for the spill-over effects from the Four Tigers to these 
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three emerging markets. Thus the spill-over effects of regional shocks within the 
region are stable over time. The intensity of the impacts from the shocks on each 
market in the region does not seem to increase over a long horizon. This suggests 
that information contained in the innovations is fully and efficiently incorporated into 
prices from the first day they arise. Hence there is no need for the markets to adjust 
to the ways they react to the innovations in a longer horizon. 
(B. 2) Impulse response functions over the first sample period 
The impulse response functions (IRF) for the seven markets are shown in Figures 5. 5 
to 5. 11 5 . The point estimates of the IRF of each market to a one-standard deviation 
shock to other markets are represented by the solid line. The two-standard deviation 
confidence band is represented by two broken lines. If this band includes zero, the 
effect of a shock to a market is considered insignificant. The IRF results are 
consistent with the findings from VDC results. First, the interactions between the 
seven regional markets are not strong. This is manifested in the overall low level of 
responses to regional shocks from each market. Second, the effects of all regional 
shocks are not persistent, as all IRFs show signs of decaying after one or two days. 
Below is a brief description of the findings from the IRFs for each market. 
South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Figures 5.5 to 5. 7) 
Impacts of innovations from all markets on Korea's returns are neither big nor 
persistent. Responses to all regional shocks are very weak. All IRFs tail off around 
5 The response of each market to its own shock will not be shown as this chapter focuses on the 
responses of each market to other regional shocks. 
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zero one day after the shock, indicating that impacts of the shocks become 
insignificant beyond the one-day horizon. The same is true for Taiwan and Hong 
Kong in Figures 5. 6 and 5. 7. Despite the overall minimal effects on these three 
markets from other regional markets, one interesting point should be raised regarding 
the nature of the spill-over effects. Not all shocks spill over to the three markets 
contemporaneously, despite their substantial over-lapping trading hours with other 
regional markets. For instance, the peak effect ofthe shock from Thailand is felt with 
a one-day lag in South Korea. Similarly, both Hong Kong and Taiwan respond to 
shocks from Thailand and Malaysia with a one-day lag. This perhaps reflects the time 
difference between the markets' closing time when one has closed while the other is 
still trading. Thus the full effect of a shock from Thailand and Malaysia can only be 
responded to in the next day in South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Singapore (Figure 5.8) 
Shocks from Hong Kong and Malaysia have big impacts on its returns, with the peak 
effects being felt on the first day of the shock. Nevertheless, effects of these shocks 
are not persistent, as they appear to decay rapidly in one or two days' time. Shocks 
from South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia have very minimal effects on 
Singapore and they are not persistent either. 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia (Figures 5. 9 to 5. 11) 
Shocks from Hong Kong are the main source of their returns variations. Among 
them, Malaysia is the market least sensitive to shocks from the Four Tigers, whilst 
Thailand and Indonesia are the opposite. The initial impacts of shocks from the Four 
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Figure 5.5 OrthogonalisedResponse ofS. Korea to regional shocks (Oct 93 toJu/96) 
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*Number of days following a shock and the value of response to the shock are shown in 
the x-axis and y-axis respectively. 
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Figure 5.6 Orthogonalised Response of Taiwan to regional shocks (Oct 9 3 to Ju/ 96) 
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Figure 5. 7 Orthogonalised Response of HK to regional shocks (Oct 9 3 to Jul 96) 
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Figure 5.8 Orthogonalised Response of Singapore to regional shocks (Oct 93 to Jul 96) 
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Response to a shock to Taiwan 
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Figure 50 9 Orthogonalised Response of Malaysia to regional shocks (Oct 9 3 to Jul 96) 
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Figure 5.10 Orthogonalised Response of Thailand to regional shocks (Oct 93 to Jul96) 
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Figure 5.11 Orthogona/ised Response of Indonesia to regional shocks 
(Oct 93 to Ju/98) 
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Tigers on the latter two markets are noticeably bigger than on any other markets. 
Thus instead of being influential in the region, Thailand and Indonesia are in fact the 
most influenced by market movements in its neighbouring markets. 
To sum up the main findings from the VDC and IRFs over the period of October 
1993 to July 1996, there are no substantial regional effects on the market movements 
of the Four Tigers nor are the effects persistent. Adding to the results already found 
in Chapters Three and Four, a fuller picture of how the Four Tigers interact with the 
world and regional markets following their liberalisation has emerged. Among them, 
Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan seem to respond to world innovations more 
than to regional ones while the opposite is true for Singapore. Nevertheless, local 
market news or innovations are still the most important factors behind the movement 
of each market. 
(B.3) Variance decomposition results over the recent crash period 
Table 5.5 reports the VDC results for the seven Asian markets in the recent crash 
period over three different time horizons. As the point estimates beyond the 1 0-day 
horizon do not change at all, they are not reported in the table. There are two main 
observations from the results. First, regional markets appear to be more interactive 
during the crisis than in the first sample period. Returns variations in all seven markets 
are increasingly accounted for by shocks from other markets, regardless of whether 
they share the common risk problems faced by the troubled markets or not. There are 
differences though, in the extent of impacts the shocks have on individual markets. 
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Table 5.5: Point estimates of variance decomposition (1.8.96-31. 7.98) 
Explained by shocks from 
Returns Days Forecast 
variation ahead standard Korea Taiwan HK Mal ay Sing Thai In do 
m error 
Korea 1 2.40 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 2.53 92.66 1.60 1.30 0.27 1.72 1.15 1.32 
10 2.59 89.64 2.27 2.30 0.60 1.79 1.82 1.62 
Taiwan 1 1.29 0.84 99.16 0 0 0 0 0 
HK 
5 
10 
1 
5 
10 
1.39 3.54 86.65 5.68 2.22 0.64 0.16 1.10 
1.40 3.58 85.46 5.80 2.38 0.88 0.64 1.26 
2.06 0.94 5.60 93.46 0 0 0 0 
2.27 4.74 6.34 82.86 0.94 0.86 1.24 3.03 
2.31 5.20 6.43 80.91 1.06 1.06 1.37 3.96 
Malay 1 2.02 3.61 3.84 11.33 81.21 0 0 0 
Sing 
Thai 
In do 
5 
10 
1 
2.24 5.93 3.47 
2.28 6.22 4.63 
1.47 0.20 5.21 
16.80 66.41 2.21 
16.99 64.43 2.59 
1.75 3.42 
1.72 3.41 
31.86 3.66 59.07 0 0 
5 1.64 1.74 4.69 34.47 5.81 48.94 0.27 4.08 
10 1.66 1.84 5.20 33.97 6.24 48.07 0.60 4.08 
1 2.09 2.85 1.97 5.68 1.64 4.52 83.33 0 
5 2.27 8.33 2.55 6.68 2.01 4.84 74.27 1.32 
10 2.30 8.27 3.09 7.19 2.09 5.45 72.42 1.48 
1 
5 
10 
1.91 1.01 1.95 
2.13 6.11 2.27 
2.21 6.27 4.07 
12.43 2.48 3.31 1.93 77.89 
13.56 3.08 4.84 3.10 67.05 
13.46 4.07 5.37 3.28 63.48 
(V ~5) is used based on AIC) 
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Second, effects ofthe regional shocks on each market have intensified over time. The 
percentages of variances in each local market accounted for by regional shocks 
become larger from day 1 to day 10 after they arise. These observations have 
important implications on the major channels through which the crisis spread across 
the region. 
(B. 3. 1) Increasing inter-dependence among the Asian markets during the crisis 
The stronger interactions among the seven Asian markets during the financial crisis 
can be shown by the increasing importance of shocks from each Asian market in 
explaining returns variations of one another. For instance, before the crisis, shocks 
from South Korea and Taiwan hardly explained more than 1% of returns variations in 
other markets. During the crisis, they account for 3% to 8% of their variances over 
the 10-day horizon. For Hong Kong, shocks from the other six markets seldom 
explained more than 1% of its returns variation before the crisis. Now, their impacts 
could be as high as 5.8%. For Singapore, shocks from Hong Kong and Malaysia 
used to have a dominant influence on its market movements before the crisis. Now, 
the sources of influence are more diversified and include Taiwan, Indonesia and South 
Korea as well. Similarly in Malaysia, the dominant role of influence from Hong 
Kong, which used to account for 26% of its returns variations, has been eroded. 
Instead, shocks from all other six markets have a larger percentage impact on it 
during the crisis. They account for 18% of its forecast variances in aggregate while 
that for Hong Kong has dropped to 17%. Indonesia was the least influential market 
in the region before the crisis, with its shocks on the whole having a minute impact of 
0.05% on the forecast variances of other markets. Now during the crisis, its impacts 
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have reached to as high as 1.5% to 4%. The only market which shows an overall 
reduction in the spill-over effects of regional shocks over the crisis period is Thailand. 
Before the crisis, regional shocks, most of which were from Hong Kong, account for 
about 35% of its forecast variances in aggregate over the 10-day horizon. Now 
during the crisis, they only account for 28% in aggregate. 
Such a changing pattern of interaction among the seven markets over the recent 
financial crisis period has provided further insights into the forces that are at work 
during the crisis. In particular, there is little support for the argument that the Asian 
crisis is spread across the region simply through the common risk factors. Markets 
such as Taiwan and Singapore that do not have similar economic problems facing 
many troubled markets, such as Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, have also 
experienced increasing spill-over effects from markets around the region. Moreover, 
the spill-over effects from the troubled markets could be far less than the effects from 
those markets without the common economic and financial problems. Again take 
Taiwan as an example, its shocks have stronger impacts on Hong Kong and Singapore 
than those from South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. Thus the common risk factors 
argument is not sufficient in explaining the spread of the Asian crisis throughout the 
regton. 
(B.3.2) Intensifying spill-over effects from regional markets 
The second major observation from Table 5.5, the intensification of regional spill-over 
effects to individual markets over time, can be illustrated by the decreasing influence 
of own market innovations in explaining returns variations. The percentages of 
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variances accounted for by own market innovations in all seven markets have dropped 
by 10% to 17% from day 1 to day 10. For instance, on day 1, own market 
innovations account for 100%, 99%, 93% and 59% of returns variations in South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore respectively. By day 10, they have 
dropped to 89%, 85%, 80% and 48% respectively. Such a decrease is made up for by 
an intensification of influence from other regional shocks. For instance, in Korea no 
regional shocks have any impacts on its returns on day 1. Now over a 10-day 
horizon, shocks to all six regional markets each account for 1% to 2% of its returns 
variation. In Taiwan, less than 1% of its returns variation is explained by shocks to 
other regional markets on day 1. On day 10, however, the percentages have increased 
to as high as 5.8%. In Hong Kong, there are little or no spill-over effects from all 
regional markets except Taiwan on day 1, but on day 10, they explain 11% of its 
returns variations in aggregate. In Singapore, the impacts from Malaysia and 
Indonesia have doubled and quadrupled respectively over the 1 0-day horizon while 
the increase from other markets is much less. 
The implication of such intensifying regional effects is that the spread of the crisis 
might be driven by market contagion and/or trade effects. As all the seven markets 
have substantial over-lapping trading hours, relevant information contained in the 
innovations from one market should be incorporated into prices immediately in 
another market. The fact that the same shocks could exert more influence on other 
markets as time passes indicates that there is a time-lag for the full effects of the 
regional shocks to be transmitted across the regional markets. This time-lag might 
suggest the existence of knock-on effects of the shocks on the markets' economies, 
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which could only be felt over a longer time horizon. Alternatively, such an 
intensification of regional effects over time could be caused by 'herd' effects. That is, 
there could be a tendency for markets to wait and see how others react to the shocks 
before responding to them. This situation may arise when there is uncertainty over 
the extent of effects that the shocks might have in affecting other parts of the world. 
The substantial over-lapping trading hours among the seven Asian markets may also 
suggest that the intensified regional effects on each market is related not only to the 
original shocks, but to the reactions on shocks from other markets as well. 
(B. 4) Impulse response functions over the recent crash period 
The IRF results for the period surrounding the Asian crisis are very much in line with 
the VDC results. There are three major findings from Figures 5.12 to 5.18. First, 
Asian markets are more responsive to regional shocks during the crisis. Second, 
effects of regional shocks on each local market are more persistent. Third, some 
regional shocks are transmitted with time-lags. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that either market psychology and/or the fundamentals contagion effect might 
be at work in spreading the crisis across the region. A brief description of each 
market's response to regional shocks is given below. 
South Korea (Figure 5.12) 
Returns in South Korea are not responsive to shocks from Taiwan and Malaysia, as 
the two-standard deviation confidence band represented by the two broken lines 
includes zero from the first day of the shocks. Responses to the shocks from Hong 
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Kong, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia appear to become significant only after the 
second, third or fifth day of the initial shock as the confidence bands do not include 
zero over these time horizons. Thus indicating that there is a time-lag for South 
Korea to respond to some of the regional shocks. 
Taiwan (Figure 5.13) 
Returns in Taiwan are not responsive to shocks from Singapore, Thailand nor 
Indonesia. Responses to shocks from South Korea, Hong Kong and Malaysia are 
significant. However, the peak effect of shocks from Malaysia is transmitted to 
Taiwan with a four-day lag while fresh responses to the shocks from South Korea and 
Hong Kong recur on the fourth and third day respectively after the effects die down 
on the second day. 
Hong Kong (Figure 5.14) 
Returns in Hong Kong do not have a significant response to shocks from Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand. Responses to shocks from Taiwan, South Korea and 
Indonesia are sluggish. The peak effect of a Korean shock is felt on the first and 
fourth day while that of an Indonesian shock is felt on the second and fifth day. The 
effect of a shock from Taiwan also shows signs of recurring on the third day after 
decaying on the second day. 
Singapore (Figure 5.15) 
Returns in Singapore do not appear to have a significant response to shocks from 
Thailand. The response to shocks from Taiwan is efficient in that the shocks are 
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Figure 5.12 Orthogona/ised Response of S.Korea to regional shocks (Aug 96 to Ju/98) 
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Figure 5.13 Orthogonalised Response of Taiwan to regional shocks (Aug 96 to Jul 98) 
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Figure 5.14 Orthogona/ised Response of HK to regional shocks (Aug 96 to Ju/98) 
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Figure 5.15 Orthogonalised Response of Singapore to regional shocks 
(Aug 96 to Jul 98) 
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Response to a shock to Taiwan 
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Figure 5.16 Orthogona/ised Response of Malaysia to regional shocks (Aug 96 to Ju/98) 
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Figure 5.17 Orthogonalised Response of Thailand to regional shocks (Aug 96 to Jul 98) 
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Figure 5.18 Orthoganalised Response of Indonesia to regional shocks 
(Aug 96 to Jul 98) 
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transmitted to Singapore on the same day. Transmission of shocks from Hong Kong, 
Malaysia and Indonesia lasts for three, two and four days respectively before the 
responses finally become insignificant. The peak effects of the shocks from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Malaysia are felt on the same day, but on the first and second day 
respectively for shocks from South Korea and Indonesia. 
Malaysia (Figure 5.16) 
Returns in Malaysia are responsive to shocks from all over the region albeit with a 
varying degree. The response to a Thailand shock is marginally significant while the 
response to a Hong Kong shock is the strongest. As regards the length of time taken 
for regional shocks to be transmitted to Malaysia, only a shock from Taiwan is 
transmitted within the same day. Shocks from Singapore and Indonesia are 
transmitted with a one-day lag, whilst the transmission of shocks from South Korea, 
Hong Kong and Thailand takes two to four days before the responses become 
completely insignificant. 
Thailand (Figure 5.17) 
Similar to Malaysia, returns to Thailand are responsive to all regional shocks. Shocks 
from Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia are transmitted within the same day, while the 
shock from Indonesia is transmitted with a one-day lag. Responses to shocks from 
South Korea and Hong Kong are more sluggish, for it takes them on and off for three 
days to be transmitted to Thailand. 
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Indonesia (Figure 5.18) 
Returns of Indonesia are responsive to all regional shocks, particularly to shocks from 
Hong Kong followed by Malaysia and Singapore. The peak effects of the shocks are 
transmitted on the same day for shocks from Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, 
but with a one-day lag for shocks from South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The 
effects of shocks from Hong Kong and Malaysia are more persistent and last for three 
to four days while others last for two days. 
To sum up, there are three special features of the findings from Figures 5.12 to 5.18. 
First is that all seven markets are now more responsive to shocks from around the 
region than they were before the crisis. Second, the impacts of regional shocks are 
becoming more persistent during the crisis than before. Recalling the IRF results from 
Figures 5. 5 to 5. 11, the transmission of regional shocks normally takes place within 
one day. Now during the crisis period, the impacts of some shocks could last for up 
to 5 days. Third, there are time-lags for markets to respond to regional shocks even 
when the markets involved are located in the same international time zone. There is 
also evidence of a rising response to shocks a few days after it falls or becoming 
insignificant in some markets. All these suggest that either the pure market contagion 
effect and/or the fundamentals contagion effect through the presence of substantial 
trade relations is at work during the crisis. The pure contagion effect could manifest 
itself in the form of herd effects, whereby Asian markets react not only to a shock 
itself, but to other markets' reaction to the same shock as well, particularly the 
western markets. Since they open after the Asian markets are closed, their responses 
to the Asian shocks will only be known to the Asian markets with a one-day lag. 
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Taking directions from these western responses, which may either help aggravate or 
alleviate the situation, there could be a need for the Asian markets to adjust their 
response to the original shock. That could be why impacts of the regional shocks 
have become more persistent and the peak effects of some shocks are transmitted with 
time-lags. Alternatively, the persistence of some regional shocks and the sluggish 
response by some markets could be attributed to the fundamentals contagion effect. 
Due to the presence of substantial trade relations among the seven markets, the fall of 
one or more markets could trigger a wave of knock-on effects on the economies of 
their trading partners, which then feed through to their stock markets as well. Such a 
process of an indirect transmission of market shocks to other regional markets might 
take longer to complete as regional markets need more time to digest the innovations 
and assess their implications on their economies. This could result in the increasing 
persistence of regional shocks and a hesitant response to the shocks during the crisis. 
(VI) Conclusion 
The inter-relationships between the Four Tigers and three emerging markets in Asia 
are investigated using the V AR methodology over two sample periods representing 
the time before and during the recent Asian financial crisis. Results from the variance 
decompositions and impulse response functions derived from the V AR model suggest 
that there is no strong interaction between the seven markets before the crisis. 
Returns variations in Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan are mostly explained by 
their own innovations. Innovations from the three emerging markets namely 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have just negligible impacts on them. Only 
Singapore is found to be more responsive to innovations from both Hong Kong and 
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Malaysia. This has been attributed to the fact that Singapore has more exposure to 
these two markets than to others. During the Asian financial crisis period, 
interactions between the seven markets become much stronger. Every market is 
becoming more responsive to innovations from around the region, regardless of 
whether they share the same economic and financial problems facing the troubled 
markets such as South Korea and Thailand. There is also strong evidence of 
intensifying effects of the same regional shocks on each market over time during the 
crisis period. This suggests that the regional shocks have more persistent effects than 
those before the crisis and the regional markets are less efficient in incorporating such 
information into prices. Findings from the impulse response functions for the seven 
markets show a similar picture of persistent shocks and sluggish response. All these 
indicate that the Asian financial crisis is not spread through common risk factors, nor 
should the flight of foreign capital be blamed as the major cause of the crisis. 
Instead, a combination of a pure contagion effect and a fundamentals contagion effect 
could be at work during the crisis that has caused a wide-spread downfall of the Asian 
stock markets. It might not take long for the pure contagion effect to diminish once 
investors realise that their panic reaction to other markets' reaction is not justified by 
economic fundamentals. However, full recovery of the Asian markets to their pre-
crisis levels is still remote as most Asian economies have dramatically slowed down or 
even slipped into recession. Thus international investors wishing to return to Asia 
now might need to be thinking of long term investment instead of profit taking in the 
short-term. 
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Chapter Six : Conclusion 
The last ten years have seen a remarkable rise and fall of Asian economies as well as 
the growth and slump of their stock markets. It provides a good opportunity to 
examine how price and volatility behaviour of the Asian markets and their 
relationships with other world markets might have changed over time. There are two 
major events in particular that could have special implications to their market 
behaviour in the past ten years. One is liberalising their markets to allow or 
encourage foreign direct participation and the other is the outbreak of the Asian 
financial crisis. The investigation of market behaviour of four Asian countries as well 
as their inter-relationships with other major world markets and regional markets thus 
revolves around these two events. It has been the fear of some Asian governments 
that opening up of their markets for foreign investment would risk being led by major 
markets. This in turn might cause market instability as the chances of price and 
volatility spill-over from them become higher. An empirical investigation into the 
changing volatility behaviour of individual markets as well as their inter-relationships 
with other world markets following liberalisation could help provide evidence to 
support or refute this argument. Meanwhile, international investors would also be 
able to assess whether there exist the benefits of risk diversification by investing into 
Asian markets if they are found to be increasingly integrated with other world 
markets. 
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The Four Tigers in Asia, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, 
are the markets whose price and volatility behaviour are the major interests of this 
thesis. Hong Kong is the most open market of all, while Singapore is one of the least 
restricted markets in Asia, although real opportunities for foreign participation might 
be lacking. South Korea and Taiwan are newly opened markets and still have tight 
restrictions in place on foreign direct participation. Apart from their varying degrees 
of market openness, they also have different economic structures. Hong Kong's 
economy is based on the service and financial sectors; Singapore relies on 
manufacturing and service sectors, whilst South Korea and Taiwan emphasise 
manufacturing industries. Nonetheless, all four of them have experienced substantial 
economic growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The surge of foreign equity 
capital from international investors seeking higher investment returns has also led to 
substantial growth in their stock markets. An examination of these four markets 
could thus provide further insights into the possible effects that differing degrees of 
market openness and different economic structures might have in affecting their 
market relationships with others. 
The overall finding of the thesis is that the nature and structure of volatility in 
individual markets have changed over the past ten years with the increase in foreign 
participation. Volatility is more a reflection of rapid impounding of information into 
prices through better informed trading rather than noise trading activities as before. 
However, their relationships with three world major markets, the US, the UK and 
Japan, are not getting much stronger. There is no evidence to suggest that their 
prices are being increasingly led by the world markets, nor is their volatility becoming 
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more sensitive to foreign news. The presence of cross-market stock investment is 
thus argued as not being a necessary pre-condition for price and volatility spill-over to 
the four Asian Tigers. Instead, such spill-over effects are more determined by their 
differing policies towards intervening in the stock markets and the level of trading 
links they have with the world markets. Their price and volatility relationships with 
three regional markets, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, are not particularly strong 
either, until recently when the Asian financial crisis has made them more responsive to 
shocks from one another. This has been attributed to the presence of market 
contagion, both pure contagion and fundamentals contagion, that is at work during 
the crisis which help spread the crisis across the region. A brief summary of the 
findings from each Chapter is given below. 
After giving an account of the economic and financial developments in the Four 
Tigers in Chapter One, Chapter Two looks at the changing nature and structure of 
volatility in each individual market. The unpredictable daily returns series of the four 
markets are each fitted into an asymmetric GARCH model along the lines advanced 
by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1989) to capture the possible asymmetric 
response of volatility to negative news. The presence of negative news asymmetries 
has been argued as an indication of a noise trading effect rather than the leverage 
effect. Results show that there are indeed negative news asymmetries in the four 
markets and such asymmetries have reduced following their liberalisation. This is 
interpreted as an indication of a reduction in the impact of noise trading activities, 
with an increasing participation of foreign investors that helps improve the impact of 
informed trading within these markets. Thus volatility in the four individual markets 
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following their liberalisation should not be seen as detrimental, since it is now more 
related to the impounding of information into prices rather than noise trading 
activities. 
In Chapter Three, the price relationships between the Four Tigers and three major 
world markets, the US, the UK and Japan, are examined. The focus is on whether a 
closer international price relationship has also been enhanced through an increasing 
participation of foreign investors in the four markets. Weekly price series of the seven 
markets are fitted into a Johansen cointegration framework over the pre- and post-
liberalisation periods to mitigate the problem of overlapping trading hours of the Four 
Tigers. No cointegrating relationship exists during the first period while one is found 
during the second period. Nevertheless, only Hong Kong, Taiwan and the UK are 
found to enter significantly into this cointegrating relationship following their 
liberalisation. Their prices adjust to the price discrepancies from one another too in 
the short-run to maintain such a long-run relationship. The lack of significant 
cointegration of South Korea and Singapore with any of the major markets is 
attributed to their governments' influence over the movements of their stock markets 
and/or the limited actual investment opportunities available to foreign investors. The 
lack of a significant long-run relationship between Japan and the US to any of the 
Four Tigers, on the other hand, is attributed to their low level of actual participation 
in these markets as well as their changing economic conditions at home. Thus only 
the UK is found to be more related to Hong Kong and Taiwan following their 
liberalisation. 
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The lack of a significant long-run relationship between some of the seven markets 
does not preclude the possibility that they might be related to each other in the short-
run. Therefore in Chapter Four, the issue of whether foreign news impacts on the 
volatility of the Four Tigers in the short-run is investigated. The unpredictable daily 
returns series of the four markets are each fitted into a GJR type GARCH model with 
lagged news from each of the three major markets included one at a time. Apart from 
finding whether the Four Tigers and the three major world markets are inter-related 
through volatility spill-over, another purpose of the investigation is to establish the 
channels through which the spill-over effects are transmitted. Results indicate the 
presence of volatility spill-over from the three major world markets to the Four Tigers 
even before South Korea and Taiwan were opened to foreign direct participation. 
Meanwhile, market liberalisation in Hong Kong and Singpapore does not seem to 
have intensified the spill-over effects from the overseas markets. This is suggestive 
that the presence of cross-market direct investment is not the key mechanism for 
volatility transmission. Instead, foreign news could impact on their stock markets 
indirectly through trading links. However, the exact way in which foreign negative 
and positive news impacts on the local markets depends much on the nature of the 
economic ties they have with the foreign countries. The actual size of the impacts on 
each local market does vary according to the different levels of foreign direct 
participation in the local markets. Thus the forces behind cross-market volatility 
transmission are manifold and inter-related themselves. 
With the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in July 1997, an investigation into the 
regional market inter-relationships in Chapter Five is in part related to this extra-
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ordinary event. The way the Four Tigers interact with three regional emergmg 
markets, namely Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, is examined from a different 
perspective. Instead of looking at the impact of foreign news on local market 
volatility, the intensity and persistence of regional shocks in explaining returns 
variations in the Four Tigers are addressed. Daily returns from the seven markets are 
fitted into a seven dimensional vector autoregression model over two sample periods 
before and during the Asian crisis. Variance decomposition and impulse response 
functions are derived from the V AR model on which the interpretations of regional 
market inter-relationships are based. Results for the period before the crisis suggest 
that there is little interaction between the Four Tigers and the three regional emerging 
markets except for Singapore which is found to be responsive to shocks from both 
Hong Kong and Malaysia. The effects of regional shocks are not found to be 
persistent either. However all these have changed during the crisis. There are 
stronger interactions among regional markets. Effects of regional shocks on each 
individual market, regardless of whether they share the common economic problems 
facing all troubled markets or not, have all intensified over a long horizon. Responses 
to the shocks, however, are slow and uncertain. It is thus argued that market 
contagion is at work to spread the crisis across the region during this period. Without 
such an extraordinary event, the Four Tigers are not found to be more closely inter-
related with the regional markets than with the world's major stock markets even 
after opening their markets to foreign participation. 
The implication of the findings from this thesis on the Asian governments' policies 
towards their stock markets is clear. Increased foreign direct participation in their 
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markets should not be seen as detrimental to their stability. Activities of foreign 
investors have not made their markets more volatile nor more reliant on the lead of 
foreign markets. Just the opposite, they have helped bring better informed trading to 
their markets. Their investment in high communication technology not only enhances 
international information flow but also facilitates them to adjust their global 
investment strategies efficiently. Thus, in a way, their presence has helped reduce the 
impact of noise trading activities in the Asian developing markets. The spill-over of 
volatility from foreign markets could happen with or without foreign direct 
participation in the stock markets. The economic ties they have with overseas 
countries are able to help transmit foreign market volatility to their local markets 
indirectly through the knock-on effects to their economies. In the end, the major 
source of their market volatility comes not from overseas markets but from within the 
local markets. Hence the Asian governments should continue opening their markets 
to tap the pool of international investment capital. Meanwhile, they should 
concentrate on the efficient use of acquired resources on profitable investments and 
ensure a sound management of their macroeconomics so as to attract further 
investments from international investors. Returning to the old path of a closed-door 
policy by shutting off foreign investors could help little to improve their stock market 
developments now or in the future. 
The findings of this thesis have pointed at least three ways in which future research on 
the stock markets of the Four Tigers and/or other emerging stock market could be 
undertaken. First, the changing nature of volatility in individual Asian markets 
following their liberalisation suggests that emerging stock markets in other parts of 
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the world, such as the Middle East, South America and Eastern Europe, may also 
experience similar changes. If this was true, it would support the argument that stock 
market liberalisation is beneficial rather than detrimental to the operation of the 
markets concerned. Second, as volatility of stock prices in the stock exchanges of the 
Four Tigers was found to respond to both local and foreign innovations, it would be 
useful if such volatility could be predicted. In the past few years, a number of studies 
examining the predictability of volatility in the capital markets were made. These 
include Fleming et. al. (1995), Jorion (1995) and Franses and van Dijk (1996), to 
name a few. An investigation into the predictability of stock price volatility in the 
Four Tigers could help provide more insights for the local governments to determine 
whether there is any need to regulate the activities of both local and foreign investors. 
Last but not least, with the gradual recovery of the stock markets in Asia from the 
beginning of 1999, it would be interesting to investigate the factors contributing to 
their recovery. While some countries, such as South Korea and Thailand, continued 
to ease their restrictions on foreign investment in their stock markets during the Asian 
financial crisis, other countries, such as Malaysia, Taiwan and Hong Kong, tightened 
their restrictions and even intervened in their markets. It thus provides us with an 
opportunity to assess the effectiveness of these two differing government policies in 
affecting the recovery of their stock markets. This could also help the local Asian 
governments design policies to manage their stock markets in the future. 
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